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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
( i ) GEOGRAPHICAL JaJD HISTORICAIi SETTING t 
Kuwait s tre tching over an area of about 17#818 aqaare km. 
( including 2,590 square km. o£ part ioned or Neatraa zone) , l i e s 
i n the north-west c » a s t of Persian Gulf, ^ I t l i e s between the 
l a t i t u d e s 28° and 3 0 ^ and between the l ong i tades 46° and 48°W. 
On the north and west i t i s bounded with 240 Ion wi th Iraq, and 
t o the south and south-west i t shares i t s borders of 255 km, with 
Saudi Arabia. To the e a s t i t has a c o a s t l i n e of 290 km. along the 
Gulf.^ A l a r g e port ion of i t s c o a s t l i n e of 199 km. l i e s along the 
"Kuwait Bay". In addit ion, there ^ r e a d a number of i s l a n d s 
extending the Kuwaiti t e r r i t o r y . Of these i s l a n d s , Bubiyan, warba, 
Faaiakha, uram Al-Maradem, Umm An-Namil, KUbbar, Miskan and Qaru 
4 
are famcMis for d i f f e r e n t reasons . Failakha i s the most populated 
and b e a u t i f u l whi le Bubiyan i s the l a r g e s t and mostly uninhabited. 
Kuwait has hot and dry c l imate and observes r e l a t i v e l y cold 
winters with low average r a i n f a l l . There i s wide f l u c t u a t i o n i n 
1, Olie Econcmist I n t e l l i g e n c e Unit , Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l 
Review i Kuwait* Annuial'"3ippiem«it, l 5 « 5 , p , 2 , 
2 . Ministry of Information t Kuwait, Fac t s and Figures* 
1984, p . 1 5 . 
3 , The Economist i n t e l l i g e n c e Unit , op . c i t . , p ,2 
4 . Alessa shanilan Y., The Maxipower Pi^^^lein^^n Kuwait, 
Kegan Paal—Internation^, London, 1^61 
tORtpexrature varying between 45 c in JUly and 8°c in January, The 
desert diinate features a high rate o£ eva^oratican and an inter-
mitteat ra in fa l l . iSie average annual rainfal l i s 115 ran. 
Frequent sandstorms which are ccsanon in suiamer cause much inconve-
nience. 
i 
Kuwait having an old history of i t s inception^ the written | 
aocoonts of which aire scarce. Apoordlng to Laurence Lockhart, 
the entire history of Kuwait can be divided into f ive stagesr viz.« I 
(1) ancient (11) early i s lan lc (111) medieval (iv) modem, and 
6 t 
(v) present dynasty. 
l!hB record of the establishment unfolds that the history of 
7 
ancient times begins with the Greeik settlemrant around B.C.600. 
This can be Ixiferred from the Qre^ writings Inscaribed on a stone 
found in 1937, in the wall of a building situated in south-east 
of the v i l l age of As»-zar on north-west coast of Failakha Island in 
Kuwait, the early period of Islam I s ascribed to A.D. 633 with 
the victory of a rauslim General Khalld Itoiu'l waleed over Arab 
hos t l l e s to Islam and the Sasanlan dynasty. He had cssngped at 
Kasana which turned to be the battleground of the lousllm 
5. Ministry of Information i now a l t , Op. c l t . , 
6. LocOchart, Laurence; "Outline of the KLstory of Kowait**, 
Joornal of Royal central Asian society? 
vo l , XXXIV, Parts 3 and 4, OUly-Octdber 1947, 
P, 262. 
7. Al-sabah, Y,s ,F„ Tiie Oil Econorny of Kuwaitt Kegam Paul 
International, London, 1980, p . l . 
Arabs and the Persians, The victory of Arabs brought about the 
conversion of the Persians to Islam which la ter e^^anded up to the 
g 
Far East, Portuguese are said to have profitted by their good 
aKiahorage in Kawait Bay and constructed a fort in the island 
"Al-Qurain* (the l i t t l e h o m ) , ^ The name of KavaitJsa dirninuiive 
of the Arabic word "al-Kou-tf*, which means a house bu i l t in the form 
11 
of a fortress and surrounded by the smaller houses. 
The history of modem Kuwait dates back to A,D 1716 when 
many families of Aneiiza tribe migrated from north-central Arabia 
and set t led down on the southern shore of iOawait Bay, predominantly 
ca l l ed Ras al-Ajuza (the c ^ e of old woman). The present dynasty 
was founded by these migrants when they decided to choi^ their ruler 
one sabah Abu Abdullah as their Sheikh in 1756. Tlie town was 
reported to have a some of 10,000 prosperous inhaijitants, possessing 
about 800 ve s se l s to carryout fishing and pearling to earn their 
l ive l ihood. ^^  
IQtiwait i s reported to have come into contact with Brit ish 
in 1776 when the war between Turkey and Persia (presently known as 
Iran) broke-out* and Basra(jn Drag) was captured by the Persians and 
8 , liOcMiart* liaurence, op. c i t . , p.263 
9. Al-sabah, Y.S.F.> Op. c i t . , p . l 
10. Lockhart, Laurence, p.263. 
11. Ministry of Information t iOawait; Op. c i t 
12. Lockhart, Laurence, Pp.. c i t , , P. 263. 
r 
t3 
remained under their control t i l l 1779. The Brit ish came into 
contact with Kuwait through their East Xhdia company which stretched 
their south-eastern mall rout to Ale|>po v ia Rawait instead o£ Basra 
and much of the trade of Basra was directed to Rowait. OSience-
fortlv the sa e^dkh of iOiiwait £>ieikh Abdullah was said to have beccme 
very attach with Bri t i sh when temporarily transferred the ir agency 
from Basra to Kuwait. 
l%e Geographical location of Kuwait made i t an ideal place 
of the Arabian peninsula and la ter tsumed to be a s ignif icant trade 
cent]^ for tiie desert caravans cazzying various goods across t h i s 
region to Europe throxigh XL«^po and other ports . The geographical 
posit ion gave i t a p o l i t i c a l significance in the eyes of major 
powers. 
ttiere Kuwait had i t s significance in the strategic and geog-
raqphical terms on the one hand, i t was thought to have vast mineral 
resources beneath i t s earth on the other. The discovery of o i l in 
Persia snatched the attention of the big powers which la ter 
exploited the entire region, Kawait* afterward, turned to be the 
veritable bone of ccsatenticm amongst Britain, lUrkey, Russia emd 
Qexraany. As a resu l t of clashes in the interest of these powers, 
13. i b i d . , p.264. 
14. The Middle Bast and North Africa, Earopa Publications, 
London, 1984-65, p.474. 
15. Lockhart, Laurence, pp. cit., p.264, 
16. AL-sabah, Y.S.F., op^cit., p.2. 
BrltaiB had to inc l ined t o «ign a t r e a t y with mwa i t on Janaary 23, 
1899, in order to sadEeguard her i n t e r e s t s i n t h i s regicm. Under 
the t r ea ty , the sbeikh of nawait was bound not to c e ^ or l ease 
otherwise diispose o£ any p a r t of h i s t e r r i t o r y t o anyoneelse except 
the B r i t i s h go'vemment, nor to en te r any relat icoiship with a foreign 
17 
govensooent without t h e i r con s a l t . By t h i s t r e a t y i t appears tha t 
not only B r i t i s h were a f ra id of los ing t h e i r ground in t h i s region 
due to the increasing i n t e r e s t of o ther powers laut Ruiwait was also 
a f ra id of being merged in the 'ilurldLsh suzerain t y . To avoid such a 
vulnerable s i t u a t i o n and mt l l l fy the impact of other powers, both 
the governments inc l ined t o Join t h e i r hands. In turn, B r i t i s h 
promised t o give t h e i r p ro tec t ion to Kuwait. Thus, the t r e a t y was 
signed and proved t o be the base of Oil Concession Agreement which 
was signed between the two count r i es as fa r back as on 23rd Decetaber 
1934. Others a l so began to take keen I n t e r e s t In ge t t ing o i l 
concessional r i g h t s from Kuwait a s they esierged meanwhile. But Axe 
to the t r e a ty of 1899 and B r i t i s h stronghold, they could no t get 
success in t h e i r mission except jo in ing t h e i r hands with B r i t i s h . 
American i n t e r e s t through t h e i r Qulf Oil corporation (Q.O.c) showed 
the same in ten t ion of pu t t i ng t h e i r s t ^ s in t h i s region. B r i t i s h 
government, in order to Jaeep the area under t h e i r control , had 
appointed t h e i r P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Hawait, responsible to mediate 
between the Kuwait and the B r i t i s h government through her Po l i t i ca l 
Resident, s ta t ioned a t Bushire, ®^ 
17, chisholm, A.H,T,, The F i r s t Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement, 
Frank casas, Loncbn, i^^TT:^ 
Lockhart, Laurence, op. d t . , p . 270. 
r^  
filnce the o i l pzospects were Icnoim in th i s region. British, 
through their Jttiglo Persian Oil Conpany (APOC) had in i t ia ted nego-
t ia t ing with Kuwait to get o i l concessional r ights . Their negotia-
t ions went on throughout the period f rcan l 9 l l to l934. l!he 
arrival of Major Prank KJlraes of Eastern and General syndicate 
(BGS) a «ub«tdiary of Oulf Qtl Corporation, interrupted the negotia-
t ions going on between Bri t i sh and Kuwait for o i l concessional 
r ights , 
IGS not only began negotiations separately with the gheil<h 
of Kuwait but put him in a dilonma, 'SUneXr involvement created an 
atmosphere of strong bargaining between Kuwait and Bri t i sh and 
^odLKh's posit ion afterward became strong, ultimately Brit ish hsui 
to arrive a consensus with BOS and r e v i v e their negotiations for 
o i l concessions with the ir hands joined with tl^m. cn 23rd 
December 1934, jo in t ef forts of Bri t i sh and Americans through their 
eqaailly shared Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) proved frui t fu l when an 
Agrea:nent of Oil Concessional Rights was signed between Klxwait and 
KOC. 
On JUne 19, 1961, the treaty of 1899 was terminated and 
19 Kymalt becane an indep^ident s ta te . The sheikh of Wiwait took 
the new t i t l e of "Amir" and the state was admitted as a new member 
of League of Arab Nations, Thenceforth, a constitutional monarchy 
i s hereditarily descending in Kuwait with an alternatively taken 
over ais Amir from one of the two l i n e s of Al-Sabah family. The 
present Amir i s Sheikh Jabar Al-Ahnad Al-sabah, who had succeeded 
19, The Middle East and North Africa, Europa Publications, 
London, 1984-85, p. 4 75. 
the l a t e Amir Sheikh sabah Al-salirn in Decentoer 1977. The h e i r -
apperent takes over as crown prince and prime Minister who 
p r e s e n t l y i s igheikh saad Abdullah Al-Salim Al-sabah, ^ The f i r s t 
e l e c t i o n held i n 1963, two years a f t e r the independence, on a very 
l i i o i t ed franchise for the 50 meidbers liatLonal Assembly. However, 
the Assanbly was a rubber stamping body u n t i l 1976 when the oppo-
s i t i o n gxxstips became stronger and tlie Assentoly was disbanned for 
f i v e years . In t h i s way, the l e g i s l a t i v e authori ty i s ves ted in 
Amir, whi le execut ive power i s v e s t e d cwsslusively in the ^ i r 
22 
and h i s counci l o f Min i s ters , 
Kuwait, s ince the discovery of o i l aaid mineral resource;^ 
ha^ turned t o be a r i c h s t a t e of the Gtilf, The hige o i l revenues 
have brought a trerooidous upsurge in the economy, Rrofoxandly exit-
flow of o i l i s abundantly inflowing revenues against i t . The hage 
o i l revenues s t eered the e n t i r e s t a t e t o be well advanced. The 
s o c i e t y has t a m e d to be an open one and i s enjoying every sophis -
t icat icoi of uptodate s c i e n t i f i c and technolog ica l invent ions and 
r o l l i n g in wealth. Means of transportat ion and conuirjiication are 
of high standard. Though there i s l a c k of ra i lways but the induce-
ment of l a t e s t designed motor v e h i c l e s has never made i t think 
towards that a ide. Communication system i s h ighly t echno log ica l ly 
20, Economist I n t e l l i g e n c e u n i t . Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l Revlewi 
Kuwait, Op. c i t . , PTT, 
2 1 , i ^ i d . , p , 3 . 
22, Ministry of Informatics t Kuwait, Op. c i t , , p,3 6. 
equipped aand can cx»npete with almoat every western syartem. I t has, 
no obubt, c rea ted an atmosphere of intimacy amcmg the Ktiwaitis and 
people a l l around, Kuwait i s proper ly l inked with the oa ter world 
through i t s high standard a i r l ine /mar ine l i n e and oomnunication 
network. Hospitals and hea l th c e n t r e s are well equipped with 
l a t e s t iioplements and equipments t o take the hea l th care of the 
people . To improve the l i t e r a c y r a t e of the s t a t e , the government 
has es taMished a nuaber of i n s t i t u t i o n s including a Univers i ty 
which provide education from Kindergarten to the higher l e v e l . 
Education i s t o t a l l y f ree in iOytwait. Thus, pa>ple enjoy every 
sopMst ica t ion of the moC^xn e ra , 
( i i ) DEMOQBAPHIC CHIRACIERISTICS j 
p r i o r to the year 1957# ttiere had never a census been 
ccxQducted in iQuiwait. In the f i r s t census, a s i t i s evident from 
the t a b l e t ha t the poptilation was estimated a t 2,06,8S1, out of 
t h i s there were 1,13,622 <S5 per cent) Rawaitls population 
increased by 55,48 per cent VBpix> 1961, 45,3 per c ^ t upto 1965 
and 58 pe r cent upto 1970. The nuiriber of I ^wa i t i s declined to 
50 per cent i n 1961, 47 .1 pe r cent i n 196S and 47 p e r cent in 1970 
agains t the number of e ^ a t r l a i ^ s which increased to 53 per cent 
of the t o t a l in 1970, Population Increased tremendously due to 
the increasing o i l revenues which in turn crea ted employment oppor-
t u n i t i e s in a l l the s ec to r s of tlrie econaaay. Total labour force 
of the country stood a t 17,300 in 1965, out of t h i s figure, 
80,7 per cent were non-KUwaitis, However, the ntaitiber of Kuwaiti 
woxkers increased marginally which fur ther dropped to 18,7 per cent. 
TABLE - 1.1 
Tota l Populaticaa and Labour-Force of Kuwait % 1957~1985 
( D i s t r i b u t i o n by N a t i o n a l i t y ) 
Tota l Kuwait i Non- Tota l 
Popula- Kuwait i Labour-
t i o n fo rce 
Kuwaiti Non-
Labour Kuwaiti 
a s % of Labour 
t o t a l as % of 
1957 206851 113,622 92851 
1965 467339 220,059 247280 17300 19.3 80 .7 
1970 738662 347,396 391266 242100 32 .7 26 .9 73.1 
1975 994837 472,088 522749 304500 30 ,6 3 0 , 1 69.9 
1980 1357952 565,613 792339 484033 35 ,6 21 .3 78.7 
1985 1695128 679,601 105527 662588 39.0 18.7 81,2 
sou rces t (i) Alessa , shanilan y , "The Manpower Problems in Kuwait, 
London, 1981, p , 1 3 . 
9 
Cii) I3m Middle Eas t and Nor th Afr ica , Eurppa P u b l i -
c a t i o n s , London, 1984-85, p , 4 8 3 . 
( i i i ) The Econan is t I n t e l l i g e n c e Unit* Qua r t e r l y s t a t i s -
t i c a l Review t Kuwait, Annual sapplement, 1985, 
Londont p . 6 . 
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in 1985, The tota l population of KUvait was estimated at 16,95,128 
in 1985 and the tota l nuniber of workers were 6, 62, 588, out of 
which 81,2 per cent were non-Kuwaitis, I t can be observed frcn 
the table that the total workforce has ever been increasing. Though 
the foreign labour force have always over numbered the loca l s but 
increased with s l ight variat ions, D^endence on es^atriates s t i l l 
continues. This leads to a conclusion that the foreign labour 
force i s the result of lack of indigeneous ski l led workers and huge 
investnients and industrial es^ansion which happened only due to 
the abundant o i l resources in the country. 
( i i i ) ECCHQMIC SIGNIFICANCE t 
within a span of four decades since the discovery of o i l , 
the Kuwaiti economy has transformed i t s e l f and i s ccmsidered as 
one of the most affluent country in the world. I t has ^cipped from 
the traditional modes of production and communication to the upto-
date ones, l^e i^waiti econcny has been ireckoned as one of the 
top per capita income economies in the world. However, the 
structure of the economy i s typical and exhibits many features of 
an under developed society l i k e high per capita income aoconpanied 
with skewed inccxae distribution, lack of developed financial i n s t i -
tutions and high rate of i l l i t r a c y e t c . Therefore, on account of 
sectoral and faictoral imbeULances the eccmomy suffers from economic 
dualism. Broadly peaking, the Kuwaiti economy i s divided into 
two sectors (i) 'Oil sector and <ii) 'Non-oil' sectors. I t i s 
raalmydependent upon ' o i l ' sector because of i t s greater 
contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) as th i s sector 
alone const i tutes for about 51 per cent to the G.D.P and over 
90 per cent of export eaxnuing in the country even today. 
The o i l - s ec tor i s not only ain engine of growth* but i t i s 
destined to be a leader among the sectors activating the process 
of development. I t i s the o i l - s ec tor that i s the principal dynamic 
of d0velO|»Qent in the case of i^wait. No other sector occupies 
23 
such a dominant posit ion and influences as strongly and widely. 
The 'non-oi l ' sectors coiabines different sub-sectors such 
as Agriculture and Fisheries, Manufacturing; construction; Elec-
t r i c i t y ; Gas and water; Wholesale and Retail Trades; Trani^port, 
Storage and cx>mmunication; Financial Inst i tut ions and Insurance. 
Among these. Agriculture which generally happens to be the primary 
sector in developing countries, constituted with Fisheries merely 
0,66 per cent of the G.D.P. in 1985, due to the scarcity of arable 
land. Fishing, Pearling and Boat-building a l l have suffered from 
the increased wage rates induced by the growth of o i l industry, 
modem seacvicea sector, ccnsnexrce and Goverxuoent* services sector 
absorbs over 80 per cent of the tota l man-po%fer while Coranerce and 
Construction sectors en^loy moderately. The ' o i l sector' i s a 
23, sayigh# VUsif Abdella; The Economies of the Arab world, 
CXocKi Helm, Lex:don, 1978, p, 136. 
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TflCLS " 1,2 
Distributloia o£ G . P . P . Between o i l and Non-oil 
STCtory~7l970»ig85 
( Mill ion DinarBJ" 
year o i l sector % share Non-oil % share Total 
i n G.D.p sector in G . D . P G . D . P 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
618.8 
906.7 
913.5 
994,1 
3020.0 
2456,6 
2519,7 
2477.3 
2527.3 
4417.91 
5059.23 
4117.76 
2805.56 
3089,29 
3425.66 
2983.16 
60.3 
65,6 
62,3 
61.9 
79.2 
70,4 
65.6 
61.0 
59.3 
65.7 
66.9 
59 .6 
45 .7 
4 9 . 1 
52 ,1 
50.2 
407.5 
475 .1 
550.5 
610.0 
792.9 
1030.4 
1320.0 
1579.6 
1733.1 
2305,8 
2696.61 
2785.94 
3328.29 
3202.38 
3149.03 
2951.74 
39 .7 
34.4 
37 .7 
38 .1 
20,8 
29 .6 
34,4 
39,0 
4 1 , 7 
34.3 
33 ,1 
41 ,4 
54 ,3 
50 ,9 
4 7 . 9 
49 ,8 
1026,3 
1381,8 
14 64.0 
1604.1 
3812,9 
3487.0 
3839.6 
4056.9 
4260.4 
6723.8 
7555.84 
6903.70 
6133.85 
6291.66 
6574.69 
5934.90 
sources t (i) Cwitral sank of Kawait; iSie Kuwaiti Economyt 
1980-1984, p.155 
( i i ) Ca:itral Bank of Kuwaiti Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l 
Bul le t in ; JUly - September, 1986, Vol.l3,No.3,p.43 . 
( i i i ) cen t ra l Bank of Kuwaiti Oiar te r ly s t a t i s t i c a l BoDetin, 
October-December, 1987,vol. 14,No,4, p .57 . 
I <t 
capital intensive and absorbs a marginal workforce. There are a 
very few Items which are maraifactared In the country amd the 
Manufacturing sector constituted only 6.47 per cent of the total 
G,D,P. In 1985. 
Heavy d^endence of the econoray on *oll* sector which 
accounted 50,2 per cent of the G.D, P. on the one hand and the 
progress of •non-oil ' sectors which constittited the roraalning 49.3 
per cent of the Q.D.P. in 1985, mainly depending direct ly or 
indirect ly on '(^l* on the other hand, are the indicators of seo-
•toral iinbalances. Absorption of expatriates and greater reliance 
on foreign workforce, abundance of capital , scarcity of indistr ia l 
raw material, low infrai-structure, lack of domestic market for the 
indigenous prodacts and laurk of ccnducive indastrlal atrooatphere 
show the signs of underwdevelqc»nent. 
T3iough the •oil» sector i s the key determinant of progress 
of the economy but the 'n(xv*oll* sector has also made sc»ne progress 
recently. I t cam be ascribed from I t s share of 54,3 per cent of 
the G.D .P. held in 1982 at current pr ices while surpassed Oil 
sec tor ' s share. This shows that despite being dependent on o i l 
revenues, the 'non-oi l ' sector has proved viable to become self-
sustained to some extent. Inducan^&t of o i l revenues and growing 
nationalian have put 'non-oi l ' sector in a positican that i t helds 
a share of 49,8 per cent in G.D,P. at current pr ices but i t s 
contribution to the country's export was only 9,7 per cent of the 
total in 1985, Of the 'non-oil' sectors. Wholesale and Retail 
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trades helcl a share of 6,98 per cent of the G.D.P. followed by the 
Manufacturing with 6,47 per cent« Financial inat i tat icmB with 3,7 
per cent. Transport, storage and Ctonmjunications wi th 4,36 per cent, 
msurance with only 0,32 per cent and Construction wi th 3 ,57 per 
cent of the G.D.P. This, the sub-sec tors of the ' n o n - o i l ' sector 
erven as a whole c o n s t i t a t e l e s s than the share of ' o i l ' sector 
which s t i l l jremains as the backbone of the economy. The development 
and growth of 'ncan-oil' sec tor as a whole depends upon the progress 
of • o i l • s ec tor , 
(iv) IMPORTWCE OF OIL SECTOR » 
There seems nothing scapt i ca l that the transfoznnation of 
the economy i s the outcome of the discovery of o i l and i t s v a s t 
u t i l i z a t i o n as the main source of revenue to the s t a t e . I t i s a 
non-renewable source of energy which has des t ined the s t a t e within a 
short period of tiiue. The e x p l o i t a t i o n of o i l downs the l e v e l s 
of re serves beneath the earth and increases i t s s c a r c i t y , QLl 
indastry has transformed the economy of Wiwalt i n such a way where 
the people used to t rave l on camel's back accross the wideflanged 
deser t are now moving in R o l l s Royce and the s o c i e t y demonstrates 
a l l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a f f luence . Oil dominates a separate sector 
i n Kawaiti econcany ccflastituting a share of more than 50 per cent 
i n the Oross Deraostlc Product and more than 90 per c « i t in the 
country ' s t o t a l esqport earning even today. The ' o i l ' sector has 
encouraged the other s e c t o r s of the economy t o surv ive . Owing to 
the abtindant o i l revenues, the economy has moved i n upward 
r? 
direction. This sector i s the backbone of the economy and i t has 
enabled the state to absorb a large aniount of foreign labour-force 
and meet every requirements either by producing indigenously or by 
importing. The capacity of the state to invest viithin i t s ^ f or 
in foreign lands has highly improved. Through i t s vast o i l 
revenues^ ioavait has been successful in establishing and maintaining 
socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l af fa irs with the outer world. Thus, 
o i l i s the central figure of the economy and requires attention of 
everyone, 
(v) PLJtfl OF STUDY I 
m th is 8tud7, an attempt has been made to evaluate the 
importance of o i l sector and eacpose the vedues of the o i l revenues 
which have brought about a drastic change in the economy and trans-
formed the state in i t s present status. I t i s tindisputable that 
i t had become poss ible atHy after the discovery of o i l . The 
upstremn operations of o i l has outflowed o i l revenues through 
downstream operations. After the discovery of o i l and natural gas, 
thera emerged a separate ' o i l ' sector, which had proved to be a 
stimulator in the overadl development of the economy. iSie socio-
economic plans and programmes have brought the country in a strong 
and reputable condition primarily because of inflow of o i l receipts . 
The o i l sector i s the key determinent of econraaic a c t i v i t i e s and 
i s the nucleus of the economy that every sector revolves around i t . 
The study has been divid«KL into f ive chapters dealing with 
different a ^ e c t s of the o i l industry in the country. 
•Aie f i r s t c h ^ t e r reviews the geographical and histozrlcal 
slgnlflcaance o£ the Kuwaiti economy as also deals with the economic 
characterist ics of the country. I t also highlights the role of 
the o i l sector to provide the bas i s for further invest igat ions . 
m the second chapter an effort to reappraise the histo-
rical baclcgxDund to the long drawn negotiations for o i l con-
cessional r ights has been undertalcen so that the importance of the 
o i l sector i s understood in a proper p e r f e c t i v e . 
The third chapter ecandnes the development of o i l indastry 
since i t s Incqption in terras of various indicators and norms. On 
the basis of the analysis we have arrieved at some relevant 
conclusion. 
The fo\jrth chapter draews the attention towards the main 
period of the development of o i l indmstry, daring which the prices 
of o i l witnessed sharp fluctuations in the international o i l 
market. A detai led analysis of entire developments in the o i l 
market during the scope of the stmdy has been undertaken. lUne 
roles of CfPEC and OAPEC have also been highlighted in th i s r e j e c t . 
Our approach to the problem has been s t a t i s t i c a l . In the l a s t 
chapter, we smn-i;?) the main finding of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
OIL DISCOVERY AND EMERGENCE 
OF MODERN KUWAIT 
n 
OIL DISCOVERY AK3 EMEROa^ CE OP MODERN KITWAIT 
( i ) A BRIEF HISTORY OF OIL JWOSTRY 
(a) Growing B r l t l B h I n t e r e g t t 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n the s t a t e of KUvjait s t r e t c h e s back t o 
1976 when i t came unde r t h e P e r s i a i n f l u e n c e , t h e t r a d e and the 
i n t e b i t a n t s had d i v e r s i f i e d from Basra t o Kuwait. I t was none b u t 
the B r i t i s h E a s t Ind ia conpany which made Kuwait i n s t e a d of Basrah, 
t h e i r sou th -Eas t e rn d e s e r t m a i l - r o u t e t o Aleppo, an arrangement 
t h a t l a s t e d fo r a number of y e a r s . By t h i s means t h e B r i t i s h f i r s t 
cajue i n t o c o n t a c t w i th Kuwait and i t s r u l e r s . Since then the 
Sheikh of Kuwait had become "very a t t a c h e d " t o t h e B r i t i s h , In 1792, 
the c o n t a c t between t h e two c o u n t r i e s (Kuwait and B r i t a i n ) became 
even c l o s e r , when the Eas t I n d i a Company, i n consequence of t h e 
v e x a t i o u s b e h a v i o u r of Turk ish a u t h o r i t i e s , t en^ora i r i l y t r a n s f e r r e d 
i t s agency frcan Basrah to Kuwait. This , t h e l o c a t i o n of 
KuWciit was f i r s t cons ide red of much s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
L a t e r i n 1862-63 the importance of Kuwait i n c r e a s e d f u r t h e r 
when a B r i t i s h t o u r i s t "Pa lg rave" b o a s t e d i t s v a l u e s a s i t was be ing 
r u l e d by " I s a " a prudent r u l e r , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h e p o l i c y were 
1, Lockhar t , Laurence, " O u t l i n e of t h e H i s t o r y of Kuwait", 
Journa l of Royal C e n t r a l Asian s t u d i e s Socie ty , 
v o l , XXXIV, P a r t s » 3 and 4 , JUly^October 1947, 
P. 264. 
good, import du t i e s were low, b e t t e r anchorage and sk i l l ed mariners 
were ava i l ab l e . Inhab i tan t s being rausliin Arabs, t o l e r a n t s to 
other anti-wahabis were strong enough for i n t r u d e r s j n i t s rnercan-
2 
t i l e and p o l i t i c a l aspect t h i s town formed a s e a - o u t l e t . 
Apart from stepping i n the s t a t e , the re were some other 
f ac to r s a lso which motivated B r i t i s h to take much i n t e r e s t in i t 
such as - the growing German i n t e r e s t as i t had covetous eye over 
the s t a t e to e s t a b l i s h a railway, running accross the region 
(pa r t i cu l a r ly over Kuwait) frcsn Berl in to Baghdad, which clashed 
with the B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t . By reasons of i t s geographical s i tua -
t ion, Kuwait became a. vearitable bone of ccmtenticxi between Turkey, 
Russia, Germany and Great Br i ta in and i t was a lso d i r e c t l y involved 
in the g rea t s t ruggle for sc^erernacy between the r i va l houses of 
saad and Ibn-Rashld who had covetous eyes over the po r t of Kuwait 
3 
t o use i t for t h e i r t rade purposes. Later i n 1898 the same 
i n t e r e s t developed i n Russians who were said to have covetous eye 
over Kuwaiti po r t s as t h e i r coaling s t a t i o n s , and wanted to e s t -
a b l i s h a railway from Mediterraneaffi coast to Kuwait, This th rea t 
of Russian in t rus ion added to the B r i t i s h concern about Kuwait, 
But u l t ima te ly in September 1897, the s i t u a t i o n tuimed in favour of 
B r i t i s h government tha t a f t e r being much entangled, the r u l e r of 
Kuwait sheikh Mubarak asked for B r i t i s h pro tec t ion because of the 
2, i b i d . , p . 267 
3 , i b i d . , p,268 
growing dangers, but the B r i t i s h government urged him to remain 
under the lu rk i sg a i ze ra in ty . The saroe request was made even 
a f t e r a year but met with the same i r ^ l y . But events soon occxirred 
which turned B r i t i s h government t o change i t s view and these th rea t s 
r e su l t ed in her concluding a t r e a t y with Kuwait on January 23,1899, 
whereby the r u l e r of Kuwait tindcrtook never the cede or lease any 
por t ion of his t e r r i t o r y to any foreign government or nat ional 
except with the eyepxeos author izat ion of the B r i t i s h government, 
5 in re tu rn . Sheikh was assured of B r i t i s h p ro tec t ion in case of need, 
Afterward, the t r e a t y proved to be f r u i t f u l for the B r i t i s h | 
government when in 1900 a pa r ty of rai lway engineers under Herr j 
Sterarich, the German Consul-General accsompanied t h e i r m i l i t a r y 
at tache a t Constantinople, who was to repor t on s t r a t e g i c matters , 
arrived Kuwait to car ry out « survey of the route to be traversed 
by the Baghdad Railway to the Persian Giaf, They were courteously 
received by the sheikh but the t r e a t y proved to be of much favour 
in Br i t a in as the Sheikh mindful of h i s t r ea ty ob l iga t ions to 
Great Br i t a in and d i s t r u s t f u l of Germany's motives disregarded the 
lav i sh promises, he p o l i t e l y but f irmly refused the offer . This 
shows much of h i s l oya l t y towards the B r i t i s h government and 
Sheikh's firm decision making a t t i t u d e , Ttereupon, undeterred 
Germany by t h i s r^auff, i n c i t e d her a l l y Turkey ti> se ize Kuwait, 
i b i d . , p ,2 68 
i b i d , , p, 268 
Ib id , , p . 268 ff. 
sheikh Mubarak, defeated by Ibn Rashid, was not in a p o s i t i o n to 
r e s i s t . But the B r i t i s h kept t h e i r promises a l i v e by sending her 
cru i se in the Bay of Kuwait as rece ived the warning of Turkish 
i n t e n t i o n s and l a t e r TVxrkey had to withdraw as the troops steamed 
7 
i n t o Kuwait Bay in t h e i r c r u i s e r . This was another defeat of 
foreign i n t e r e s t s in Kuwait and the success of B r i t i s h stronghold 
over i t . Thereafter, a few other attempts too were made abortive 
and thus the Great Britadj:i could succeed i n n u l l i f y i n g the foreign 
impacts but not to ul t imate ex tent . 
(b) B r i t i s h Po l i cy Towards Kuwait t 
The growing B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t never detached from i t s pace 
because of wide f langed B r i t i s h colony accross the region and the 
s t a t e of Kuwait. The B r i t i s h government never ignored the p r i o r i t y 
of the ir i n t e r e s t and keeping the matter i n t o considerat ion. This, 
the v iceroy of India , Lord Curzcxi in November 1903 was sent to 
t h i s regicffi who included i n Kuwait h i s v i s i t , Cn h i s return t o 
India , he arranged f o r the appointment of a P o l i t i c a l Agent in 
Kuwait, a s tep that l e d to an i n e f f e c t u a l p r o t e s t by Turkey.® The 
p o l i c y was wel l enunciated by h&cd Lansdown, the secretary of 
State for India, in h i s speech i n the House of Lords on May 5,1903, 
True t o h i s views a^a t 
7. I b i d . , p . 269, 
8 . i b i d . , p . 270. 
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" I t seems t o me t h a t our pol icy should be 
d i rec ted in the f i r » t place to p ro t ec t 
and prcntote B r i t i s h t rade in those v a t e r s . 
In the next p lace , I do not think , , , . 
t h a t . . , . those e f f o r t s should be d i rec ted 
towards the exclusion of l eg i t ima te t rade 
of other Powers, In the t h i r d place - I 
say i t without he s i t a t i on - we should 
regard the establishonent of naval-base or 
of a f o r t i f i ed po r t in the Persian Gulf 
by any other Power as a very grave menace 
to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and we should ce r - | 
t a i n l y r e s i s t i t wi th a l l the means a t oar j 
disposal" / j 
with the Br i t i sh a t t i t u d e , Oextnan made no fur ther endeavour j 
•to obtain a foothold in Kuwait and Turkey abandoned her p lans . In 
1907, Russia concluded an agrearaoat with Great Br i ta in in regard 
with t h e i r respec t ive spheres of i n t e r e s t s in the region. Later, 
the negot ia t ions were s t a r t e d between Turkey and Br i ta in which 
resu l ted in to a t r e a t y (29 July 1912 ,^ which provided with the recog-
n i t i on of B r i t i s h t r e a t y with Kuwait, t e r r i t o r i e s of the sheikh were 
to be autoncxroous, Turkey would not extend Baghdad Railway to the 
10 
south of Basra without B r i t i s h consent. But t h i s agreement was 
not r a t i f i e d owing to the out-break of war between the two 
count r ies , s i t ua t i on fur ther aggravated with the outbreak of ^orld 
war I . I t made the region as a whole ' a bone of con-tention' 
amongst the Big Powers, because of i t s s t r a t e g i c loca t ion . The 
ea^erience of world war I c l e a r l y demonstrated the s t r a t e g i c iirpor-
tance of the region and the decis iveness of o i l in the prosecution 
I b i d , , p . 270. 
ib id . , p. 270 
of a war, a c lash betweai the B r i t i s h and Americans fo r the f r u i t s 
of the v i c to ry in the form of o i l . In t h i s grim s i tua t ion , the 
pro tec t ion of the small s t a t e s could only be poss ib l e while 
rianained under the B r i t i s h aupereroacy which u l t ima te ly succeeded in 
turning the table in her favour by having a firm gr ip over a l a rge r 
p a r t of the region. The B r i t i s h pos i t ion edived u n t i l the s t a t e s 
became independent in d i f fe ren t s tages of t ime. Kuwait remained 
as B r i t i s h p ro tec to ra t e u n t i l 1961 when i t became an independent 
s t a t e . The t r ea ty of 1899 l a s t e d t i l l 1961, 
^^) Oil prospects and BacHground to concession Agreement x 
The prospects of o i l in Kuwait had beoi known i n the 
beginning of the century and i t s importance and need always 
increased day by day, since the time B r i t i s h began to take 
i n t e r e s t in the Middle-Eastern region in generad amd the Gulf i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , a s e r i e s of negot ia t ions were undertaken, for the o i l 
concessions. Anglo Persian CCLl Company (APOC) a t t ha t time, the 
sole owner of the Persian concession and j o i n t owner of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC), was the prime mover in obtaining the 
Kuwait concession, APOC, predic t ing of o i l resources along the 
coast of Gulf, on November 3, l 9 i l , asked the B r i t i s h Po l i t i c a l 
Resident a t Bushire. Sir Percy cox, whether an o i l concession was 
obtainable from the Sheikh of Kuwait, If t h i s were the case, i t 
wished to apply for a prospecting l i cence on behalf of the company. 
But the p o l i t i c a l Resident rep l ied tha t the condit ions in the 
Persian Gulf were f u l l of menace for such an appl ica t ion to be 
11 put forward. Bat In 1912 when the s i tuation turned peaceful 
and f aroural^e, the Po l i t i ca l Agent in Kuwait had again approached 
the sheikh on the same l i n e s , who gave h i s consent -to make a survey. 
Receiving the favourable reieponse from Kawait, s ir Winston 
Chirchill , as Head of the Admiralty, appointed a commission named 
"Slade ccaramission" headed by Admiral E.J.W, Slade. This 
commission v i s i t e d Kuwait in Novenrber I9l3, consisted of well-
12 known Geologists, among thorn there was one Mr, Janes of APOC, 
11, chisholm, Archibald H.T,, The F i r s t Kawait Oil concession 
Agreement t A Record ot the Negotiations i 
i s 11-1934, Frank Cass, London, 1975, p ,3 , 
12, ibid. , p,l2 
The Firs t Kuwait Oil Concession Affireemept t 
This document i s a written record of the negotiations taken 
place between 1911 and 1934, amongst the Oil conpanies, Brit ish 
government and the sheikhs of KUwed.t, All the informaticns 
regarding Riwait QLl concessicm in this documait, divided into 
three parts i 
1. chronology * All the events are in dhronological 
order (Year-wise) 
^^* R^oord • All the records of events are based 
cm four chapters as s-
(a) Chapiter - 1 i <feloven4>er l 9 n to June 1923) 
(b) Chapter - 2 t (July 1923 to May 1932) (c) chapter - 3 « (June 1932 to Pehruary 1934) (d) chapter - 4 i (February 1934 to December 1934) 
i l l , Notes t I t cons i s t s of 159 notes. 
'^> 
Ihe ccnsnlssion a l s o met Sheildi Mubarsik as-sabah. The coinrnlssion 
made a prel iminary survey cf seepages of bi tomai . In i t s report, the 
commission a s se s sed the area ' s o i l chances as h igh ly cpeculat ive 
though on the whole 'not favourable' , and recommended the central 
13 p la in of Bxirgaoi a s the b e s t s i t e f o r t e s t d r i l l i n g . However, 
in 1914, APOC sent a gecAogist t o Kuvait t o i n j e c t the seepages 
a t Bxirgan and Bahra, but owing t o the outSsreak of the world war I , 
i t was not u n t i l 1917 that the oonpany was granted permission by 
Sheikh salim (successor of sheikh Jaber 1915) who had succeeded 
Sheikh Mubarak ear ly in 1917, because of the i r deaths) to make i t s 
14 f i r s t g e o l o g i c a l survey i n Kuwait, Though, i n accordance with the 
1899 treaty , APCX: had to seek permission to n e g o t i a t e for o i l r i g h t s 
i n Kuwait, but due t o the d i f f i c u l t war condit ions , the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident (Bushire) advised postponeraent. vHth the passage of time, 
the s i t u a t i o n turned calm and peaceful and i t allowed the APOC 
to apply t o the B r i t i s h foreign o f f i c e , which was dealing the 
a f f a i r s for the o i l concess ion, covering e n t i r e o i l d e p o s i t s . But 
the resett lement amd the peace t r e a t i e s in the Middle East prevented 
any progress wi th t h i s appl i ca t ion u n t i l APOC reminded the B r i t i s h 
Foreign Office in May 1921 of t h e i r appl i ca t ion which received a 
br ie f acknowledgement in JUne of the same year, s ta t ing that a 
further ccnuunication would fol ic*/ i n due course and i t needed 
15 
another reminder from APOC, APOC sent another reminder in 
13. i b i d . , p , 3 , 
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October 1921. In I t s response in December^ the B r i t i s h Colonial 
Office informed APOC t h a t the negot ia t ions would be i n due course 
arranged by the P o l i t i c a l Resident, TaJcing the advantage at 
f i r s t hand, the B r i t i s h jvimiralty through i t s P o l i t i c a l Agent in 
Kuwait, i n i t i a t e d negotiaticais with the Sheikh in January 1923 
APOC had not any p r i o r information of submitting applicatican by 
the P o l i t i c a l /igent on behalf of the Coinpany, The teiras were 
proposed by the Adoniralty included a payment of P . 10,000 
(upprox, £ 750) for a two-years explorat ion l icence , covering a l l 
Kuwaiti t e r r i t o r y , followcsd by a two year prospecting l icence for 
a s imi lar p a r e n t , covering se lec ted areas, followed by a mining 
lease , covering a maximuun of 100,000 ac res i n not more than 3 
blocks, for a per iod to be negot ia ted dciring which a royal ty would 
be payable of Rs, 3,8 pe r ton of crude o i l produced with a minimim 
of Rs,30,000 p , a . This roya l ty would be subject to review a f t e r 
ten years . Imports necessary for c^erating the concession were 
to be f r ee of a l l taxes and custom du t i e s for the f i r s t ten years 
only. ^^ 
The Sheikh i n i t i a l l y favoured APOC for i t s es^lora t ion and 
proapecting l i cences but not to the mining l ea se for which the 
Conpany had proposed 1^ ,3 Annas 8 per ton roya l ty on crude o i l , he 
did not l i k e , but suggested ins tead 29^ roya l ty on net crude o i l P 
16, i b i d , , p . 9 1 . 
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Inapi-to of her repreaenta t ion by the P o l i t i c a l Agent* APOC had 
some objecticms in the pz»posed draf t concession and these proposed 
terms remained under discussion between APOC and Nbr Majesty's 
Government (H.M.G,) and the P o l i t i c a l Resident in the Gulf, and 
a l so between the P o l i t i c a l Agent and shoilch Ahmad in Kuwait, cn 
March 8,1923, the Company (APOC) provided the P o l i t i c a l Agent with 
a d ra f t concession agreement as a ba s i s of fur ther negot ia t ions 
including a l l h i s proposed modificat ions except h i s suggested 
18 
a l t e r a t i o n in the royal ty b a s i s . The d ra f t of the o i l concession 
proposed by APOC, cons i s t s of 17 a r t i c l e s , presented to the sheikh 
in JUne 1923, who in h i s response, informed the P o l i t i c a l Resident 
t h a t the terms of the APOC d ra f t concession %«ere e n t i r e l y un-
sicceptable to him and h i s people. Olhere was a reason of t h i s un-
acceptance, nothing but i n t e imi t t an t a^jpearance of Major Frank 
Holmes on behalf of Eastern and General syndicate Ltd. , (EGS), and 
presen ta t ion of h is d ra f t concession for the ssne which, ofcoirse , 
19 
was b e t t e r in monetary terms than APOC* s. Thereafter, the 
bargaining pos i t ion of the Sheikh had become stronger while the 
competition ex is ted between the i n t e r e s t of two Conpanies, Looking 
the s i t ua t ion turning from t h e i r favour, B r i t i s h colonial office, 
on September 2l, 1923, despatched l e t t e r s t o the P o l i t i c a l 
Resident, EGS and APOC separately, conveying B r i t i s h government's 
18. i b i d . , p . 9 1 . ff . 
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pol icy regarding negotiations for o i l concessions in the Gulf in 
general and Kuwait in partLculari according to which the priority 
was to be given to APOC. OJie APOC Wcis correspondingly d is -
appointed but remained confident because of their long and close 
connection with Kuwait and Sheikh's assurance of keeping the treaty 
a l ive . Meanwhile, there was silence from the sheikh tu t the 
reports from Pol i t i ca l Agent revealed that the Sheikh's <:^inicn 
was evenly balanced. Later, APOC replied to the colonial office* s 
l e t t e r of 2 l8t September, agreeing i t s proposed procedire for tiie 
Kuwait negotiations including the revision of i t s exist ing draft. 
Sheikh Ahmad informed the Pol i t i ca l Agent in January 1924, that 
his views on APOC'S draft concession terras would not be ready for 
at l e a s t s:.x montha Found the Sheikh desinclined, in March 1924, 
.\POC decided to outmatch the texms proposed by Holmes (EGS) and 
invi te the sheikh to v i s i t the ir o i l operations In Persia, 
believing his f i r s t sight of such operations in actual progress 
and their very impressive scale of developrosat, would influence him 
in their favour. 
Sheikh Ahmad accepted the invitat ion and subsequently 
v i s i t e d the Persian o i l f i e l d s from 25th to 29th JUly and Abadan 
Refinery <xn 14th August 1924, expressed grea* in teres t in a l l he 
21 saw, during talks with APCX: o f f i c i a l s . Despite his v i s i t to the 
APOC's o i l f i e l d s the sheikh didn't show his consent to either 
company and the matter was delayed. Meanwhile, the APOC's prior 
20. i b i d . , p,99 f f . 
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r i g h t s of negot ia t ions lapsed on 31st March 1925. However, EGS 
found the i r pos i t ion in Oil Concessions in neighbouring s t a t e s , 
offered to s e l l t h e i r Bahrain, Hasa, Neutral Zoni and Kuwait 
i n t e r e s t to APOC but the l a t t e r r e j ec t ed than a l l , 
iSie r i g h t s of APOC to negot ia te for the o i l Concession in 
Kuwait were renewed by the co lonia l of f ice and APOC sent t he i r 
geo log is t s to Kuwailt in January, who submitted t h e i r r epor t s on 
Februajcy 13, 1926, reached the discouraging conclusions on the 
22 Kuwait o i l prospects . But the matter remained undecided on the 
p a r t of the ;gheikh as he was double minded due to the competition 
between the two companies. Having received no favourable response 
frOTi the ^ e i k h , the P o l i t i c a l Agent, rece iv ing the d i rec t ion 
from H.M.G., informed the sheikh on 29th November, 1928 tha t the 
B r i t i s h government required, i n any o i l Concession agreement with 
22. ibid. , p . m . , ff. 
Neutral zone i The Neutral zone i s an area of about 2,500 
"" square mi les adjoining the southern boundary 
of Kuwait, i t s other boundaries being the 
Gulf coas t t o the cas t and Saudi Ara^a to 
the West and south. This area was daneuxated 
and agreed on December 2,1922 a t the ojalx 
toquair) Conference (Note -22) 
as one in which Kawalt and ^ u d i Arabia would 
have equal r i g h t s . Since 1970, following 
agreement between the two countr ies each t o 
have sole j u r i s d i c t i o n over half the area 
(Kuwait the northern half, Saudi Arabia the 
southern), i t has been kncwn a s the Divided 
or Pa r t i oned zone. 
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Sheikh, a B r i t i s h N a t i o n a l i t y c lause , which, undoubtedly was in 
23 favour of APOC, Despite a b ig favour and pressure from the 
B r i t i s h government for APOC, the sheikh was not e a s i l y ready 
to g ive them Concession. HB had a t l e a s t achieved a strong bar-
gaining p o s i t i o n . Another APOC* s team of g e o l o g i s t s arrived 
24 Rawait i n February 1932 which carr ied-out t h e i r survey, 
Mr, A.H.T. chisholra of APOC presented another draft Concession to 
25 
Slhelkh Ahnad, on August 16, 1932. * But the Sheikh* s a t t i t u d e was 
to postpening both APOC's and E.G.S's negot ia t ions wi th him f o r 
near ly f i v e months. After f i v e months pause, E,G,S, and APOC 
n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th Sheikh Ahmad were authorized by H,M,G, Sir John 
Caanan, Chairman of APOC, v i s i t e d Sheikh Ahnad i n March 1933 and 
o f fered very s u b s t a n t i a l l y improved terms. But these terms were, 
too, below the Hslines's o f f er as Siheikh Ahmad Informed APOC in 
Apri l , Sheikh Ahmad not only des inc l ined to accept these terms 
26 but a l so decided to suspa:id the further n e g o t i a t i o n s , Sheikh 
Ahnad* s suspension of n e g o t i a t i o n s on l 4 t h May 1983 suddenly 
changed the scene and two contenders i n the f i e l d had to be uni ted 
to propose a j o i n t draft concess ion for the same. 
(d) Eastern and General Syndicate (E.Q.S.) t 
while the r e v i s e d draf t of APOC was under consideration of 
the P o l i t i c a l Resident and as i t was to be presented to the Sheikh 
23. i b i d . , p , l 6 . 
24 . i b i d . , p, 142J f f , 
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Ahmad, an unexpected te legraphic message rece ived on Ma^ 9,1923 
by the Sheikh from Major Frank mimes of Eastern and General 
Syndicate Ltd, (EGS) s ta t ing that he had Just obtained King Ibn-
saud's o i l Concession and advising the alheildi not to grant any o i l 
Concession before considering h i s own company* £; <BGS} terms vhich 
27 favourably impressed the sheikh. 
I t was incorporated i n London on 6th iuigust* 1920, and the 
company's pr inc ipa l shareholders were — the Chartered and General 
Exploration and Timunce Co, Ltd. , Allen and Henburye Ltd. , and 
Mr, B,M, Messa Coit^any was prev ious ly to deal w i th Concessions i n 
Arabia, w i th which objec t Major Frank Holmes had proceeded to 
28 Arabia, The Con?>any was opened i n Aden, 
Major Frank Pblroes was i n t e r e s t e d in g e t t i n g and s e l l i n g 
Concessions wherever o i l might be fotand, and h i s hunting ground 
covered much of the Persian OUlf area, HB was a raining and metallur-
g i ca l engineer of Vtorld-wide p r a c t i c a l and managerial experience, 
having worked for various Companies in many countr i e s . Before 
loo3d.ng in to the APCC'S Abadan Oil re f inery , he had no acquaintance 
wi th the o i l industry . He formed E.G.S alongwith some other 
merchants i n 1920 with the object to e s t a b l i s h bus iness re la t ed 
wi th o i l industry i n Arabia, HS, eventua l ly on May 6, 1923, 
27. i b i d . , p , 5 . 
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succeeded in g e t t i n g concess ions for o i l estplorations and mining 
in the province of EL-Hasa of Arabia from King Ibn-saud, There, 
he came to Taaw about Kuwait o i l prospec t s and the B r i t i s h e f f o r t s 
for them. He, then# a f ter a t e l egraphic coionunicatioxv rushed to 
Kuwait on 23rd Ka^, wi th an i n t e r p r e t e r and an introductory l e t t e r 
both t o the sheikh and several prominant Kuwaitis who were c lose 
a s s o c i a t e s of the £iheikh« As a fr iend of King Zbn-Saud and having 
introductory l e t t e r s ^ he was well rece ived by the sheikh, before 
whom he outlixied the terms, raore generous and of much monetary 
values than of APOC. Meanwhile, Holraes rece ived information from 
the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l Resident def ining B r i t i s h government's p o l i c y 
regarding n e g o t i a t i o n s for o i l Concessions in the Gulf, However, 
i t was made c l e a r that APOC's appl icat ion with regard to Kuwait 
be given p r i o r i t y . Despi te a l l the hdLnderances, Holmes did not 
l eave any stone unturned but kept negot ia t ing for the Concession 
for which he could be succeeded in g e t t i n g fiSheikh Ahmad's per-
missicai for undertaking a g e o l o g i c a l survey of Kuwait and of 
Neutral-ssone f i e l d s . For the same, a renouned g e o l o g i s t Dr. Arnold 
Heim, a Swiss subject» came to Kuwait and began h i s survey of 
Kuwait and the Neutral zone and Hasa f i e l d s in January i924 and 
29 
submitted h i s report . On September 5,1924, the report s tated 
that there was some earth irapregnant wi th o i l a t the Bahra seepage, 
Heim found that Kuwait was a country of some o i l p o s s i b i l i t y , but 
not of high promise. In regard with the Neutral Zone, he s tated 
in h i s report that there was no seepage, and that he could not 
ib id . , p. 103i ff . 
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recoimncnd i tr and in h i s view, d r i l l i n g anywhere on the Arabian 
s ide of tlte Gulf would be a pure gamble. While t h i s report did 
not discx>urage EGS i n t h e i r e f f o r t s in Kuwait, i t did make i t 
d i f f i c u l t for i t to i n t e r e s t other p a r t i e s in the o i l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Found the th ings d i f f i c u l t , EGS had approached KPCC on 
February 23, 1926, o f fer ing t o transfer t h e i r Bahrain, Hasa and 
Neutral zone concess ions together with any Kuwait Concession they 
might obtain, i n return for reimburseraent of a l l t h e i r eaqienditure 
on obtaining and v a l i d a t i n g thatn to date, but the APOC in the l i g h t 
o f t h e i r g e o l o g i s t s * unfavouraOale opinion, refused t h e i r o f f e r , 
simultaneoualy E G S ' S e f f o r t s proved successful in obtaining o i l 
concess ion in Bahrain in May 1932, I t r evo lu t ion i zed the previous 
geo log ica l theor i e s of o i l p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n Ajrabia, tha t Holm's 
opt imis t ic e f f o r t s and success accederated the tempo of negot ia t ions 
in Kuwait, I t highly boosted Itolmes's morale and h i s reputat ion, 
EGS Taken Over by Qulf Oil Corporation t 
Having the r e p o r t s of EGC's success fu l nego t ia t i ons and o i l 
r i g h t s in the region. Gulf Oil Coirporation (a oc) of Pennsylvania 
(U.S.A.) took over the concess ions in the Gulf i n November 1927, 
After hapiring taken over h i s Concession r i g h t s by the Gulf, Holmes 
informed the Sheikh that he would short ly o f f e r a b e t t e r terms 
for an o i l agrecjment and that h i s Coinpany had American backing. 
But a f ter proracted d i scuss ions , sheikh Ahmad re jec ted Holmes's 
(EG^Gxilf) terms as inadequate. Later, Holmes obtained an 
agxreement for b e t t e r terms from the Gulf cail Corporation and 
:\ 
dlscassed with sheikh Ahmad. Meaa:iwhlle^ he was informed by the 
P o l i t i c a l Agent tha t the B r i t i s h government then required, in any 
o i l concession with SheilcJi, a ' B r i t i s h Nat ional i ty c l a u s e ' . There-
af te r , the o i l concession i n Kuwait became the subject of nego-
t i a t i o n s between the American and the B r i t i s h represen ta t iTes , 
In February 1932, while the r e su l t of the negot ia t ions seemed 
bleak, the American government formally requested the B r i t i s h 
govemmait tha t t h e i r "Open Door Policy" for American o i l corapanies 
already ex i s t ing i n Iraq and Bahrain, shovdd a lso be applied in 
Kuwait, This reques t was granted by the H.M,G. i n April of the 
same year . After having received the suppoart from American 
government, on 26 May 1932, Holmes presented the Sheikh a renewed 
draf t for cons idera t len . 
Sheikh Ahmad l a t e r received a renewed dra f t from APOC a lso . 
But he refused to negot ia te further vith eith«ff par ty in t h i s 
regard and informed the Bol i t i ca l Resident with h i s disapproval. 
Receiving sach d i s tnc l lned response from the sheikh and get t ing 
the hopes of o i l Concession dim, both the p a r t i e s had t o come to 
nego t i a t s for a J o i n t venture aad opened d iscuss ions . They 
eventual ly a r r ived a t unanimous decision on 14th December 1934, 
whereby they (APOC and Gulf Oil Corporatioi^ signed two agreements 
which were the b a s i s of t h e i r par tnersh ip and the formation of 
31 *^  
Kuwait o i l CGupany (KOC) . I t provided for the formation of a 
30. i b i d . , p . 118. 
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j o i n t Ccanpany "Kuwait Oil Ccrapany Limited", equally owied and 
cont ro l led by both the par t ies^ to obtain and operate a Kuwait 
Oil Concession, and regtilate the manner in which i t s negot ia t ions 
63^)01 ses, f inances and operat ions were to be concfhicted. 
(e) J o i n t Ef fo r t s (Unity of I n t e r e s t s between the TWO P a r t i e s ) ! 
The j o i n t Conpany, Kuwait Oil Ccrapany Ltd , , (KOC) provided 
for, in the Principal Agreement of Decesnber 14, was incorporated 
in London on 2nd February 1934., with an i n i t i a l issued cap i t a l 
of £ 50,000, owned equally by APOC and Gulf, Of i t s s ix Directors , 
th ree were APOC and th ree Gulf appointees, the chairman had no 
cas t ing vote and was to be appointed annually in ro ta t ion by APOC 
and Gulf, In accordance with t h i s provision of negotiat ion provided 
in t h i s Agreemeot provis ion ne i the r pa r ty could carryon negotiations 
fo r o i l Concessions d i r e c t l y or alone and ne i t he r p a r t y would go 
ahead i n regard with the o i l r i g h t s without having o t h e r ' s assent . 
Later , the B r i t i s h government reached a t am agreement with 
KOC on March 5, 1934, in order t o regu la te APOC's and Gul f ' s 
r e l a t ions with herself in connection with the KOC's l a t e r n©go-
32 t i a t i o n s with the Sheikh; oliereaf t e r , the B r i t i s h government 
i n s t ruc t ed the I b l i t i c a l Resident a t Bushire about her assent 
over the invj-tations of negot ia t ions between the SJieiJch and KOC, 
32. i b i d . , p . 189| i f . 
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and to InforxQ i t to the Shellch, Under the Agreement* there was 
a provision that the Coropany wo\ild be a Bri t i sh Company, The 
Ccmcessionf in case if obtained* was not to be transfer3red withcxit 
the iffG's consent. MaJ<M^  Holmes and Mr, A,HT, Chiiholm were la ter 
^pointed "joint negotiators" by the KOC on Fe3»ruary 5, 1934. 
Both the negotiatocs described the baclcground and formation of 
KOC to the ^ e i k h who aqpprcciated i t and welcomed the formation 
of the n«w Company, After their conversation with gheikh Ahnad* 
Holmes and Chldiolm presented their f i r s t jo int draft proposal 
on behalf of KCX:»s jo int negotiators, I»ater they came to knew 
that Sheikh Ahnad had svmaoned his lawyer from Basra to a s s i s t in 
scxoitinising the proposed draft by KOC, After having gone 
through the draft and ta3,lying the f inancial terms with the previoui 
terms presented separately by Holmes and Chisholm, the Sheikh 
rejected i t as i t was below his expectations, i:he ^ e i k h res -
ponding to the KOC# in March 1934, eatplained h i s main concern 
over the monetary terms which were yet to be alterred. Afterward, 
the sheikh on March 12, sent a wi^itten statemoat reqairing the 
renewed terms. Meanwhile, sheikh Ahmad informed KOC that he had 
received another Br i t i sh oompany's offer for the o i l concession 
which was ready to give bcrtter terms but in i t s response he was 
rendnded by the Pol i t ica l Agent, of treaty obligations and his 
coimnitment of 1913 with H,M,o, to not give any Concession other 
33, i^ id . , p. 195. 
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than Bri t i sh aobject and without H.M.G's pexmission in this regard. 
Negotiations were kept on, the teuns after tanas were kipt 
revised and new c l suses included or replaced the old ones unti l 
both the part ies KOC and the i^elkh reached on an Agreement which 
was signed on Deceniber 23, 1934. 
( i l ) BASIC PRCVISIOt^ S OF FIKAL CCKCSSSICK 
The f inal Concession agreement was signed on Deceniber 1934 
between H.E. ^leikh s ir Ahmad al-Jabir a»-80ibalv the siheikh of 
KUwadt on his own behalf and in the name of and on behalf of h i s 
heirs and suocessors^ and Maj. Frank HiiLmes and Mr. A.H.T. 
Chisholro on behalf of the Kuwait Oil Canpany in the presence of 
Lt, col . H.R.P. Dickson, the Brit ish Pol i t ica l Agent.^^ This draft 
Agreement included favourable terms covering the entire area of 
Kuwait of about (17,818 sq. km) or 6,000 squaure miles, the period 
of seventy f ive years, the i n i t i a l payments of Rs,470,000, the 
annual dead-rent of Rs,95, 000 and the royalty of Rs,3 per ton with 
an aainuai minimum of Es.2,50,000, All taxation was cooinitted for 
a payment of 8s,4 per ton, Ihese paymcmts^ t r iv ia l by compariscaj 
with those current in Iraq, were in 1934 of rare value to the 
ruler and public of Kuwait and was to be increased by the money 
spent l o c a l l y and the employment given in the course of the 
35. i b i d . , p . 242| f f . 
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Coinpaxiy's operat ions . ^^ The or ig ina l concess ion which provided 
that the Kuwait Oil Conpany (KOC) would pay $ 0.13 per barrel 
whereas, the Governments of Iran, Iraq and saudi Arabia were being 
paid $ 0,22 per barrel .^' ' 
Borgan discovery proved t o be a boon for Kuwait, which 
opened the door of weal th wide-apart . But i t could not rtroained 
for a short in t erva l between 1942 and 1945 ^ e t o the grave s i t u a -
t i o n of the world war I I . As soon as the darker *dped out and the 
flames of war quenched on the termination of world War, the opera-
t i o n s in the o i l f i e l d resumed on a mass ive - s ca l e . Increased 
proaaction of crude encouraged the Ccmpany's e f f o r t s and i t further 
proved to be helpful in e s tab l i sh ing the r e l a t i o n s between the 
Company and the Kuwaiti government more c l o s e r . Rapid development 
in company operat ions i n s i s t e d the £iheilch to enter i n t o a further 
Agreement wi th the company i n 1951, The new Agreement extended the 
term for another 17 year , 
( i i i ) IMPORTWCE OF OIL IH THB ECOKC»Cr t 
The structure of the KxJwaitL econoiny had underwent a 
radical change a f t er the emergence of o i l , I t i o r to the discovery 
of o i l , the economy of Kuwait mainly depended upon commerce, navi~ 
gat ion, pear l ing , f i s h i n g and boat -bu i ld ing . The stage of economy 
3 6, Longrigg, s t ^ h e n Hemsleyy (Al i n the Middle Eastt I t s 
Discovery amd DevelopmCT '^fe^  QJtfora, 1968j"p, ITT. 
37 . El-Mallalch, Ragaeiy Economic Development and Regional 
Cooperation » KUWAIT, The u n i v e r s i t y oF 
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turned to be rooaexnlzed in the l a t e r part of 1945 with the 
beginning of eaport of crude and ref ined o i l and the i r by-prodic ts 
s i n c e 1946, Cdl industry has transfoxmed the econcory on the part 
of i t s sec tora l d i s t r i b u t i o n . There are two main s e c t o r s namely 
•oil^' and 'noD»Qil* s e c t o r s . Oil s ec tor inc lude the production, 
export %d indigenous conoumption of crude, re f ined o i l , other 
by-products, and natural g a s . The Kuwaiti economy has gained an 
tinprecedented rate of growth ever a considerable period of time 
primari ly due to o i l s e c t o r a lone . The o i l s ec tor has p o s i t i v e l y 
inf luenced the r e s t of the econcaay though the financiauL l inkages 
increased aggregate deamand and imports at a considerably higher 
r a t e s . 
Share of o i l sector in l^ational mcome i 
Ktxwait has very l i m i t e d non*oil resources . Oil sector 
has always held a gz^ater share i n the Gross Domestic Bcoduct, 
I t has he ld a share of KD 906,7 m i l l i o n , a 65,6 per cent of the 
G,D,P. In 1971 which increased to i t s peak of KD 3020 m i l l i o n , 
(79,2 per cent of the G.D,P) i n 1974. The ' n a a - o i l ' sec tor held 
as i t s h ighest share of KD 3328,29 m i l l i o n (54,3 per cent of the 
G.D.P.) in 1982. Though the h ighest f i gure of KD 5059,23 mi l l ion 
was est imated as the revemies of oH s e c t o r but i t s share in the 
G.D.P. remained 66,9 per cent i n 1980 which i s l e s s than the share 
of o i l s ec tor in the G.D.P. in 1974, The share of o i l sector has, 
however, been f luc tua t ing betwesen 1970 and 1985, but the revenues 
continued increasing fran KD 618,8 m i l l i o n in 1970 t o KD 2983,16 
f " 
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mill ion in 1985 baring in 1971 when i t s l i ght ly declined. The 
share of o i l sector in the O.D.P, was estimated at i t s l eas t figure 
of 45.7 per cent in 1982, I t s share in the G.D.P. has declined 
from 60,3 per cent in 1970 to 50.20 per cent in 1985 where as the 
share of nan-oil sector has increased from 39,7 per cent in 1970 
to 49,8 per cent in 1985, During 1970s, the share of »oi l ' sector 
in the Oross Domestic* Product G.D.P. never droped below 60 per 
cent baring in the year 1978 when i t s rate of growth was s l ight ly 
negative, Howeyer, the increasing o i l revenues and the conser-
vat ionis t pol icy adc^ted by the govemmoat did not aJLlcw KawadLt 
to accelerate i t s production. But the early years of 1980s 
recorded a tangible decline in Kuwaiti o i l revenues mainly die to 
the decline in the world o i l demand, and the marketing d i f f i cu l -
t i e s faced by the Kuwait's o i l exports. The o i l e:q>orts continued 
to f a l l for three conseoative years i . e . , 1980 to 1982. This 
\iltimately resulted in a drop in the share of o i l sector in the 
G.D.P. 
Growth Rate of odll S3g>ort t 
Where the o i l sector contributed as i t s share in the G.D.P. 
varying between 50 to 80 per cent the rate of growth of i t s export 
has also been varying between 82 and 96 per cent of the toted 
exports value. I t ' s escort increased from KD 527 mill ion in 1969 
to KD 2847.7 mil l ion in 1985 with i t s peak of, K,D 4960.8 million 
in 1980. Tlica o i l sector has contributed i t s highest share of 
96,3 per cent of the total export value in 1974 whereais i t s lowest 
'tc, 
f igure of 82,7 per cent of the t o t a l export value was estimated 
in 1982, The o i l e s c o r t s playing an important r o l e in the ec»noinic 
a c t i v i t i e s of KXxwait since i t i s the main source of revenues to 
the country, "The o i l eacports continued i n an upward trend 
throughout the per iod from 1961 to 1972 baring in 1965 when i t 
reg is te red a negative growth r a t e . This per iod was of world eco-
nomic recovery and i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n which created a substant ia l 
demand for o i l in the world roeurket, 
IXiring the per iod from 1973 to 1985, the re had been wide-
spread f luc tua t ions in o i l exports and i t decl ine by 64,29 per 
cent . The reasons which r e a i l t e d the decrease in o i l exports 
were d r a s t i c increase in o i l p r i c e s upto 1981 and then i t s down-
ward t rend followed by world recess ion and the decrease in o i l 
predic t ion as a r e s u l t of OPEC's decision taken a t i n t e r v a l s . 
Moreover, world o i l market during 1980-85 observed negative growth 
rate i die demand for o i l which had been the outcome of decelerat ion 
In consuropticm in i n d u s t r i a l countr ies , a i b s t i t u t i o n of sotirces 
of energy for consumption, decreased in the CPECs quota of world 
demand and the d iscover ies of o i l in North sea smd Alaska were 
a lso the f ac to r s which contr ibuted in a decl ine of production which 
followed by a decrease i n o i l e>pon:s. 
The non-oi l sec tor has contr ibuted in the esqsoxrt a very 
raazginal share say between 3,7 per cent to 17,3 pe r cent of the 
t o t a l export value between the per iod of 1969 and 1985. Hiere 
has been genera l ly a negative growth in the crude o i l ea^ort but 
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the r a t e of growth of ref ined o i l off and an went in an up«ward 
t rend during the l a s t decade and a half. I t was talcen i n t o accsDunt 
because of the diversion of a t t en t ion from crude o i l s a l e s to 
ref ined products sa les through which the govensnent might earn a 
l o t and the at tempts of es tab l i sh ing indigenous i n d u s t r i a l base 
could be made. 
High Propensity to Siport t 
With the increas ing o i l revenues due to the substant ia l 
ea^ort of o i l the value of imports has also improved, iSie t o t a l 
import of KD 223,3 mi l l ion in 1970 improved to i t s highest f igure 
KD 2384,6 mi l l ion in 1982, thereaf te r , i t decl ined t o KD 1784,7 
mi l l ion in 1985, Ihe increasing value of o i l and i t s products 
escor t s created a s i t u a t i o n of increasing government revenues and 
per cap i ta income which in turn improved the propensi ty t o import, 
Kuwait intports var ious i tems of luxury, machinery, f oodgrain and 
BO many other things by exporting i t s cmly source of revenue i . e . 
Oil , By having a cursory look of the tables i t may be observed 
tha t the t rade balance has in5>roved by 764,2 per cen t between 
1969 and 1974. lodthin the same epan of time, i t increased from 
KD 319,3 mil l ion t o KD 2759,6 mi l l ion . I t was a remarkable 
Improvemoit which came only because of the increasing o i l p r i c e s 
which improved the o i l revenues. The o i l p r i ces , within the sane 
period, increased by 625,7 per cent whereas the t rade balance 
improved with a l i t t l e higher r a t e say by 764,2 pe r cent . This 
shows tha t the increas ing o i l p r i c e s pushed up the export of o i l 
4.1 
and i t s products which broiight higher revenues and i n turn the 
import a l so increased s u b s t a n t i a l l y . Trade balance, thereafter , 
ind i ca ted a negat ive growth. I t decl ined from K.D 2759.6 m i l l i o n 
in 1974 t o K.D 1600.2 millicxi In 1978, due to the dece lerat ion 
in e s c o r t of o i l , T3ie highert rate of trade balance was observed 
in 1979 when i t was of KD 3651,5 m i l l i o n . Thenceforth, i t 
reduced t o only KD 771,8 m i l l i o n in 1982, but resumed improving 
and was estimated at KD 1367,2 mi l l i on i n 1985. These f l u c t u a t i o n s 
in the trade balance were observed as the r e s u l t of vauriations in 
the va lue of exports and imports during the same per iod of 16 years , 
Ejnployroent Cpportanitie s t 
Oil industry employs technology and i s ca^iital i n t e n s i v e . 
I t absorbs a marginal ricilled manpower. Though, i t does not 
d i r e c t l y opens the door f o r a greater absorption wi th in i t s e l f but 
i t has created emplojmient opportuni t i e s in the non-CcLl sectors; 
among which the Services sec tor absorbs the g r e a t e s t number of 
personnels . s ince the establishment of o i l industry in Kuwait, 
the employment opportuni t i e s hacve been increas ing clue to the 
absorption i n the non-Oil s ec tor . The t o t a l labour force in 1965 
was estimated at 17,300, i t was merely 3 ,70 per cent of the t o t a l 
population of the country. As the o i l industry developed and the 
o i l revenues increased due to the increase i n o i l p r i c e s , the 
non-o i l s ec tor iirproved aimultanecualy and the apbsojrption of labour 
force a lso improved, m 1970, the t o t a l a c t i v e population was 
est imated at 2 ,42 ,100, i t increased t o 3 ,04 ,500 in 1975 and 
further 4 ,84 ,033 in 1980. I t has ind icated a substant ia l increase 
4o 
of 39,03 per cent improving from 3,70 per cent over a period of 
20 yea r s . The t o t a l number of workers i n 1985 was estimated a t 
6« 62,588, This r e a l l y shows a remarkaisle achievement of the 
eccnany which could be made possiM.e only i n the wake of the 
developraents of o i l - i n (Wastry, 
The importance of o i l industry in the eoonamy i s not only 
due to i t s increasing reveimes to the government but a lso because 
of i t s g r ea t push ^ to the o ther sec to r s of the economy of which 
existence could be poss ib le a f te r i t s formation. I t has changed 
the e n t i r e scene of the economy through the transformaticai. 
Owing to the incept ion of the CSll sector , the economy has 
skipped from i t s r e l i a n c e on the outdated sor t of revenues t o the 
modem ones. The greater dependency on merely navigat ion, ship-
bui ld ing , pear l ing and f ishing has shi f ted t o the i n d a s t r i a l based 
economy. This, the o i l sector has i t s s ignif icance in economy 
not caaly d ie to i t s high revenue p o t e n t i a l s but i t s g r ea t e r a s s i s -
tance in the establishment a£. i n f r a s t ruc tu r e of the nan-oi l 
sec tors a l so . 
CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF 
OIL INDUSTRY : 1938-1969 
DEVEL0PMH5T OP 03L INDUSTOY I 1938-1969 
(i) IKP'RASTKgCTORaL DEVELOPMENTS J 
m the previous chapter , the h i s to ry of nego t ia t i cns to 
the f i r s t o i l agreooent between Kuwait, B r i t i s h and American 
companies were d e a l t a t l eng th . I t has been c l e a r l y highlighted 
in t h a t chapter how the siheilch of Kuwait played the ro l e of s t a t e s -
man so ad ro i t l y on behalf of the country when faced Buch superior 
powers. Uie ana lys i s of the long dzai^ m histojry of negot ia t ions 
i t s e l f por tays how i n t e l l i g e n t l y the Sheikh tackled both the nego-
t i a t o r s and turned the tab le in h i s own favour a t l a s t . The 
chapter c l o se s a t the consensus of both the p a r t i e s when an agree-
ment for o i l ooncessional r i g h t s was signed between the sheikh of 
Kuwait and KOC in 1934. 
The present chapter por tays the app l ica t ion of the agree-
ment with the f r u i t f u l d r i l l i n g of o i l in 1938. In ttiis chapter, 
i t has been s t r iven to e labora te through what s tages the o i l 
indus t ry passed on and a t t a ined the present s t a t e of developments. 
An attempt has been made to analyse the t rends in o i l production, 
e sco r t s and revenues taking in to a«x:ount the pr ic ing s t ruc ture , 
pol icy adopted by the conpanies and the government of Kuwait. 
Inpact of the formations of OPEC and O P^EC on the Kuwaiti o i l 
indus t ry have a l so been assessed. 
Ihough, the f i r s t f r u i t f u l d r i l l i n g of o i l in 1938 was 
considered a s the foundaticm oE o i l indus t ry in Kuwait but the 
4^? 
actual developinesnt began with the reaiinption of upstream operations 
and tlKs f i r s t o i l shipment fcac «5)ort a f t e r the world mx l l . About 
Kuwait, the recojni of events frcan 1942 t o 1945 seems to be s imilar , 
thoughf both the o i l f i e l d a id the scale of cur ren t development 
v;ere g r ea t e r . £a r ly in 1942, however, a l l operat ions ceased and 
work was not comiu^iced again u n t i l t i ^ war was reaching i t s c lose 
in 194S. But the Kuwait operat ions were half American in ownerc^p 
aaid had reached a stage i n advance of those of Qatar, There 
re instatement , therefore , had a decis ive p r i o r i t y and i t was ordered 
ea r ly in 1945 as p a r t of the Al l ied progranine of increasing ava i l -
able si:q?plies both flac Japanese war, and for the o i l - t h i r s t y ear ly 
years of peace. The coun t ry ' s growth s ince then l » s l a rge ly 
mirrored the smooth and swift estploitation of i t s vas t o i l reserves . 
Within a span of no more than f i f t een years i t s population came to 
enjoy l i v ing standards normally considered the prerogat ive of the 
most dflvej.oped among the Indus t r i a l i zed coun t r i e s . The pa t t e rn of 
growth tha t Kuwait has eatperienced since 1946, the development of 
i t s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t has evolved i s unparal led in modem h i s to ry . 
Because in such a short span of time of only four decatdes, a wide 
gulf between the stage of t r a d i t i o n a l modes and the modem economy 
i s seemed d i f f i c u l t to br idge-up. 
For a dese r t country whwre there l^id been an ever-
presen t need for water, i t was only natura l to give top p r i o r i t y 
t o solving t h i s accute problem, Kuwaitis had depended for centu-
r i e s on the s a l t bracldLsh water of the deser t wel ls , col lected 
ra in water and i r r e g u l a r suppl ies from Shattal-Arab by boat . 
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The supplied water was aucti costly and cjften contandnated, "The 
government inonediately s t a r t ed looking for a l t e r n a t i v e sources of 
supply, a3ie f i r s t d i s a l i na t i on p l an t wi th a capaci ty of one mil l ion 
gal lons of water pe r day from the sea, was oommissioned by the 
government in 1953. aipply of water had continued to aijoy the 
highest p r i o r i t y in a l l government p lans , TSie growth of t h i s 
a c t i v i t y i s t r u l y phenaaenal, increased from about 250 mill ion 
gal lons in 1957 to 2,2 b i l l i o n in 1964 and 6,6 b i l l i o n i n 1970,^ 
For the expansion of o i l indus t ry i n Kuwadt, the government had to 
undertake the plan of development of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , Tahahil, 
as i t was made the coun t ry ' s f i r s t ersqport terminal was provicted with 
ga the r ing- l ines , gas-separa tors , s torage tanks and p ipe l ines l inked 
3 
with the o i l f i e l d s . Further development took place i n 1949 when 
a 327 f ee t tank landing c r a f t was acquired, converted equipped, 
provisioned and anchored off the iJeutral-zone coas t to ac t as base 
4 depot and f loat ing camp near VJ^ra, in the cent re of the zone, 
A small d r i l l i n g canp was es tabl ished, another for the l o c a l l y 
1, Khouja, M,w, and Sadler, P.O,, The Ec on any of Kuwaitt 
Development and Role m i n t e r n a t i o n a l Finance, 
kacMlllan, tondony 1979, p , 2 9 . — • " " ^ ' 
2 , i b i d . , P .29. 
3 , Longrigg, Stephen Hamsley, o i l i n the Middle East, 
oxford 1968, p , l3§7 
4, i b i d , , p .2 i5 . 
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inprovlsad labour force was formed near the baeeshlp's anchorage, 
water for these and for a l l f i e l d part ies was brought by 
tankers lorry from Kuwait c i ty . 
Gathering Cqntres « 
proajicticsi of o i l was on i t s ris ing scale because of the 
new discoveries of o i l - f i e l d s and there was a need of gathering 
centres and tank farms to store the crude e3?)loited frcan these 
f i e l d s . In order to reserve the o i l exploited from Magwa f i e ld , 
the extension of Burgan f i e l d , a gathering-centre, a gas separation 
plant and a pumphouse was erected there, A pipe- l ine was l a i d 
from Magwa to the tan3c-fauan at Ahnadi, The Ahraadi tarito-farm 
contained, by the middle of 1953, twenty-five 139,000 or 168,000 
5 
barrel tanks, with one more, tender erection, Kuwait Oil ccmpany 
had 16 gathering centres in operation, 12, of which are situated 
in Burgan f ie ld , are near Magwa, to serve the Magwa and Ahnsidi 
f i e lds , A gathering-cantre i s located in nor±h-Kuwedt and serves 
the Raadhatain, sabriyah and Bahra f i e l d s and another i s located 
in Minagish and was comirdssioned i n 1962. lUnere was also a apaall 
gas separator and o i l pumping plant in Umra-Gadair, 
Pipelines, Tankage agid Loading F a c i l i t i e s t 
A net of p ipel ines connect the various gathering centres 
with two tank farms at Ahmadi, The longest of these pipel ines i s 
5. i^ id , , p, 223. 
6, General o i l Affairs Department, Ministry of Finance and 
Industryy The Oil of Kuwaitt Facts and Figures 
1964, p,25. 
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a 30 inches diameter t r a n s i t l i n e , over 60 m i l e s i n length which 
connects the nortb-Kuwait f i e l d s wi th the nozrtb-Ahnadi tank farm. 
This l i n e i s a l s o connected wi th the south-Ahmadi tank farm by a 
4 mile t r a n s i t l i n e coroprised of 30V32"/34" p i p e s . ' ' The 12 
gathering centres in the Borc;^ f i e l d , in south-east Kuwait are 
connected wi th the Ahnadi d i s t r i h u t i o n manifold through 4 t r a n s i t 
l i n e s of 2o"A 2oV22", 30V3*" ^^ 34V36" diameter r e i ^ e c -
t i v e l y , ^ The 2o* t r sms i t l i n e i s used for returning surplus 
re f inery products (gas o i l and l i g h t d i s t i l l a t i o n s ) back t o the 
f i e l d where they are i n j e c t e d i n t o 4 ho le s e s p e c i a l l y prepared for 
the pvirpose. From the Ahmadi d i s t r i b u t i o n manifold, three l i n e s 
(of 20", 22'«, 39") go to the south Almadi tank farm f i l l i n g mani-
9 
f o l d , TWO other 34" l i n e s run to the north-Ahnadi tank farm. 
One 16" main l i n e connects the Magwa gathering centre 
with the south Ahmadi tank farm. The Minagish f i e l d i s connected 
wi th the south Ahmadi tank farm through a 30 mi le t r a n s i t l i n e of 
2V24 /26 inches diameter p i p e s . i n addit ion to these , main l i n e s , 
there extends a ne t of flow l i n e s connecting each of the 16 
gathering centres with i t s surrounding w e l l s . The flow of o i l Into 
any storage tank i s regulated from the control room loca ted in 
Ahmadi. The o i l frcan both north and south-tank farm f lows t o the 
7. i b i d . , p.27 
8 . i b i d w p.27 
9 . i b i d . , p ,27 
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loading tearainals by fccoe of g rav i ty without any help of praaps. 
The south-tank fasm ootEoprises a t o t a l of 3S tanks with ncntinal 
t o t a l capaci ty of a>, 612,000 b a r r e l s , iS^ie nor th- tank farm contains 
15 tanks with the t o t a l nominal capaci ty of 3,872,000 ba r r e l s , ^ ° 
The Kuwait Oil caapany had t rans fe r red i t s f i e l d head-
qua r t e r s from Magwa to the new town of Ahnadi in July 1950, leaving 
the f ozmer, both a s an i nc ip i en t production centre and as the s i t e 
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of the company's main hospi ta l and of i t s t r a in ing Centre. The 
new headiquarters anerged as a modem o i l cent re caqpable of \mlimited 
development on model- l ines . Ihe company made roads running through 
the whole systam and joined i t wi th the c a p i t a l . The main power 
s ta t ion was erected a t Mina al-Ahmadi and there had a l so been 
e rec ted the a l l in5>ortant water d i s t i l l a t i o n p l a n t s , Mina al-Ahroadi 
named a f t e r the l a t e r u l e r , was designed as ccrapany's po r t and 
loading t^uaninal, and a f t e r 1949, i t took place of the l imi ted 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s constructed i n the same area then known as 'Fahah i l ' , 
12 
named af te r the neaifby v i l l a g e . 'Sue po r t Cblina al-Ahrnadi) 
included tankage to surve texminal purposes and a dredged anall 
c ra f t harbour. The g rea t p i e r , one of the l a r g e s t s of i t s type 
in the Vtorld, was erected the re . The "T" head, with 8 tankers or 
cargo be r ths , l a y a t the end of a 4,150- foot caase-way, carrying 
10, I h i d . , p.28 
11, Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, op. c i t . # p . 224. 
12, i b i d . , p , 224. 
vehic les and p ipes , about 3 mi l l ion bar reks of o i l pe r day could 
be loaded from i t . The no r tb -p i e r can handle the l a r g e s t tankers 
a f l o a t , Mina al-Ahmadi i s considered one of the l a r g e s t o i l 
exporting p o r t s in the world. Both p i e r s are equipped t o provide 
the tankers wi th f u e l . 
( i i ) TRENDS IK 03L PRQDPCTIQa^  EXPORT mi> REVilNPES 
production of Oil i 
operat ions in Kuwait showed no de lays . Eighteen racsiths 
from the date of the concession sufficed for the preparat ion of 
a l l s taff , labour, equipment^ veh ic les , and serv ices adequate 
for the conttnencement of d r i l l i n g ; and on 31 May 1936, a day of 
v io len t sandstorm the f i r s t well was spudded in Bahra in the 
presence of gheikh Ahmad and a l a rge concourse, encountered no 
horizcm capable of commercial production and was abandoned. The 
next stage was t o cover nea r ly the whole t e r r i t o r y during the 
winter of 1936-37, which l ed to the se lec t ion of the second 
d r i l l i n g locat ion near the bitumen sewage in the Burgaori area, 
twenty-eight mi les south of Kuwait c i t y and fourteen inland from 
the coast . Dr i l l ing / here , began on 16 October 1937. But the 
13. i b i d . / p , 224, 
14, i b i d . , p . 112, 
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TABLE » 3^1 
OIL PRCDUCTION IN KUW^T i 194&*1969 
Ttn M i l l i o n feirreTsT 
Year p r o d u c t i o n (Annual I n c r e a a e %) 
1946 5 , 9 
1947 1 6 , 2 1 7 4 , 5 
1948 4 6 , 5 187 .0 
1949 8 9 , 7 9 2 , 9 
1950 1 2 5 . 7 4 0 . 1 
1951 2 0 4 . 9 63 .0 
1952 2 7 3 . 4 2 5 , 0 
1953 3 1 4 . 6 15 .0 
1954 3 4 9 . 8 1 1 . 1 
1955 402 .8 1 5 . 1 
1956 4 0 5 , 5 0 , 6 
1957 4 2 4 . 8 4 . 7 
1958 5 2 2 , 4 2 2 . 9 
1959 5 2 5 , 9 0 . 6 
1960 619 ,2 1 7 . 7 
1961 633 .3 2 . 2 
1962 7 1 4 . 6 1 2 , 8 
1963 7 6 5 . 2 7 .0 
1964 8 4 2 , 1 10 .0 
1965 8 6 1 . 4 2 . 9 
1966 9 0 6 . 6 5 . 2 
1967 9 1 2 . 4 0 , 6 
1968 9 5 6 . 6 4 , 8 
1969 1011 ,7 5 ,7 
s o u r c e s t ( i ) El-MallaWh, Ragae and A t t a , Jacob E . , Op. c i t . , 
p , 2 0 . 
( i i ) c e n t r a l Bank o f Kuwait t l 8 t Annual Report , 1970, 
P . 17,. 
( i i i ) The Ajrab Petroleum R e s e a r c h Center : France, 
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miccess caaie in the vay in the n igh t of 23rd - 24th Peibruary 1938, 
15 
when Burgan No.l well stxiick o i l . with the disc»very of o i l , 
d r i l l i n g was undertaken with increas ing e f fo r t« . But the operations 
had to be ceased for a short span of time i n 1942 <iie to the out-
break of world war l i , when the si-txiaticwi worsened. In th i s 
unavoidable predecaraent, wel ls had t o be plugged with cement and 
the f i e l d s were l e f t unexplored, 
After the termination of war, when the th ings settleckdown, i 
1 
operaticms were resumed i n the mid of October 1945 as the damger ; 
of the war e l iminated. Staff and mate r i a l s were reassembled and ; 
bui ld ings recondit ioned, iSie produiction of crude and bui ld ings 
1 6 
recondit ioned. Hie production of crude o i l could be made poss ib le i 1 
on a l a rge sca le . The year l946isaturning point in the h i s to ry of j 
17 i 
Kuwait o i l indus t ry , production of crude on a conruercial scale j 
was ac tua l l y s t a r t ed in 1946, Production i n Kuwait, a s tab le | 
shows, amounted in t h i s year to 5,9 mi l l ion b a r r e l s , i n 1947 and j 
1948 to 16,2 mil l ion b a r r e l s and 46,5 mil l ion b a r r e l s r e spec t ive ly . 
I 
Figure turned to an increase of 174,5 pe r cent within one year | 
from 1946 to 1947 which fur ther increased wi th 187 p e r cent over 
15. chisholra, A , H , T , . The F i r s t Kuwait Oil concession 
Agreement;, granc Cass, LondoPj 197S, 
TSote - 159), P.250, 
16. Loogrigg, Stephen HJmiBaey, Gp. c i t . , p . 137. 
17. El-Mallakh, Ragae and Atta, Jacob K,, Op^ c i t , , p ,2o . 
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t t e figure <^ 1946. Kuwaiti o i l indastry kept a pace conti-
niiously and produced crude with incxeasing quantity year by year, 
t^oductian ro»e from 89.9 ndllioo barre ls in 1949 to 125.7 ndllion 
bar re l s in 1950 and 2o4.9 ndllion bar re l s in 1951. I t further 
increased to 273.4 mLllion barre ls 314.6 million barre ls and 
349,8 million barrels in the years 1952, 1953, and 1954 reapec-
t ively , Hoiwerer, there had beeaa an upward trend in the proAictlon 
of crude oi l In Kuwait r ight from the beginning but there were slight 
fluctuations in annual average increase, production which, with 
an increase of 92,9 per ca i t in 1949 oyer the figure of preceding 
year, rose further with an increase of 40,1 per cent, in l950# 1963 
61 per cent in 1951# 25 per ceaat in 1952, 15 per cent in 1953, 
11,1 per cent in 1954 and 15,1 per cent in 1955 respectively over 
the preceding years, production of oil remained on an increasing 
scale further too. I t reached from 402.8 million barre ls in 
1955 to 405,5 million bar re ls in 1956, 424,8 million barrels in 
1957, 522,4 million barrels in 1958 and 525,9 million barrels in 
1959 respectively. 
Xnapite of a contonuous increase in production, the ra te 
of increase always kept f luctuating. I t varied as 0,6 per cent 
in 1956, 4,7 per cent in 1957, 22,9 per cent in 1958 and 0,6 per 
cent in 1959, There had been certain other factors also which 
driven ahead the production of o i l since i t s commercial escploi-
tation in 1946, such as - need for oi l to be used as main source 
of energy in the western world for the recovery of WSJL- h i t 
economies. I t had created a great demand for o i l which turned 
Ktiwait as cme of ths es^porters, iSie reasons* vhLch diversif ied 
Kuwait from crude o i l e39>ort to products' estport, were increasing 
indigenous demand for o i l and i t s protects* establishment of indi -
genous refinery in 1949, and the discoveries of new f i e l d s aach 
as lieutral zone and others. The Increasing rate of production 
of o i l since 1946 was mainly due to the low cost of production 
i n iouwait, and as o i l production increased the unit cost decreased, 
which led to great economies of scale . owing to the price 
r e c ^ t i o n s in 1959 and again in 1960, the o i l companies suffered 
l o s s e s in terms of their r«»venueB to solve t h i s problem, they 
begin to increase o i l production in the big oil-producing countries 
18 
to o f f se t the l o s se s they suffered from price reaactions. During 
the early years of 1960s, the o i l production increased on a f a i r l y 
large scale because of expropriation of areas of concession under 
the Iraq Petroleum conpany (IPC) which in turn suspended o i l pro-
diction teiqoorarily. This led KOC to increase i t s production in 
19 Kuwait. The other reason of an increase of o i l production was 
reflow of o i l to the boycotted nations at the end of Arab-Israel 
war. 
The year 1960 was a milestone in the history of o i l -
producing countries, particularly Kuwait, In th i s year organisation 
of petroleum Exporting Countries (OPSC) was formed and Kuwait was 
one of the five founding menibers, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
18. Al-sabah, Y, s ,F . , The QiX Econotny of Kuwait^ Kegan Paal 
mtemat ionai , jjondon, 198(37 p. 47. 
19, i b i d . / 0.48. 
<i;^  
20 • 
and Venezuela, | 
OPEC did not coiiie-oat of blue bat vas formed after a i 
ser ies of events and forces unleashed both 1:Y the o i l oor^anies and 
by the producing asuntxies. Before the emergence of CPEC, the 
producticn, escports and pricing of o i l veace under the control 
of o i l CfXDqpanies operating in the producing countries. These 
coi^anies were tlie only decision naKers on o i l oper«iti.oxis throagh 
the system of o i l Concessions whereas the o i l producing countries 
rentained no more than tax collects or^. The Coispanies were having 
sovereignty over the national o i l resources and misuse of their 
pcwer continued by reducing the price of o i l at the esqpense of the 
economic and social develoExnents of the producers was the direct 
cause of the establishment of CJPBC. * iftie formation thus, f u l f i l l e d 
the aims and objectives of the o i l producing countries and boosted 
yap the production of o i l . One year after the establishment of 
OPEC* the treaty of 1899 was terminated and tin state of Kuwait 
22 beccyne indi^endent in 1961, Zt provided Kuwait an encouragement 
and sel f -rel iance and strengthened i t s posit ion of bargaining with 
20. Rustow, Dankwaxt A,, and Mugno, John F,, OPEC t sucoesg 
3£ad gco^|>ects# London, 197fi» p,i2. 
21 . OPEC Bul le t in . , Vol, 3CVl, No,7, September, 1985, p , 3 . 
22. Die Middle Bast and North Africaf Europe IMblication, 
1987, London, p,33 
:)'i 
-tiw operating conqpaxiies for the revenues. The eetabl is lment of 
OPEC and independence of the s t a t e revolu t ionised the o i l market 
and boosted up p r i c e s which u l t ima te ly increased the prodiicticn of 
o i l , s ince i960, the production of o i l remained inc reas ing . I t 
juBped froiB 619,2 mi l l ion b a r r e l s i n i960 to 633.3 mi l l ion b a r r e l s 
in 1961, 714,6 mi l l ion b a r r e l s i n 1962, 765,2 milli<wi b a r r e l s i n 
23 
1963 and 842,1 mi l l ion b a r r e l s in 1964, within f ive years the 
production of o i l increased from 361,4 mil l ion b a r r e l s i n 1965, 
906,6 mi l l ion b a r r e l s i n 1966» 912,4 mil l ion b a r r e l s in 1967, 
956,6 mi l l ion b a r r e l s in 1968 and 1011,7 mi l l ion b a r r e l s in 1969. 
Dtiring a span of 9 yeaurs ficoo 1960 to 1969, thexre was an increase, 
in the production of crude o i l , of 63,3 pe r cent v i t h varied 
annual averages of 17,7 per cent i n 1960, 12,8 pe r cent in 1962, 
10 per cent in 1964, 5.2 pe r cent i n 1966 and 6,7 pe r cent in 1969 
over t h e i r preceding years , supply and demand s i t u a t i o n in the 
world Oil market during the period beginning from ear ly f i f t i e s 
to the l a t e s i x t i e s was characterijsed by subs tan t ia l and constant 
surplus of o i l viorld o i l production of crude oil# following the 
increased o i l d i s co r^ r i e s , recorded continuously esca la t ing r a t e s 
for beydnd the liigh r a t e s of o i l consumption. Xn the s i x t i e s the 
%forld overa l l production of crude o i l increased by an annual average 
23. cen t r a l Bank of Kuwait i 1 s t Annual Report, 1970, p , 17 
f^O 
rate o£ 8 per cent* whezreas the world o i l demand (oKcluding 
24 
s o c i a l i s t countries} increased by on anmal rate o£ 7,5 per cent. 
TUtuB, v^ e can observe the s i tuation of a ccntinuoiais upward 
trend right f rocn the year 1946 to 1969 with s l ight variations in 
the annual average increases over their jnreceding years. iSiere 
had been some other factors also as menticned above. For 
exaraple, increase in the producticn l eve l , such as neiAy adopted 
formula of 50-50 Profit Sharing in 1953, "^  * e formation of 
organisation of Aicab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC^  in 1968 
also supported the o i l industry. Besides the increased prodaction, 
taking into consideration the factors contributed to it# there l»d 
been certain reasons which interrupted the continuity of constant 
increase were t Arab-Israel conf l ic t followed by the closing of 
Suez canal in 1956# price cuts in 1959 and in the early period of 
I960 and the policy of l imited o i l production of the meniaer 
countries of OPEC, 
Over the period of 24 years (1946-69) since the o i l produc-
tion began in Kuwait, total productica of crude ci.l reacl^d 
11931,5 mill ion barrels for the whole period. Annual increases 
were highest iaroediately after the war, reaching 187,0 per cent 
24, Central Bank of Kuwait t The Kuwaiti Bttonoiay In Ten Years> 
Economic Repv-^ rt for the Perj.od 1969-1979,p.Z3 
25, El-Sheikh* Riadi Kuwaiti Economic (gowth, Prpbl^a and 
po l i c i e s , l6iwaH:, i^^'-'n.'J^VJT 
^i 
tn 1948, Other high r a t e s of annual increaaes occured in 1951 
(63%), 1958 (23%), i960 (17,-7%) and 1961 (12,ff/o). The rate of 
increase dropped, however, over 1960'8 in general and in second 
haCLf of the decade i n p a r t i c u l a r , AS l^s been mentioned, t h i s 
phenomenal increase in the production of crude o i l i n Kavait 
fo l lowed by the rapid shortage i n o i l prodaction i n the United 
s t a t e s of America and the Western Hend«>here, a c l e a r p ic ture of 
the trend i n the o i l production o£ Kuwait can be drawn by c a l c u -
l a t i n g average annual production for a period of f i v e years and 
25 
changes therein a s table 3 ,2 shows. 
Quite apart from the except icmal ly high r a t e s of annual 
increases i n the e a r l i e r years of the period, the f i g u r e s point out 
a steady f a l l i n the ra te of sttirual increase over the I960' s (from 
10% for 1960-64 t o 3,76^4 f o r 1965-69) , Increase in o i l production 
during the per iod 1960-64 was a t t r i b u t e d to the tnplementatlon of 
esqpropriation of cdocess ional areas under IPC and tertporary suspen-
s ion o f o i l production there l e d KOC t o increase i t s prochiction in 
Kuwait, In 1962, the Arabian Oil Company entered i t s second year 
of o i l e scort ing in Kuwait and i t s ra t e of growth was highest in 
1962, oSie dec l ine i n producticm of o i l daring 1965-69 was mainly 
due to the o i l supply from Libyan and Nigerian f i e l d s aond the 
27 Aj:ab-israel war. 
26. El -sheikh, Riad, , Op. c i t . , p ,45 , 
27, Al-sabah» Y,S .F . , Qp. c i t . , p ,46 . 
TftBLE » 3 . 2 
he 
Period 
1946-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
Average Annual 
Pro(^ctlon 
(In Mi l l ion Barrels) 
39 .6 
253.7 
456.3 
714.0 
929,4 
Average 
Annual Increase 
32.5 
8.8 
10.0 
3.76 
E3qE)ort of Oil aixd Revepues t 
The discovery of o i l in a profound quant i ty could make 
the production poss ib le on a ooimnercial s c a l e . After the termi-
nat ion of war and i t s recovery, production began in the raid of 
1945 and reached the leve l of 5,9 mi l l ion b a r r e l s i n 1946. Olie 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and oorapletion of wel ls and bu i ld ings made i t 
poss ib le to inaxigurate the es^port of o i l from the ten^orary marine 
28 terminal a t Fahahil on the l a s t day of CJUne 1946. This occasian, 
marked not only the end but the beginning of the company's pos t -
war achievements. P ipe l ines were l a i d down from the o i l f i e l d s to 
the export t e rmina ls . The por t - inc luded tankage to serve terminal 
29 purposes and a dredged small c r a f t harbour a3)e transformation 
of BCcaxmiY could be made poss ib le only through the eeunmings of o i l 
revenues against the export of cxrude. Oil revepaes has changed 
the s i tua t ion favourably. There was a severe need of oH to be 
used as a source of energy in the European ccnxntries whose econo-
mies were j u s t re leased frcm the e f fec t of war and they were 
s t r i v ing hard t o t h e i r recovery. Middle e a s t o i l producing 
count r ies psorticularly l^wait , were a t g rea t advantage of supplying 
them t h e i r o i l s . They could earn hige revenues through t h i s non-
renewable source t o change t h e i r economies. 
There had been g r ea t emphasis on the export of crude o i l 
since the beginning of transhipment of o i l in 1946 from the Pahahil 
Longrigg, Stephen lemsley; Op^  c i t . ^ p . 222 
i b i d . , p,223 
8i 
tsBxndnal. AS t ab le tehows, the eacport of crude o i l , thance en, 
had been on an increasing s c a l e . The revenues of the government 
through the sa les of crude o i l increased frcmi $ 0.76 ndll ion in 
1946 t o $ 11,52 millicjn in 1949 with an annual average increase 
of 172,e per cent i n 1947, 187.4 per cent in 1948 and 93,6 per 
cent in 1949, They had been am upward t rend in the e :^or t of o i l 
and the o i l revenues. Most of o i l produced wi thin the country, 
eixported to var ious count r ies l i k e Unitesi Kingdom, uni ted s t a t e s 
of Apierica, oejnnany, Japan, I t a l y and so on. The o i l revenues 
fur ther incireased from $ 16.09 ndl l ion in 1950 t o $ 57 mill ion 
in 1952 wi th in an aiusial average increase of 39.6 per cent, 
11,8 per cent, and 216,6 pe r cent i n 1950, 1951 and 1952 respec-
t i v e l y . The new discover ies of the o i l f i r i d s and d ivers i f ica t ion 
of the economy frora tradlticarial t rading a c t i v i t i e s of the o i l devel-
opments which i s , of course, the main source of the government's 
revenues. The development of ths o ther sec tors of the economy could 
caalY be made poss ib le a f t e r the development of o i l indus t ry and 
having achieved the present stage of the indus t ry . There had 
been treaomdous increase in the export of o i l and t h e i r revenues 
which Jttitped to $ 169 mil l ion in 1953 with an annual average 
30, Khouja, M.W„ and Sadler, P.O., Op. c i t . , p , 2 6 . 
r>;, 
TABLE - 3^3 
Tear 
OIL REVENUES TO TIE KUWMTI GOVERNMENTj 1946-1969 
{In M i l l i o n U . s Dol lars} 
o i l Revenues % Annual of Change 
1946 0.76 
1947 2,07 172.3 
1948 5.95 187.4 
1949 1 1 . 5 2 9 3 . 6 
19''^ 0 16 .09 3 9 . 6 
1951 18.00 11.8 
1952 57,00 216.6 
1953 169.00 195.6 
1954 194.20 14.9 
1955 281,70 45.0 
1956 293.70 4 .2 
1957 308.00 4 . 8 
1958 356.00 15,5 
1959 419.40 17.8 
1960 445.80 6.3 
1961 467.40 4 . 8 
1962 484.40 3 . 6 
1963 513.80 5 .7 
1964 554.40 7 .9 
1965 567.50 2.4 
1966 598.30 5.4 
1967 648.80 8.4 
1968 736.70 13,6 
1969 690.20 - 6 . 3 
sources « (i) El Mallakh« Ragae, and Atta, Jacob K.« 
Op. cit., p,2o 
( i i ) centra l Bank of Kuwait t Annual Report, 
1970 K., Op. c i t . , 
( i l l ) Khottja, M.w. and sadler , P.G., Op. c i t . , p . 2 6 , 
fit. 
increased of 195,6 pe r cent within only one yeau:. I t fur ther 
• t reched to $ 194,2o mil l ion in 1954, $ 281,70 ndLllion in 1955, 
$ 356 mi l l ion i n 1958 and $ 419.40 mill ion in 1959. I t further 
w«nt on i t an upward trend due to many reasons such as the 
increasing e f f o r t s of the country towards gaining control over t t e 
o i l r i g h t s and the formation of C3PEC, Ihe change in the payment 
system a s from roya l ty to 50-50 p r o f i t shauring through which the 
government had s t a r t e d earning j u s t half of the p r o f i t of the 
companies' o i l revenues. The Kuwait Oil conpany exported o i l of 
about $ 445.80 mi l l ion in 1960, $ 484,40 mil l ion in 1962, $ 554.40 
mil l ion in 1964, $ 598,30 mill ion in 1966 and $ 690.20 million 
in 1969. All these show tha t the e3?)ort has ever been in an 
upward t rend and so the revenues too . The o i l ccwnpany which 
e3?)orted more than 7000 tons of crude o i l i n 1946 increased i t to 
about 85000 tons i n 1963.^•'• 
The slowdown in the r a t e of growth of demand for o i l during 
the years i960 to 1967 was due to tlie recession in the United 
States of America, i^jestem Europe and Japan. This s i t ua t i on l a t e r 
improved and the r a t e of growth went up . Caae of the fac to r s which 
caused the sluggishness in the 'temand for o i l , was an increase in 
the demand for na tura l gas, which i s an important subs t i tu t e for 
fuel o i l in western Europe, as a r e s u l t of the increase in the 
31 . General Oil Affairs Department t Ministry of Finance 
and Indus t ry . , Cp. c i t . , p , 32 . 
n 
p r i c e s o£ o i l pxsoaacts and because natural gae i s not an a i r 
p o l l u t a n t . The Middle East c r i s i s of 1967 had i t s repercussions 
on the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n of esqpozrts of r e f ined products; 
the r a t i o of exports t o Western Europe decreased from 19,6 per c « i t 
in 1966 to 11,1 per cent in 1967 and further to i o , 5 pear cent in 
32 1968 and 6.6 per cent in 1969,'' Meanwhile, the r a t i o of exports 
of ref ined products t o markets East of Suez, re s ; from 42 ,8 per 
c « i t in 1966 to 47 ,5 per cent in 1967 then to 47 .7 per cent in 
33 1968 cttid to 57,5 per cent in 1969, The economics of transport 
are considered a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r in determining the markets of 
r e f i n e d prookicts s i n c e products are shipped by small tankers 
where t r a n ^ o r t c o s t per ton i s r e l a t i v e l y high as conpared with 
the c o s t of transport by large tankers, s p e c i a l l y for long d i s -
tances . The c o s t of t r a n ^ o r t a t i o n of crude o i l by large tankers, 
and of re f in ing i t near i t s consumer markets, i s rmich l e s s than 
that of ref ining o i l i n the producing coxmtries and then shipping 
i t to these markets. 
The government revenue per barrel of exported crude o i l 
has been f l u c t u a t i n g during the years 1953-1968. Although, a 
32 , Central Bank of Kuwait t 1 s t Annual Report for 1970, 
C^. c i t , , p , 1 4 . 
33 . i b i d . , p . 1 4 . 
50-50 p r o f i t sharing formulae was applied, the revanie was 81.7 
U , s c e n t s per barre l in 1958. The high l e v e l of revenues at 
that time was due t o the high Posted-price of Kawaiti carude, which 
was 180 c e n t s in 1957 and 185 in 1958, Lateron, the Posted-price 
decl ined to merely 159 c e n t s per b a r r e l . At the same time, the 
Pos ted-Pr ices were on the d e c l i n e for crude o i l wi th various 
g r a v i t i e s , but then, OPIC i n t e r f e r e d i n 1961 to prevent further 
c u t s in Posted P r i c e s , Posted Price for Kuwaiti crude reached 
i t s h ighes t l e v e l i n 1959 (185 c e n t s per barre l , a f t e r which i t 
f e l l to 159 in 1965-69).^^ Thxs, payments to Miwait over 1946-1950 
36 t o t a l l e d £ 13 m i l l i o n . I f we c a l c u l a t e the payments to the 
country over the per iod 1946-1969, i t reached t o 7840.79 mi l l ion 
U . S . d o l l a r s . Thus, niwait has been enjoying the o i l revenues as 
i t s main source of income and i t tes brought about a s i g n i f i c a n t 
change i n the econc»nic s tructure . 
( i i i ) IRICJHG SPqJCTORE mV OIL POLICY : 
pric ing structure i 
pr ior to the world war second, the p r i c e of o i l was 
determined by the Odl conpanies on the b a s i s of t h e i r pr i ce in the 
34 . i b i d . , p . 15. 
35. El-sheikhr SiSS-' *^ » *=^ *«* P.^* 
36. i b i d . , p.47 
United s tates of Anerlca, which unt i l the world w^ n , vas the 
major o i l •«5>plier In the world market. Looking into the history 
of o i l -pric ing, the following three stages are discernible t 
(1) The domination p£ the major o i l CGinpanies in the world 
o i l market unt i l 1950. 
(2) Entrance of the soviet Union in the world o i l market 
after 1950# which forced the Majors to lower prices, and 
(3) The emergence of OP£C in i960 and i t s e f for t s to organize 
the o i l escorting countries and to formolate the pricing 
and prockiction p o l i c i e s . 
The Domination i 
It i s substantiated by the fac t that the f i r s t f i f t y years 
in the history of the o i l industry, which developed admost exclu-> 
s ively in the United states , covering the period between 1859 and 
1909, were marked by the domination of John D, Rockefeller, who 
37 
was Buch concerned about gaining inccHoe from a monopoly s ituation. 
He took almost coraplete control and established a monopolistic 
posi t ion. standard o i l of California (socal) turned to be a 
cartel under Rocke£eler*s monopolistic poslticm. They gradually 
se t up enozmous contnezcial network covering Europe, China, Africa 
and i^s tra l ia . A new group of companies such as Shell Transport 
37. chevalier, Jean-Marie., oSie New Oil stakes, London, 
1973, p.15. 
) 
and ixadlng coiapaBy, entered the o i l baoiness and began to trans-
port o U produicts by aea« a f ter having b a i l t the f i r s t o i l tanlcer 
i n 1892, and l a t e l y bought a share of Gulf C41»s production. 
Later, they linked^-up wi th Royal Dutch ( j^ ie l l ) . They widened 
t h e i r inhere of marlcet a l l over the world, thereby reducing the 
c o s t . By that tiiae the Middle East had begun to p lay an i i ^ o r t a n t 
r o l e , wLlllara Knox d'Arey was awarded the Persian Oil Concession 
i n 1901, o i l f i e l d was discdvered in 1908 a t Masjid- i -ai laiman and 
D'ATcy founded the the An^o Persian Oil Coropany (APOC) 
39 l a t e r loiown as B r i t i s h Petroleum ( B , P , ) . 
vzLth the passage of tiiae, seme other ccmpet i tors jumped 
i n t o the f i e l d of o i l t o market the product. The seven Majors 
i . e , standard Oil of New Jer«y, Mobil Oil, Gulf Oil, Taxaco, socal , 
B r i t i s h petroleum (B,P.) and s h e l l had doninated the world o i l 
marlcet up to the end of world war I , The importance and the need 
of o i l had been wel l Judged dmrlng the war days. The p r i c e s of 
crude were based on American QLl p r i c e s , for tJnited s t a t e s being 
the l a r g e s t o i l producer: in the world. oSie u n i t e d s t a t e s ' o i l 
p r i c e s have been s t e a d i l y increas ing or maintained at a high l e v e l 
40 through the prorat ioning o r production r e s t r i c t i o n . The p r i c e s 
38, i b i d , , p . 16, 
39 , i b i d , , p , 1 6 . 
40, Jtmkins, Gi lber t ! Oil Bconomists* K&ndbooK London, 1977, 
p ,58 i Prorationing t - i s a meaaaare to l i m i t the 
crude o i l prodict lon to e l iminate d r a s t i c compe-
t i t i o n amongst crude o i l s e l l e r s . In U.S.A. 
vca.untary prorationing was f i r s t introduced i n 
1914. 
of o i l ID the world were mt In accordance with the "BajBlng^Point" 
or "Galf-Plus" lystan under which »attlf of Mexico* waa aipposed to 
be the only o i l prodacing centre, regardless of the actual source 
of origin. iSiese prices were also cal led 'Posted Prices• , The 
concept of 'Posted ^ i c e s * was f i r s t developed in the United States 
o i l Industry. It appears that i "It aiB?)ly means that any 
refiner or agent wanting crude o i l posts a price at which he i s 
wi l l ing to buy o i l from a specif ied f i e ld , from operator in that 
43 f i e ld , who may number in doassos^, Zt also included gathering 
costsr pipel ine charges, and o i l l e s s e e . The origin of the 'Gulf-
Plus* pricing systean, f i r s t came into use in 1927 by the logical 
method for pricing o i l under the prevailing supply conditions and 
industrial structure prior to the world War I I , AS i s evident 
44 from the following, 
(i) The united s tates Oil Industry was largest in the world. 
( i i ) Uhited s tates o i l e3q>orts from the Gulf of Mexico coa.»t 
covered a large part of the world, whereas the western 
Hemisphere and the Middle East supplies were s t i l l in the 
process of rapid esipanslon and developiMnt, 
41, Sayegh, Kamal s , , Ctt.1 and Arab Reglooal Development, 
praeger, London, 1968, p,49, 
42, i b i d . , P.49 
43, i b i d , , p. 
44, Frank, Helmut J, , Crude Oil prices in the Middle East., 
praeger, London, 1^66, P. 10. 
( l i l ) The Oilf of Mexico was the oRly place where Imports ooald 
obtain supplies and spot cargos on the open market to 
cover a»y l i k e l y repairenent. 
These conditions bad prevailed since 1880 when Rockefeller 
bad decided to widen the operations of his standard o i l Conpany a l l 
over the world while the other oon{}anies of Eastern He&ilqphere were 
not able to supply o i l shipment in unlimited quantity, as the 
AC 
united States* Oulf could. I t i s also substantiated by the fact 
that "The existence of a raoltiplicity of producers did raake i t 
necessary for the company as leading refiner and transporter to 
"Post" prices at which i t stood ready to purchase crude at the 
wellhead, so that numerous transactions occurred constantly at 
puOalished market quotations". Sven after tlws breakup of old 
Standard Oil conpany in 1911, t h i s system of Posted prices remained 
continued. Under the system of 'Gulf Plus* which was cost ly to 
the importers or the consuming countries of the Eastern Hemiaphere, 
the main benef ic iaries were the international o i l conpanies which 
charged such f ict icxial-cost of tanker trangport from the Gulf of 
Mexico. But t h i s system l o s t i t s contrive log ic by the eve of the 
world iiiar IX, when the Persian Gulf became loiown as the source of 
t h i s noiv-renewable source of energy for Europe and Asia. I t appeaurs 
45. i b i d . , p , l l . 
46. i b i d . , p.11. 
that during the world war i l i t was anomalous for the American 
and Bri t i sh navies to take de l iver ies of o i l at Abadan and other 
places in Persian Qulf, a t a price equivalent to the price pre-
vai l ing in Taxas port* plus a phantc»a freight charges, Taxas-
A)»adan. 
prior to the world v^r I I , the treuie of o i l was to make 
out i t s by-proAicts or refined predicts which were more cost ly and 
useful and the l e s s waste material remained af t«r i t s processing. 
I t was generally more econc»aical to process o i l near i t s source in 
big r e f i n e r i e s , ^ The re f iner ies were ioainly established in the 
United s ta tes . 
Therefore, the big American Oil C0B5>anies were in utn»st 
advantage of having high o i l pr ices . This led Bri t i sh government 
49 to object in 1944 t* purchase bunker o i l at these high prioes. It 
was so because the Bri t i sh government was trying to expand her 
naval command over the region and that needed hage quantity of fuel 
o i l . Discussions were started among the Brit ish and the major 
o i l companies. As i s evident from the fact that "It was set-off 
by an investigation by the Bri t i sh Auditor General of the prices 
paid by the Ministry of war Transport for fuel o i l at ports in the 
IndisiJ Ocean and the Middle East". It i s further mentioned that 
47. Chevalier, Jean - Mariei C|>. c i t . , p,20. 
48. Hartshorn, J ,E, , Cll Companies and Governments, Faber and 
Faber, London 1967, p. 144, 
49. sayegh, Kamal s , . Op. c i t . , p,49. 
"Under sach a "single basing point" sg'stttn the buyer (in t h i s 
case, the Brit ish Goverrunent) had no control over the origin of 
50 the o i l shipment". The Auditor General, henceforthr deemed i t 
f i t to raise objections during wartime which pennitted such an 
inefficiemt utilissatLon of v i t a l shipping space. 
Ihere was second objection too, that the bulk of Middle 
Bast o i l exports had gone to Europe and under t h i s 'Gulf-Flus' 
system the net retiuaa on shipment had generally been below the 
United s tates price, th i s , offsett ing the higher real izat ions on 
sedes in the east o£ aiez area. 
Moreover, the continuation of such policy, when Allied 
goveaaaments were receiving large quantities of o i l , was specially 
objectionable. Under the old pricing system, con^jaratively snail 
freight charges on ejqoorts were o f f se t by higher charges on others. 
However, l a t e r these appeared to be no longer jus t i f i ab le on the 
grounds of unity. However, the pre-war pricing method was out-
dated since the role of Middle East in the world o i l trade under-
51 went a fundamcsntal change. In contrary, the position of 
western HemiiQ>here had deteriorated while i t s large o i l resources 
had already been chunked by the war and the ef forts vere made to 
52 discover new o i l fields."* 
50. Frank, Helmut J., Ct>, c i t . , p , l 9 . 
51. i ^ d , , P.21. 
52. i b i d . , p.22 
When the demand for o i l trera«idously increased after the 
war and the contarol over prices vanished in the United states , the 
crude o i l prices at the united states ' Golf began to increase unti l 
they reached $ 2,75 per barrel . The prices in the Middle East 
S3 increased too, txxt prtaportionately at a lower rate . I t i s 
further substantiated from the fact that "As a resulr, "the centre 
of gratvity of world o i l production was shifting from the Gulf of 
Cjrlbbean to the Middle-East Persian Qulf area and was l ike ly to 
continue to sh i f t ," The Middle East was bound to play a far 
greater role in tha world o i l market than i t had before the war. 
I t i s evident that "The interest ing dlraensi<»i of the post-*»r 
American policy i s that iwerican administraticaa's European Recovery 
prograponme, and European cooperation Adrainis-tacation <ECA) were also 
prepared keeping the o i l strategy in mind. The strategy was to 
increase Europe* s depoidence on those industrial or resource sectors 
in which u , s , possessed coroparative advantage or controlling 
strength. One o£ these sectors was oH," 
Discussion continued long enough and t h i s concluded into 
an agreenient to modifying the "Gulf Plus* system. There an 
53, Sayegh* Kamal s , . Op. c i t -# P.49. 
54, Frank, Helmut J., Qp. cit,, p,22 
55, Asopa, Sheel K,, Oil, Jtfrms and Islam in the Gulf, 
Prmtwell, ^ Jaipur (jhdia), 198g, p,43 
! 
agreeraent reached on "Perstan Gulf" as a »• second-Basing Point" 
in 1947, t h i s , a l igning the p r i c e s f , o , b , Persian G\ilf on the 
p r i c e s f , o . b . Gulf of Mexico e l iminat ing the phantom f re igh t 
56 
charges . Although, t h i s new system of 'Duzd Basing Point ' 
decreased in the re^e tues of o i l companies which had been 
receiving out of the se l l ing p r i ce and the production c o s t s in the 
Middle East, remained considerable . Taking i n t o account the new 
system, the neut ra l po in t was l a i d somewhere between the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Persian Gulf, i , e , i the Mediterranian, At t h i s 
point , the p r i ce of o i l was a t the same, coun t r i e s s i tua ted on the 
eas t s ide of the point obtained suppl ies from the Middle East and 
57 
the o the rs fron th« Gulf of Mexico and Venezuela,"" Price in 
the Gulf of Mexico was under the ccmipfttition amongst the small 
p r iva te concerns which even affected the p r i c e s i n the in te rna t iona l 
market but a t low pace despi te the imposit ion of prorat ioning 
by the government of u n i t e d S ta t e s . Major o i l prodaclng c a ^ a n i e s 
are managed to red ice Middle East o i l p r i c e s as they could be 
succeeded in captur ing the Europeein meurket by supplying tha t the 
cheep Persian Gulf crude. I t i s t rue to the Adelman's view that 
t h e p r i c e of t l ^ American crude was determined by the raviltitude 
of Btnall producers outs ide the Ma^jors and they did not compete with 
56, Chevalier , Jean-Marie., Op. c i t . , p , 2 l , 
57. i b i d , . 
each other and ca lcu la ted the Middle Ea»t p r i ce s as they l i ked . ®^ 
I t was In t h e i r i n t e r e s t t h a t American p r i c e s should be high and to 
reduce the Middle East p r i c e s so as to capture the European 
jnarket and pene t ra te the JWJerican market, with other things, 
the major o i l conpanies had s t r iven well to conceal the rea l cost 
of production of o i l and even managed t o keep the exact wordings 
of t h e i r operating concessions in order to ca r ry on the i r p r o f i t s 
for a long by keeping them f ree from the d iscont inent of the o i l 
producing coun t r i e s . I t i s t rue to the f a c t t h a t in 1947, even 
the B r i t i s h government could not seek out the r ea l cost of o i l i n 
the Middle East desp i te having her r p r e s e n t a t i o n on the board of 
60 
d i r e c t o r s of Anglo-Iranian Qtl Co. (APOC) . In t h i s process, 
the producing count r ies were the u l t imate l o s e r s as were being 
esjploited by the operating Majors, 
At the eve of Vbrld War I I , the s i tua t i en took a s l i gh t 
turn i n favour of the producing na t ions . The governments began 
to seek out the d i r ec t ion of company's pol icy in order to bring 
f o r t h the f a c t before the eyes of pub l i c , iJiis unreasonable and 
i r r a t i o n a l p r ic ing s t ruc tu re gave way to the economic and o i l 
nati^onalism in which the government of the p r o ^ c i n g nat ions put 
58, cheva l ie r , Jean-Marie,, Op. c i t . , p , l 9 . 
59, Adeiman, M,A,, The world JE^troleum Market, 
Jolttis"lbpXln, Baltimore and London, 1972, p,150. 
60, Chevalier, Jea»-Marsy, Op. c i t . , p,154. >-^ f^ ^ 
t h e i r demand before the o i l qperatixig canpanies for the revision 
of p r i c e s t o be in t h e i r favoor, "'• The producing count r i es 
r ea l i zed tha t they should have had seme of the p r o f i t s of the 
Majors. 
En t r i es of New Independent Coiapand.es 
anyone Dnap i n the Fcjces i 
Many new independent companies entered the o i l laarXet 
which fur ther de te r io ra ted the p r i c e s t ruc tu re of the Middle 
Eastern o i l wi th t h e i r ccanpetitions. Russian entry as a f ree | 
suppl ier in the o i l inarloet had fu r the r flooded the market wMch j 
i l ed to fu r ther decrease in p r i c e s , i t i s even substant ia ted by 
i 
the f a c t tha t "veneau^a has played a v i t a l ro l e i n shaping the 
o i l p o l i c i e s of the paroducing coun t r i e s . When General Eleazer 
Lopoz Contreras, came to power a f t e r the death of Qcmez, he ore-
ssur ised the i n t e rna t iona l o i l companies t o increaf« t he i r taxes 
62 paid to the government. The government of venessuela could be 
able t o introduce 50-50 p r o f i t sharing formula by mald.ng an arrange-
63 
ment with the Cortpanies between 1950-52, The formula of 50-50 
61. Asqpa, Sftieek K., Cfi. c i t , , p . 4 3 . 
62. Maxtoharan, s . . The Oil C r i s i s t End of an Era, 
New Delhi i ind ia) , 1974, p,4 6, 
63. i b i d . , p ,60 . 
50-50 Foagaaula t This formula (50-50 p r o f i t sharing) was 
based on egaal d ivis ion of the na t iona l production p ro f i t , 
i , e , , difference between posted p r i c e s and cost, with 
roya l ty payaents (usually l2Js% of the Posted p r i ces value 
of output, taiken i n cash or o i l a t the govamment's choice) 
o f f se t g a i n s t the tcoc due to the s t a t e . 
profit Sharing was established in the Middle East, e»:ept in Iran. 
Under t h i s systsra^ the government of producing countries got 50 per 
cent of the total prof i t s of the Company, Bi th i s way, the pro-
ducing countries had an enormous prof i t for which they had never 
thought earlier^ The refusal of o i l coiiipanies operating in lean 
for the 50-50 ftrofit :^aring principle led the producing nation 
to revolt against them, Iran's annoyance over Brit ish invasion 
in the country coupled with her animosity over o i l companies* 
att i tude. But the ccnnpsmy tried to can5>ensate i t by guaranteeing 
Iran that the govemaant's revenues accruing from the prof i ts 
would not decrease below £ 4 mill ion a year. Though, Iran was 
offered 50-50 Profit l a t e r by the CooE|>anie6 fcJLlowing their 
Agreement with ^ u d i Arabia yet i t was l a t e enough tc be accepted. 
OSiereafter, the Royal Assent was given on May 1,1949, to the 
64 national isat ion. 
It i s substantiated fzcm the fact that "Mossadeght by a 
stroke of pen, had proclaijpaed the nationalization of the Iranian 
£S 
asse t s of Br i t i sh Petroleora (the former Anglo-Xranian)", Iran 
was the f i r s t of Middle Eastern o i l exporting ccauntriea which 
naticnalised i t s o i l indis try . But owing to the Majors' control 
over tankers and ref iner ies a l l over the wodd, Iran had to face 
64, Manc i^aran S„ Qp^ c i t . , P,46. 
65. Rustow^ Dankwart A and Mugno, John F , , Op^  c i t . , p ,5 . 
9^  ?Q 
prcbl«m». De»pit« shatdown in Iranian o i l production and i t s 
•upply, there was not f e l t shortage of o i l as the Brit ish Petroleum 
had accelerate i t s production in other Middle-Eastern countries, 
notably saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq (where B . P , had a half 
66 
share of the concession), iSie situation of world o i l marlcet 
rather than of the Majorat operating In th i s region, deterioted 
after the soviet entry. I t had evaded the monopolistic position 
of the Ha^oTB in maintaining the marlcet o i l pr ices . I t seemed 
d i f f i c u l t to control the overflow of o i l in the marlcet despite 
67 Iceeping the prices up i n 1957. The importing countries also 
68 
•xertftd pressure on the Companies to reduce the price . The o i l 
companies used to trani^ort crude o i l to their parent countries 
on lowsr prices and import the refined prodicts from thenn on a 
higher rates which caused further l o s s e s to the producing countries. 
a%e o i l CaQ#anies cut Persian Gulf o i l prices in 1959 and again in 
I960 to re f l ec t the wealcsning market pr ices , OSie Iranian Agreement 
of 1957 with the foreign o i l Companies provided the country with 
go 
75 pev cent prof i t through the increased income tax. I t 
encouraged Rawait and Saudi Arabia (who hanre equal sharing over 
Neutral aone) to gain their prof i t s from 50 per cent to 57 per cent 
66, ib id . , p .5 , 
67, StorX, Jeo, , Middle East-Ctil s^ Pcl the Energy c r i s i s . 
New York and lion<kon« 1975, p.87, 
68, Manoharan, S., QP. c i t , ^ P.52. 
69, Asopa, sheeL K,, Og^c i t . , p.44 
70 from the Company concexned. But the saez canal c r i s i s and some 
other reasons caused the Majors to drop In the prices which c u l t i -
vated a deep concern among prodiclag nations and ultimately they 
created organlsatlcxi of Petroleum E3<portlng Countries (CPEC) In 
order to mates the ir co l l ec t ive e f for t s to f ight v;lth the ij^surglng 
power of Majors* 
Rawaltl QLl PoJilcy t 
A vide qpread veaksnlng of the price structure took place 
In 1959 and again In 1960 when the operating Ccrapanies, without 
consultation with the proottdng countries, lowered posted prices 
71 on crude o i l . As the national Inccroe of the producing countries 
depended heavily on o i l revenues, cutting the prices of th i s v i ta l 
commodity effected their economies. Consec^ently these price cuts 
e3q>osed them to untdld darters stemming from the fact that reducing 
the prices would lead to def ic iencies In the revenues. Reacting 
to these price cuts which were not approved by the prodadng 
countries, the government of Kktwalt, In participation wl'&h Iraq, 
Iran and saudl Arabia, protested against t h i s one sided action by 
the Majors, lliese countries in participation with Votietauela, 
founded Organization of Petroleum Esqiortlng Countries (OPEC) in 
70, Chevalier, Jean-Marie,, OpI g i t , , p .23, 
71, Sl-Mallalch# Ragae,, Bconondc Deyeloprocnt and Reglopal 
Cooperation k Ji^mxT, Tiie Pniversitv oi! 
Chicago press, Chicago, 1980, p,54. 
I 
sep-tember 1961 to further strengthen the pooition of the o i l 
exporting nations. The Qcganiaation aervee asnan important step 
towards a jo int stud^ of o i l problems and the preparation of a 
unified o i l pol icy , Kawait* thus» l i k e OPBC, adopted a pol icy to 
conserve i t s non-rencrwable source of energy by deraanding a return 
to the prices in e f fect before 1959/1960 cuts . The government of 
Kuwait presented a mcmorendnm to a l l the operating Companies within 
Kuwaiti territory, which d e a z l f i e s the K&wait's o i l pol icy on 
72 
certain points related with, 
(1) Engageraent of Sbiployees 
(2) Birchaaes by the ccc^anies 
(3) Pension for Kuwaiti labourers and working hours 
(4) Arabi2;ation of the cccpany 
<5) Pa3fments to the country and 
<6) The prices of o i l 
Under the f i r s t point, t h i s pol icy restr ic ted the wxniser 
of foreign workers in the Company and directs the Company to 
increase the aomber of Kocwaiti workers and provide them T i^th the 
f a c i l i t i e s to encourage them to work with the Company. 
I f the number of Kuwaiti ^ p l i c a n t s for en^loyment i s 
insuff ic ient , other Arab c i t i s e n s might be employed. 
72, Oeaneral Oil Affairs Department, Co, c i t . , p.65 
s , i 
(c) Foareign %«orkers might be employed canly f oar special 
re<|aLired Jobs. 
(d) special qual i f icat ion holder foreign vorlcers night renew 
their contracts, 
Under the seaond point* t h i s pol icy restr icted the canpany 
t6 purchase the coRunodities through direct imports rather the 
CoBpany was boond to parchaiie ttie ccramodity f ran within the local 
market. If the commodity were not availaWLe the Company could get 
them imported through the local registered merchants. 
company was allcjwed to direct ly import saae of the heavy 
machinery which they needed for their dLilling and ea^leoration worlc 
and which Dxwaiti merchants could not import, 
Kavaiti government had to appoint a representative to attend 
the opening of a l l tenders made by the coi^any, 
contractors who warked as technical or designing consul-
tants for an o i l Cornpany were not allowed to take any contract. 
Regarding the pension for Kuivaiti labourers and their 
working hcurs, the o i l pol icy directed the company to have a pension 
scheme for their employees and the workers especia l ly for Bawaitis, 
2he pol icy further directed the Companies to reduce the 
working hours without reducing their wages and sa lar ies . 
8 , 
Government evident ly aaOced the o i l Cconpanies to t r a i n 
Kawaitis in a l l branches o£ t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
The government of Kuwait was concerned in hapring strong 
and f ru i t fu l r e l a t i o n s estaboished between the Oonpanies and the 
l o c a l controercial c i r c l e ^ , and to have these Cocnpapies deal with 
Kawaiti merchants to ac t iva t e loca l t rade and cu t down the r a t i o 
o£ conpanies' purchases front abroad. The goveminent was also 
i n t e r e s t e d in having ttie oil Companies en t rus ted t h e i r construction 
operatio»iS to locad con t r ac to r s . 
The signif icance of the o i l resources to Kuwait made the 
government exteeroely i n t e r ee t ed in the proper reservat ion of t h i s 
na tura l wealth* and thenceforth^ request the concerned o i l Companies 
to employ the most upto-date s c i e n t i f i c methods in t h e i r explora-
t i o n s of o i l . 
Government through t h i s pol icy, by r e s t r i c t i n g foreign 
labours* encouraged iQiwaiti workers and geeve a new d i rec t ion towards 
Arabizaticaa of the Company, ihe government intended to encourage 
Kuwait Haticmal Petroleum Coc^any to pioneer in to the f i e ld of 
explorat ion and production ra ther than confining i t s operat ions 
to loca l marketing. I t also aimed a t pa r t i c ipa t i ng in the operationi 
of t ranspor t ing both crude and ref ined o i l en nat ional o i l t ankers , 
Kuwaiti government had decided to se t up a n iwa i t i share Company 
for car ry ing-out vwrk r e l a t i n g to o i l d r i l l i n g and explorat ion 
within and outs ide the t e r r i t o r y . To t h i s venture, Kuwaiti govemroenl 
had also inv i t ed a l l reputed and esjperienced in te rna t iona l COR|>anies 
8-7 
73 
which were interested to go along with the lA&walt ac a partner. 
Thus, Kuwait had tightened her grip over the control of 
o i l industry by fornulatlng t h i s pol icy and picJoed vsp the adv^antage 
of being a free state after beccming independent in 1961. Bat 
la ter in 1972 after reaching her o i l production at i t s peaJii;, had 
adopted a s t r i c t 'Oil Conservationist Policy* to check the decline 
in the o i l pr ices dae to the fa l l ing o i l supply. 
Oil conservation Pogjcy t 
The concept of optimization of prof i t can be materialiaed 
only when one attains the highest possible leve l of i t s set of 
objectives, subject to a given set of constraints , since the 
objectives of economic and p o l i t i c a l agents in o i l induistry differ, 
an optiaum price pol icy w i l l be interpreted differently by 
different economic u n i t s . T3sree in t ere s t s are at play in the world 
o i l arena. First are the producing exporting countries which would 
l i k e to obtain the highest poss ible price at the lowest rate of 
production, second are the foreign o i l Coeapanies whose interests 
are to maxlmuse return on theix investment and l a s t l y the o i l 
consuming covmtries are interested in maximum access to crude o i l 
a t the lowest possible cost to thara. 
f 
73. i^i^.# P.66. 
POiMATICK OF OPEC JJID CftPEC mJ> TICIR 
we may now ^rery br ie f ly mention and the reasons for 
analyse the formation of Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and Organization of Arab petroleum Exporting 
countries (OAFEC) and their ef forts in maintaining prices and 
control over the production of o i l for the member s t a ^ s . Petroleam 
market vas controlled by the o i l conpanies; and the o i l prodacing 
countries were confined to offering the petroleum coicpanles *area* 
for exploitat ion against the payment of roya l t i e s . OAiey did not 
participate in any meaningful way in the determination of p r o j e -
ct ion er of price l e v e l . 
The postwar period since 1945 onwards was very profitable 
to the seven s i s t e r s . Between the years from 1913 to 1947# the 
total net prof i t to the o i l canpanies from t h i s region was $ 2,2 
billl<»if only $ 425 mill ion of t h i s was reinvested in the area 
while $ 1,7 b i l l i o n was transferred abroad as profit,' '* The o i l 
InAxstry i s legendary for i t s high pro f i t s and allegedly high 
r i sks . In the Middle East, the prof i t s are higher and the r i sks 
lower tlwn any place e l s e , Ofce bas i s for the fantast ic prof i t s 
i s the incredibly lew cost of prodiclng Middle East Oil, conblned 
74, Stork, jor , , Ct), c i t . , p,56. 
Si 
with the ar t i f ic ia l ly high pxice • t ruc t aze of the world o i l 
iiadustry. The average cos t of roaixitaining and es^anding prodaction 
in the Middle East was 16 cen ts pe r ba r r e l , while average 
Venezaelan c o s t s pe r ba r re l were 51 cen t s amd u . s c o s t s were 
$ 1,73, Prof i t s» crudely Bpea3d.ng, represent the difference 
between c o s t s and p r i c e s . The p r i c e s of o i l have been cont ro l led 
by the in t e rna t iona l Ccxipanies on the b a s i s of the p r i c e s general ly 
in the U.S.A. Any pr ic ing system based on ac taa l co s t s would 
have farced p r i c e s downward. The post-war economic reconstruct ion 
of Buurope and Japan required unprecedented amounts of petroleum, 
' t ransportat ion with the r i s e of aute»nobile and the change in the 
r a i l - r o a d s from coal t o d iese l fuel came to depend almost exclu-
s ive ly cm petroleum products . In contrast* the un i ted Sta tes of 
America, Jitpan and the Europe wiare almost r e l i e d upon source of 
o i l the bulk of which was con t ro l led by the American Companies, 
Thus, most of the o i l produced in the Middle East by the b ig g i an t s 
was being chinked by these i ndus t r i a l coun t r i e s . The aerat ion 
of var ious concessions o r ig ina l ly awarded before the viojdLd war I I 
were long enough say 75 yeau:s asid some of them were for a century. 
iSheBB long durat ions were u s ^ u l t o the Con^anies in order to 
e s t ab l i sh f irmly in the ficsld. Area covered were a l so vast , 
soo^tiroe almost the e n t i r e t e r r i t o r y (2Q3wait*lrag and Qatar), 
There was no provision in concessican to re l inqu ish them; and 
75, i b i d . , p . 58. 
s^ 
ne i the r these a reas wexe rel tngolehed by the conceaslonalres nor 
easpXoxed or explo i ted , ;#ien the producing count r ies put 
pressure on Cotnpanies^ there ex i s ted an i l l f e e l i ng . 
Despite the s ignif icance of the revenues dhie to o i l , the 
producing countr ies f e l t t*iat they %fere not having enough anncmry 
to control, the a c t i v i t i e s of ti^ o i l Ccxspanies. 39)e greater 
inportance of the o i l sc»ctor for the na t ional economy and absence 
of the e f fec t ive control by the na t iona l a u t h o r i t i e s over the 
behaviour of t h i s sector was made very d e a r when the oH caapmiS.es 
u n i l a t e r a l l y reduced the o i l p r i c e s , f i r s t i n l9§9 when per bar re l 
revenue declined frcxn 84«6 Ccsits i n 1958 t o 75*6 Cents and again 
76 in August 1960, Veneanela was the main suffexfer due to thede 
p r i c * fa l l s* because t l » cos t of production of i t s o i l i s the 
highest among the o i l e:t^orting countr ies , about 3 to 4 times 
g r ea t e r than the Middle Eas t . Moreover, t l ^ VeneaEuelan o i l reserves 
77 
are fa r l e s s than the Middle Eastern c o u n t r i e s , ' However, there 
weare a few strong reasons which forced the companies to reduce 
t h e i r p r i c e s . F i r s t , hecmiBB of the enforcanent of inpoart quotas \ 
i n the u ,S .A . "Shis crea ted a s ign i f i can t suxplus i n the World o i l , 
bu t the surplus made a t e l l i n g e f fec t on the p r i ce s t r uc tu r e . 
Second the a i t rance oE the soviet in the world o i l market who 
76, Manoharan, s.# C|?. c i t . , p ,50 . 
77. ih4-d,# P . 5 1 . 
SI 
sold I t s crude to I ta ly In Novecbco: 1960 at the rate eqalyalent 
of $ 1,00 per barrel f , o . b . Black sea was the equivalaat of 75 
cent f . o , b , Persian Gulf Ports which was actaally lower than the 
total of l i f t i n g cos t s plus governmental taxes and royalty charges 
78 
incurred by the typical Middle East producers/ Thirdly, the 
hraae countries of the o i l coiapanies brought pressore on them to 
reduce the prices dae to the increase in foreign exchange cost 
of the o i l inports . Meanwhile the p o l i t i c a l tensions and the 
aspirations of the Arabs made their impact on the o i l industry. 
Thas Arab League f i r s t took direct interest in o i l at the time of 
the Palestine t<ar in 1948, The shipment of o i l through pipeline 
froDQ Iraq to Haifa refinery was suspended. I t also put pressure 
on o i l companies to stop their o i l marketing in I srae l . Arab 
Leagvua, in l95l, set up an *oll Experts' Committee* abd aubse-
queatly a decision was taken In 1954 to make a pezmanont organi-
sation to look into o i l a f fa i r s , within the Arab League most of 
the ideas of paa^JWsio p o l i c i e s for o i l took shapif Here i f we 
look into the deep concern of Kuwait in regard with i t s growing 
need to intensify the movement to organise OPEC, i t would be found 
a jus t i f iab le step o£ Raw a i t . For instance. Royalty payments in 
1950 to the neighbouring countries, i , e , Iraq, Iran and saudi 
Arabia amounted to 22 cents per barrel, while Kuwait received 
80 
the equivalent of 13 cents a barrel, " This was a direct 
! 
79. Hartshorn, J .E„ Op,cit , , p,338 
80, MikdasdxL, zuhair, A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern 
Oil copcesalon tl^01-19§5, Breager,New YorkT" 
i9ii, p.83' 
) ^ 
advantqge to both APCX: and Gulf acting Joint ly rather than in 
coBipetition, This, c l ear ly shows that the financial terms obtained 
by Kuiwait %fere certainly l e s s favourable than those obtained by 
neighbouring countries. I t was because of Riwait being a br i t i sh 
pro-tectorate under the treaty of 1899 which was terminated in 1961 
and Kuwait becaane an indepondent s tate , 
Therefore, in s tort , growing o i l needs in the industrialized 
world which almost ent ire ly dependent upon Middle Eastern o i l , 
their e f for t s to lowering down the crude o i l prices to safeguard 
! 
their own economies and substitute energy sources, restrict ion j 
ixiposed by the United States of Aiaerica an the inporting of crude 
l ed to price cuts in 1959 and 1960 by 18 cents per barrel and 10 
cents a barrel reapectively, decreased the huge o i l revenues of oi l 
exporting countries, Iran's abortive e f forts in 1951 -co nationalixe 
i t s o i l industry and the stoppage of Iranian o i l production bet-
ween 1951 and 1954, closure of Suez canal in 1956 and the use of 
o i l as a weapon by putting an embargo on e3q>ort to U.S.A and Israel 
by some Middle Eastern o i l producing countries and soiue other 
p o l i t i c a l reasons were the factors creating a unity amongst Middle 
Eastern o i l exporting countries to es tabl i sh the Organization of 
Petroleum E3?>orting countries (QPEC). 'Hheae o i l exporting 
countries had a ccnsciousness for o i l since they found themselves 
to have a control over their own valuable source. They were 
confined to merely the recipient of royal t ies against their 
valuable source of energy. Thus, they coiad no longer stayed 
merely as watcher of the gara .^ ultimately they had to unite to 
'U 
oxganlM the Cartel (OEEC). Five b ig o i l producers t Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, saudi AT^ia and Veaeseuela, fonoed the "Organiiation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in aeptentoer i960. These f ive 
founding meiriber countries passed a resolution in Baghdad ccxiference, 
81 in regard with the o i l po l i c i e s , anad functions of the ocganiaation. "^  
QcganizatioB of Petroleuia Exporting countries (OPEC) was 
the idea of combining, within the framework of such an organisaticwi, 
was not a thought which came overnight. It had occupied the minds 
of es^^erts and p o l i t i c i a n s i n the o i l exporting countries for 
several years before. CGPEC was founded to safeguard the interests 
of the petTQleum exporting countries in the face of conpanies which 
82 
ccotrol led prices and had Icwered them several tiraes. The prime 
Gbj€»ctives of GPEC wore t to persae a cotaroon pc^icy and strategy 
in dealings with the o i l coispanies; secondly, to get the Posted 
prices restored to the leve l prevailing before 1959 and 1960 
reductions node by the o i l con^anies, and thirdly, to get the oi l 
coopanles to notify CPEC and i t s laerrtoers of any price change in 
83 futore. Further meetings of GPBC followed in quick succession. 
T?hey had the ef fect amongst other things, of holding the s t i l l new-
born organisation together against any internal and external 
attenpts to break up the jo in t front. 
81, Manohoran, s , , Ct), c i t . , p,55 
82, Al-Otaiba, Mana Saeedi OPEC i_apd the Petrolevim aidustry, 
Crooin HBIK ,^ London, 19^S, p.47. 
83, Khera, s. S„ Oil t Rich Maa Poor Man, National 
N«s!W Delhi iOhdia) i579, p , l 61. 
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During the alxt iee , the coBapanies resorted to nunber of 
tact lce to prevent the newly fanned GPEC frocn real iz ing i t s aim 
of adjusting posted pr ices up%fard. The Ccrapanies were of the 
following arguments i 
1, There was an increasing surplus of o i l in the world. 
2, Independent o i l Coitpanies were giving tcugh coinpetitiai 
and forcing pr ices dcwn, 
3, Bcessore of soviet eaf>orts on M^ors to cut dcwn their 
pr ices . 
However, to have the new capacit ies , the story of surplus 
proves odd for the C(»tpa»:iies investing in the North Sea, Alaska 
and elsewhere. In any case, the conpanies not only tamed the 
taps on and off to m«»et exactly the quantit ies consumed but also 
developed saxplus cs^ac i t i e s to presazriise one country or the other 
During aixtiesy they were pressurising the entire OPEC. The 
rea l i ty i s that production capacity has always beai a part of the 
o i l industry without xresulting in over-supply, soviet o i l was 
never thought of being a threat as i t came very slowly iiK:reasing 
trcxa 16 million tons of o i l exported outside t2% sociaaist countH 
rie«, to ^ o u t 30 mil l ion tons in 1956. Independent o i l Companies 
never made prices in the situation t in t existed at that time, but 
rather followed the Majors in pricing decisions as marginal 
producers normally, ^ 
84. Jaidah, All M,, an A p p r a i s a l ^ OPEC Oil Pol ic ies , 
Iton^an, i^ ondon, 1983, p . 20 
85. i b i d , , P.21. 
0 ••; K; 
MMSting a f t e r meetings held a t d i f fe ren t p l ace s , January 
1961 saw a meeting in Caracas (vcnezulla) and l a t e r in October of 
the same years a f\ irther meeting was held i n Tehraon, A fourth 
meeting zond^  perhaps, more inportcuit than of 1961 mceetingsif vas 
held a t Geneva in June 1962. By t h i s time, the OPEC had gained some 
e ^ e r i e n c e of mechanics of working together emd of the reac t ions of 
the o i l companies to t h i s new t h r e a t t» t h e i r v i r t u a l monopoly of 
the interr jat ional petroleum t rade and industxY. *he Geneva meeting 
adopted a nuisber of r e so lu t ions , while ca l l i ng for the irauediate 
i n i t i a t i v e s t o he taken by the CPEC, of nego t i a t i cus with the 
Conpanies to r e s to re the p r i ce reductions of 1960, Two further 
reso lu t ions ca l l ed upon OPEC members to formsiate t he i r own long 
term pol icy for petroleum pr ice* , and the p r i c e s index of goods 
imported by the OPEC menftaers to be made important fac tor in future 
86 
p r i ce lervels for petroleum, iSie e3q>ort of o i l was s t ressed 
because of bringing huge revenues to these coun t r i e s which 
heavi ly r e l i e d on the p r i c e s of crude for t h e i r income ra ther 
than on the sa les of f in ished products , Qatar Joined CPEc in l961, 
Indonesia and Libya in 1962, Abu Dhabi in 1967, Algeria in 1969, 
Niger!II j o i n e d in 1971, and Equador in I973®^aiwait, being a 
founder membea:, ever played an important ro le in CFEC, and i t s 
menisership cMinrnenced p r i o r t o the cessat ion of the agreement with 
86. Khera, S.S., C^. c i t . , p . i e ? . 
87 . Khouja, M,W, and Sadler, P.O., CD. c i t .^ p,7o 
in 
Britain, In fact* the f i r s t Secretary of OPEC vas a Wiwaiti 
national cind the development of OPEC v i th Kuwait as a raeniber was 
an important aspect of Kuvait*s ^pearance in the international 
pol it ics .®^ 
Increase in Reyenmee t 
Even though* CPEC's endeavour to restore posted prices 
fa i led , but t t e organization^ merely by i t s continued existence 
aand potential power, did succeed in preventing any further cuts 
in the face of continually declining o i l pr ices on the European 
market. Posted crude prices remained at $ 1,59 a barrel in iOtiwait 
89 for raany years. Owing to the constant prices for some tirae, the 
crude u l l production remained increasing with slow pace and so as 
to i t s revexues. Kuwait produced 619,2 million b«urrels at the 
rate of 1,69 ab/e i n 1960, I t increased to 861,4 ndllion barrels 
9o 
at the rate of 2,3 nifc/d in 1965, These f igures could make 
Klixwait possible to earn $ 445.QO mill ions in 1960 which increased 
9l to $ 554,40 million In 1965 BO as to i t s revenues. The pre-
vention of further price cuts resulted in the earnings of 50 per 
cent of the total prof i t s of the Coii|>any to the producing countries. 
But there was s t i l l no formal r^ognit ion of CS>EC*s existence on 
88, i b i d . , p, 
89, El Mallakl, Ragae^, Ot>. c i t . , p .54. 
90, El-Mallakh, Ragaeiand Atta, Jacob K,, Op^ c i t . , P.20, 
91, Khouja, M,w. and i^dler, P,G,, Cs>^ c i t , , P. 26, 
•9, 
the part of the coqpanles, or of the princdlple of co l l ec t ive 
bargaining, 
Relipyiiahment of the Area s 
I t i s al»o subs tant^^ that **aae of the moat notable 
changes was the rel ln^is lroent of over haJ.f of the original 
92 Concer>sion area in 1962", This area, thev caiae xuder the control 
of the Kuwait National petroleum Conpany (la^ PC) whix:h was 
establialied in i960 with the Kuwaiti govemiaent's sobscribtion 
of 60 per cent of the original shares, i^wait Oil Con¥)any (WIPC) 
was involved <»ily with the local marketing of Rawait d l Ctxi^any's 
(KOC) refinery proaict;. unt i l KOC relinqaished about 9262 sgaare 
93 kilaaetres of i t s concessio: 'area, i\s i s evident from th i s 
"A schedule of progressive and more accelerated relinquishnent of 
acreage of presoat ccwitract areas shall be introdiced. In any 
event, the government shadl participate in choosing the acreage 
to be religuished, lucduding those cases where rellnguishnnent i s 
already provided for but l e f t to the discretion of the operator."^* 
However, opEC has been proved a carte l in real sense for 
some time unt i l the control of o i l was sl iped off i t s hands. I t 
92, &1-Malla3c« Ragae and Atta, Jacob K,, Cp, c l t . , p. 12. 
93, El Mallakh, Ragae, C .^ c i t . , p.46, 
94, OPEC t £|>ocial Resolution and Press Release t 1960-1980; 
'Resolutions of the sixteenth CPKC ConferCTce*, 
Vienna, June 24-25, 1980, p .81. 
' ! • > 
has r e a l l y provided a l o t to the o i l exporting countr i e s a f ter 1971 
when the p r i c e s jumped h igh . But i t appears that "During 1960s, 
however, C3PEC found i t d i f f i c u l t to exer t c o l l e c t i v e pressure 
d i r e c i i y on the o i l coinpanies. The CcMiipanies refused to t rea t 
wi th OPEC as a l e g i t i m a t e spolcesman for the member n a t i o n s and 
95 i n s i s t e d on n e g o t i a t i n g wi th each nation i n d i v i d i a l l y * , In 1962 
OPEC had delegated, i t s secretary , the authori ty of negot ia t ion 
with the Con^anies regaarding the matters axch as roya l ty es^panding 
but the o i l producing na t ions had t o deal i n d i v i d i a l l y wi th them 
as the conipanies had already refused t o n e g o t i a t e with CPBC 
96 
cx j l l e c t i ve ly , 
formation of QAPSC and i t s Irpact s 
1967 Arab-Israel c o n f l i c t f u e l l e d the f i r e and the most of 
the CPEC members put an embargo on, t h e i r export t o , Igcael and i t s 
a l l i e s , ihe c r i s i s of 1967 v?as more severe than of 19DG account of 
97 the fo l lowing b a s i s t ' 
( i ) only Saudi Arabia and iftiwait had enough resources of funds 
t o cope with the s i t u a t i o n of shutdown for more than 60 days. But 
95, Tetreault , Mary Ann,, The ocganigatJon of Arab Petroleum 
Expecting Coun-cr3.e6 t mistory^ JPoiicies, an^ 
prospects , greenwood, London, 1981, P . 4 0 . 
9 6 , i b i d , , p,40 
97, i b i d . , p ,43 . 
I 
•f I 
t o t a l ahatdcwn of i n B t a l l a t i o n s was ga i t e reveraed, 
( i i ) The United Sta tes of America and European na t ions had 
already es^erienced of the shor t fa l l in o i l despi te increased 
p r i c e s owing to the high t r a n ^ o r t a t i c n cost , on account of the long 
sea rout was being used v ia Africa coas t ins tead of aiez Canal, 
Sizeable reserves were l a i d down by the inpor t ing nat ions in 1956 
axez c r i s i s and i t was estimated tha t the European nat ions could 
have survived on t h e i r reserved stocks for a t l e a s t 6 months. 
( i i i ) In 1967, the U.S.A by using i t s reserve stock (invento-
r i e s ) , and increasing domestic production, not only s a t i s f i e d 
i t s indigaaeous requirements taut was also in the pos i t ion to t r ans -
por t more than 23,5 thousand b a r r e l s per day to Europe, 
(iVD In 1967, I ran and Venezuela produced an addi t ional 
8,50,000 b a r r e l s of o i l per day which fur ther de te r io ra ted the pr ice 
structaire. 
(v) F ina l ly , the Russia and i t s a l l i e s * production had come to 
i t s previous leve l which had improved the o i l market sitaiation in i 
I 
favour of importing na t i ons , | 
I I 
Effec ts of 1967 C r i s i s a j 
"" i 
(1) The o i l ^libargo and cufr-down in production ser ious ly 1 
de te r io ra ted the f inanc ia l s i t u a t i o n of Arab States,^® | 
98, i b i d . , P ,43. 
H/i 
(2) The government of these na t ions were h i t by the s i tuat ion 
which r e su l t ed in the severe need of finance to revive i t s damaged 
conditicai and hoped to withhold o i l from fr iendly na t ions . I t s 
99 
c a p a b i l i t i e s were damaged. 
Having such a b i t t e r experience of c r i s i s of f inancial 
re^^urces owing to the entoargo and production cu t , the Arab o i l 
exporting na t ions , decided to recover t h e i r damages^ and agreed 
upon to seek out a su i t ab l e solut ion for which there were two 
approaches came out in t h e i r meetings held in 1967, 
iBt Approach t 
Iraq, having support of United Arab Emirates, (UAE), Syria 
and Algeria, proposed the following remedial measures to cope with 
the ex i s t i ng s i t u a t i o n s 
(1) complete embargo on Arab o i l e3<por-t to the United s t a t e s 
of America, Br i ta in , I s rae l and i t s a l l i e s which aimed a t stoppage 
of flow of o i l to t he Zionis t and i m p e r i a l i s t s . 
( i i ) Complete embargo on the flow of o i l flowing through pipe-
l i n e s accross the Arabian s t a t e s ' t e r r i t o r y , 
(111) complete c losure of Suez Canal. 
99, i b i d . , P.44 
,9J 
This, the following r e w i l t s could poss ib ly have been 
achieved by adopting sach hard-core pol icy or approach t 
(i) Arab re l i ance on W( t could have be®i a l l ev ia t ed 
or miniiaised, 
( i i ) There could have been a s h o r t - f a l l in the foreign eaachange. 
lb t h i s way, the r e s u l t s seemed such b l eak . 
second approach t 
•j^iis approach, ra ther moderate and l en ien t , was proposed 
by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Lybia which was observed t o be more 
favourable. 
These count r ies proposed^ as t 
(i) Cdl shipment should be resumed. 
( i i ) Pa r t i c ipa t ion of Arab naticxis in the o i l industry 
should be on l a rge r s ca l e . 
( i i i ) Higher o i l p r i c e s should be demanded. 
(iv) Fn^ds in the forms o£ o i l p r o f i t s and increased tax 
should be spent by the prosperous na t ions on recona* 
true -ion of war-hi* Arab s t a t e s , 
(v) I t was proposed tha t the moderate step should be 
taken through nego t i a t i ons . 
100 
(vl) The establishment of Organization of Arab Petrol earn 
Ejqjorting count r ies (OAPEC) was proposed with the 
r e s t r i c t e d entry of Arab s t a t e s whose xnain source of 
r e r en i e was petroleum expor ts . 
There had been some other f ac to r s also which l ed Arab-oil 
producing na t l cns to e s t a b l i s h OAPEC such as i t i s evident froro 
t h a t "In the pas t and daring the 1967 c r i s i s the nan-oi l producers 
were usua l ly the most vociferous i n regard to ca l l i ng for the use 
of the o i l weapons, ihe 1967 embargo had ser ious ly cr ippled the 
101 econcwiies of the l a rge producers ," 
Ttus, the moderates who proposed the second approach* wen 
unt lmately , The p a r t i a l embatgo was l i f t e d in aeptentoer 1967 and 
Middle East Oil p a t t e r n came back to normal but the t r a n ^ o r t a t l o n 
was s t i l l unusual due to the continued closure of Suez Canal. 
I t i s subs tant ia ted from the f ac t tha t Idbya, sptudi Arabia, 
and Kuwait p a r t i c i p a t e d in the signing of the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Escorting Countries (OAPEC) Agreement on January 9,1968, 
but without any represen ta t ive from Iraq^?'^ There were three 
reasons of I r a q i absence and i t s a p l i t with o the r s . F i r s t , I r a q i s 
100. i^ i^ .# P.44 
101. i b i d . , P.44. 
102. i b i d . , p ,46 . 
If] 
w«re of the view t h a t the OAPEC'S exclusiveness might occuj: i n t r ^ -
Arab d iv i s ion , They were opposed of not allcwing a l l the Arab 
na t ions , but o thers were i n favour o£ allowing csnly those Arab 
coun t r i e s whoi^ main source of revenue was o i l , second* I raq was 
a t odds with OAPEC# because of the leve l of independence QAPEC 
enjoyed froro i t s mena»ers s t a t e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as r e f l ec t ed in the 
provision for an OAPEC cour t t o a r b i t r a t e d i l u t e s among the 
members. Third and f ina l reason of I r a q ' s opposition, was of the 
103 locaticm of OAPEC headquarters i n Kuwait r a t h e r than in Baghdad, 
Kuwait, was the venue of i t s f i r s t conference, v^ h^ich held 
on September 9-11,1968, The admissions of the mexribers were 
approved but I r aq and Algeria did not jo in because of t h e i r p o l i -
t i c a l differences with the founding members. After 1967, a short 
l ived, i l l concieved - i t was opposed by Saudi Arabia - embargo on 
petroleum going to the U,S,A,, West Germany and the U,K, had fa i l ed 
to have any impact (because the u , s , A , Oil inpor t was only 3,00,000 
b a r r e l s per day and because the o i l conpanies increased t h e i r r a t e 
of output in venemela and I r an ) , t he o i l producing count r i es 
decided tha t the bes t way t o use o i l as a "weapon" was t o t ransfer 
some of the o i l revenues to the so-cal led •confrontaticn s t a t e s ' 
104 
Of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria,-^ . AS a matter of fact , OAPEC had 
very l i t t l e inpac t on the world petroleum marker p r i o r t o October 
1973, Though, OAEEc had c e r t a i n l y strengthened the pos i t ion of Arab 
Oil Coxin t r i e s and t h e i r prockicts, 
103. I b i d , , P.47. 
104, i b i d . , p , 4 7 . 
CHAPTER IV 
OIL INDUSTRY DURING 1969-1985 
ini 
OIL MVOSaSCS IXRWG - 1969-85 
Bi the preceding chapter, the l eve l of develc3pi»ent sizice 
the Incepticsn of o i l indus t ry was assessed. oSie economy t rans -
fonaed amly a f t e r the f i r s t explorat ion and xipstreain of o i l , 
Ea^ort of o i l has improved the capac i ty to absorb the imported 
goods to a l a r g e r extent through i t s abundant inflow of revenues, 
Eis^ansion of o i l indas t ry , the development of i t s in f rae t ruc tura l 
stttup# improvements in predic t ion of o i l and increase in o i l 
revenues through changing financing s t ruc tu re s and p o l i c i e s have 
already been r e f l e c t ed in the preceding chapter . 
Here, i n t h i s chapter, an ana lys i s i s made t o know the 
fu r the r developments of o i l i ndas t ry . An a t t«npt has been made to 
analyse the world o i l s i t ua t ion , t rend in o i l p r i c e s , revenues and 
proiixction. Changing OPBC's, CAPEC's and others* po l i c i e s in 
regard with the o i l impply, demand and p r i c e s have a lso been 
included i n t l » stady. An asses snent of dcwnstream operations in 
Kuwait and i t s o i l p rospec ts has been made. 
(i) world pqaaand For and supply of ca.1 t 
MLth the ©naergence of o i l in the world energy market, i t 
has become the focus of world a t t en t ion within a span of time, the 
need for o i l has been consideraOaly ascending because of i t s utmost 
10 
usefulness. This non-renewable source of energy has proved to 
be the 'engine of growth'. I t has been severely needed in thB 
time of war and peace both. The experience of two world wars 
c learly dononstrated the significance of o i l . sometiiaes i t 
became the bone of contention between the two r ivals , some times 
i t became the source of friendship among the r iva l s , since i t s 
emergence, o i l has replaced the most important source of energy 
i . e . , coal. The consumption of o i l had continuously increased, 
from 5,3 per cent in 1925-50 to 7,6 per cent in 1950-65 and 8,5 per 
cent in 1965-70, with an average of 6,5 per cent . Cdl consmiption 
rose sharply uninterrupted in USSl in 1965 onwards. I t was the 
result of the increasing rate of production. World c i l supply 
and demand can be catagorized in following three stages as 
2 
suggested by the Centrad Baenk of Kawedt. 
1. First stage ~ l945 — i960 
2 . second Stage — l960's 
3 . Third stage — 1970's 
In the f i r s t stage, supply of o i l reraained substantially 
and constantly increasing, Ohe supply side was strong enough and 
surpassed the demand. I t was the period when the new o i l f i e l d s 
were being discovered, and due to the esq^lorations, o i l ovex^ 
flowed in abundance to meet the growing world demand in order to 
1, Issawi, Charles, o i l . The Middle East and the world. 
Sage Put>ilcations, London, 1972, p .4 . 
2. Central Bank of Kuwait t "The RawaitiEconomy in Ten Years", 
Economic Report for the Periodi 1969-1979,p,23 
racorer the dsaag^s ^nd blofws o£ the l«>rld V)ar l l , IXirlng the 
period 1945 »id 1959, the prlcses of o i l in the vorld market r«nained 
increasing. Howeyer, the two price cute tn 1959 and 1960 deterio-
rated the producing countries but encouraged the importing countries. 
£ven after the e^tabiishraent of OPEC, the prices of o i l renained 
unchanged and t h i s sitaation did not affect the consuxoption. 
In 1950< the world o i l production vas es t i iaat^ at 379 i , i 
million barrels at the rate of 10.38 million barrels per day« i t 
rose to 7674,4 million barrels in 1960 at the rate of 21.02 million 
barrels per day by an increase of 102,4 per cent or^ er a decade's 
period. During the same two decades, the demand for o i l in the 
vorld (eaocluding s o c i a l i s t countries) increased by an anmal 
3 
average rate of 7,5 per cent . iSiis i s substantiated by the fact 
that "The highest rates of growth in o i l consuraption were recorded 
in Japan and T e^stemti Europe, 2o per cent and 11 per cent per annum 
4 
reapectively*. The rate of cxsnsumption of o i l ixi the world 
Increased during 1950s and 1960s on accoxmt of the fas t development 
and industrial ization a l l round. The production of o i l rose 
sharply owing to the increase in the rate of e3?>lorations and new 
dlcK»>verles, 
3. ih idw P.23. 
4. i b i d . , p.24. 
m the third stage starting from 1970 onwards* the pro<ixc-
tion of o i l rose steadi ly from 4 7 , U million barrels per day in 
1970 to 63.2 mill ion barrels per day in 1979, baring in 1974 and 
1975, in which the dax>p of about 50 per cent over the year 1973 
was recorded. The over a l l production from 1970 to 1979 increased 
by 34 per cent. The year 1979 was observed as the peak year by 
the world o i l prodaction point of view. In th i s way, the T-Jorld 
o i l market situation remained balanced diring t h i s ^an of time. 
But the price war favoured the producing camtr ies and they earned 
a l o t even by cutting their proaxcticns. The overall situation 
of the supply side in the world, showed a negative growth from 1979 
onwards. I t dropped by (-1,8 per cent) to 62.04 million barrels 
per day in 1980, and further decreased by 6.5 per cent to 58 
million barrels per day in 1981. Decrease in the rate of proAio-
tion of o i l was an outcome of the decline in rate of anrual o i l 
discoveries. The drop in the rate a£ consumption or oil in the 
world was mainly due to the a l l around economic stagnation in 
industriali«e<I countries, the appl icabi l i ty of o i l conservation 
pol icy in the industrlalissed world owing to the shortage of o i l 
g 
supply and inadequacy in future o i l supplies. 
If we look into the situation beginning from 1979 onweurds, 
we find that the sluggishness in economic a c t i v i t i e s in 
5. ib id . , p,25. 
6. i b i d . , p.25, 
I On 
InaustrlallaBd naticsns and rationalized u t i l i za t ion of energy 
7 
particularly of o i l , l ed to a drop in the consumption. 
( i i ) Trendg in prices, Revetmeg and production t 
price of Oil s 
The most s ignif icant development of the period between 
1969 and 1985 was in regard with the price of o i l on account of 
which the oil-producing/e3<porting countries of the Middle-East 
could have controlled their economies, Ihe developnent i n crude 
o i l prices enaMed the escorting nations to have control over 
their indigenous non-renewable mineral resource, The prices of 
o i l remained almost unchanged or stagnant at $ 1.59 per barrel 
since the establishment of Organization of Petroleum Esqjorting 
countries (CPEC) in i960 upto the f i r s t half of the year 1970. 
But the Arab-Israel war in 1967 caused severe below to the posi-
tion of the Ma^ jora, operating in the Middle £a«t. However, the 
Suez Canal c r i s i s did not d irect ly af fect the western European 
nations, even in the situaticn c^ short of o i l supply to them 
because of the in^>osition of embargo by the Middle Eastam o i l 
e:jq)orting nations. But i t rather caused a shortage of vesse l s 
which ultimately turned the tide in favour of o i l exporting 
naticns as the high cost of transport resulted in the increase of 
o i l pr ices . 
7. i b i d . , p,25. 
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TABLE " 4 . 1 
miCES OF KUWaT C31UDE OIL OF 31 API 
( U . S . Dol lar per Barrel ) 
Year priOB % change 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1980 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
(l January) 
(l Novernber) 
( l January) 
(1 May) 
1.72 
1.72 
1.85 
1,85 
1,67 
1.59 
1,59 
1.59 
1,59 
1,59 
1,59 
1,59 
1.59 
1,59 
1.59 
1,68 
2,18 
2.37 
4.82 
11.54 
12,15 
12.07 
13.30 
12,27 
12,83 
25,50 
27,50 
29,80 
35,08 
32.30 
27.80 
27.30 
27.21 
7 .5 
- 9 , 7 
- 4 . 7 
5 .6 
29,7 
8.7 
103,3 
139,4 
5.2 
- 0 . 6 
10.1 
98.7 
7.8 
8,3 
17,7 
- 7 . 9 
- 1 3 , 9 
- 1.7 
- 0 .3 
sources t conputed on the basue of t 
( i ) El-Mallakh# Ragael, Economic Development 
cooperation i Kuwait Chicago,tfs^, 19fe ,p,54 
( i i ) El Mallakh, Tagaei and Atta, Jacob K , . The 
jifcsorptive Capacity of Kttwait, LexingtonT" 
TofontoV 1^81, p , i 9 
( i i i ) centra l Bank of Kuwait s Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l 
B u l l e t i n January-March,vol, 14 ,No , i ,p ,34 
10 
The price of Kuwaiti crude of 31° ARC went-on in an iQyward 
trend since 1970. Price of o i l which had been stagnant at 
$ 1.59 per barrel since the establishment of Organization of 
Petroleoni Escorting Countries (OPEC) in i960 increased to $ 1.68 
per barrel on 14 November, 1970. The posit ion of the econcmiy 
further strengthened when price rose to $ 2,085 per barrel on 
15 i^bruary 1971# $ 2.188 per barrel on l JUne, 1971 and $ 2,48 
per barrel on l January, 1973. I t i s substantiated from the fact 
t l ^ t **Three sets of causes, oozmected with the slump in supply, 
the increase i n demaid and cos t s and the unbalanced wnergy situa-
tion in Aperica, help to e3qE>lai|i what triggered off the 1970-73 
c r i s i s and what sustained it". Apart from these fac ts , thftre 
were some e f for t s too, made by QPEC in regard with the adjustasient 
of tiie pr ices of o i l for i t s members diring seventies . With the 
increase in i t s o i l prices , Kuwait accelerated tAd pxodtiction which 
reached i t s peaJc at l 2 o i , 6 million barrels at the rate of 3,28 
million barrels per day in 1972, " These increases were reflected 
by the change in the OPEC pol icy which occurred in i t s agreement 
signed on 14 February 1971, in Tehran. ^ •'' under t h i s agreement. 
8, El Mallakhf Ragaei and Atta, Jacob K| 'ihe Absorptive \, KagawL ana xxa, o acoo .| Tne PSorptxve 
Capacity of lOawait, liexlngton, Toronto, 1981 
9, chevalier, Jean-Mariei Tte New Cll ataJces^ Allen 
Lane, London, 1^75, p.35. 
10. central Bank of Kuwait • Economic Report 1969-1979| 
op. c i t . , p.35 
11, Chevalier, Jean-Marie,, Op. c i t . , p .51. 
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the minlnRim rate of taxaticaa was increased from 50 per cent to 
55 per cent. uniforinity of Posted Prices and an increase of 33 
12 Cents per barrel from a l l Gulf countries were agreed upon. 
Quality differential was set up according to which o i l of above 
40° API was to be sold with 2 Cents per barrel per degree in 
addition to the price of o i l o£ l e s s than 40° API with the 
decrease of 1,5 Cent per barrel in i t s price . All the disccunts 
were eliminated. Other things which included i n the "TBhr i^ 
Agre^nait' were t an annual increase of 2,5 cents per barrel in 
Posted Prices to cover inf lat ion on iirported good«, an additicmal 
increase of 5 Cents per barrel of o i l because of the increase in 
the prices of o i l products, and in order to reitcve the differential 
of trancport cos t s there was an increase of 2 cents per barrel. 
And, l a s t l y , a period of f ive years, was taJosn into account to 
12 staibilize the taxes and basic Posted Prices;;- Two agreentents at 
Geneva in Jemuary, 1972, amd OUne, 1973 gave boosts to the Itosted 
Prices by 8,49 per cent and 11,9 per cent respectively, followed 
by the devaluation of American dollar, ^^ Owing to these to pushes, 
the OPEC prices of o i l reached $ 4.82 per barrel in October 1973J* 
12. i b i d . , p.52. 
13. i b i d . , p. 53, 
14. El-Mallakh, Ragael and Att, Jacob K„ Cp, c i t . , p. 19 
as 
!£he pr ices of o i l Increassed substantial ly as I s evident froeo the 
fac t that "the more important cLcvelopment In the seventies vas 
OPEC's declslc» on 16 October i973 to assume the reapore i b i l l t y 
for f ixing the Posted Prices for crude o i l , and to tripple these 
prices between October 1973 and January 1974, This adjustment 
cmae as a radical modification in the o i l markets' price structuref^ !^  
The inflationary trend was the contributory factor to the increase 
of Posted HTices by 70 per cent in October, i973 and again by 10 
per cent inoctober 1975. lHaaB, the o f f i c ia l sa l e s prices of 
Kuwaiti o i l of 31° API reached $ 11,54 per barrel on 1 January, 1974, 
$ 11,30 per barrel on 1 October, 1975 and $ 11,23 per barrel on 
17 
1 JUne 1976, Above a l l , increase in the prices of e35)Qrts of 
dsfveloped coantrles by 12 per cent in 1978, stressed OPEC to set 
a gradual increase of o i l prices averaging 10 per cent with ef f c t 
18 from 1979,* 3to accorcia -ce with t h i s Increase, the OPEC prices 
of oi l junped up from $ 15,80 per barrel in April 1979 to $ 19,49 
per barrel in July 1979 and furtheo: increased to $ 25,50 per 
barrel in Noventoer 1979, •'•^  
15. central Bank of nawalt i EcoEic»nic Report 1969-1979; 
16. ibid^, p,27, 
17. F,ii,A. I Arab world Filey No, l59i , May 2 l , 1980, III-K7 
18. central Bank of Kuwait t Bconcinic Report 1969-79,, 
Q?. c i t . , p,27, 
19. central Bank of Kuwait t Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l Bulletin, 
vo l , 14, No,l , January March 1987, vo l . 14, 
No.l# r',34. 
i 1 
Ev«tt though, the Posted p r i ces were increaaing con t i -
nuously, ye t the o f f i c i a l s a l e s p r i c e s of KHvaiti crude of 31° API 
were f luc tua t ing daring the years preceding 1978. AS i t i s 
evident from t h i s "After the 1976 p r i ce - f r ee sae, Kiwait and ten 
other OPEC mentoers r a i s ed t h e i r o i l p r i c e s by 10 per cent e f fec t ive 
1 January 1977, and maintained t h i s arrangeinent upto the end of 
the f i r s t i a l f of t ha t year when i t was agreed t o a l ign a l l OPEC 
p r i c e s on the ba s i s of 10 per cent inc rease" , ^ I t i s fur ther 
subs tan t ia ted by the fac t t ha t "In 1978, no p r i c e increases were 
effected by OPEC, but iOiwait reduced the p r i c e of i t s crude 31° API 
by around 15 centsA'^Jcrel, considering the oversupplies in 
world o i l raarkets in 1978, and acting on an advance approvad from 
QPBC, Kuwait and soins other members decided t o give the purchasers 
two incen t ives t one i n the form of a 5 cent discount per barre l 
and the o t t ^ r i n the form of an addi t ional 30-day c r e d i t period 
(over and above the t radi t ica ia l one), which equals a d i sca in t of 
2i 
around 7-8 cen t s pe r b a r r e l " , ^ According to OPEC resolut ions (bf 
i t s Abu Dhabi conference, held in Decorber 1978, c a l l i n g for a 
<jiarterly increase averaging 10 per cent a n m a l l y over the 1978 
pr ices , Kuwait QLl p r i c e s were brought upto $ 12,8 per b a r r e l , 
Under t h i s new p r i c ing systenv the g rav i ty based d i f f e r en t i a l 
20, Central Bank of Kuwait t Economic Report, 1979, p ,38 . 
21. i b i d , , p ,38 . 
1:2 
between the ioxwaiti exude of 31° API and the Arabian Idght wae 
22 
ra i sed t o 5 cen t re pe r b a r r e l . At t h a t time, while the ' s p o ^ 
Market' p r i c e s were a t a l u b s t a n t l a l l y high l eve l of $ n^oo/haxxBl, 
the o f f i c i a l s a l e s - p r i c e of Kuwaiti crude were a t $ 12,83 per 
b a r r e l , Oliis subs tan t ia l r i s e in the 'Sipot-Market' p r i ces 
encouraged the Ktzwaiti governingt t o decide i t s 'Of f ic ia l P r i ces ' 
t o take high a t $ 14,03 pe r b a r r e l wi th an increase of 9.35 per 
cen t (in the form of $ 1,20 per b a r r e l aaircharge) against 
$ 19,20 per b a r r e l a t 'spot-Market*, The CPEC decision of auiy, 
1979 bound the raentoers not t o exceed the p r i c e c e i l i n g , OdLng t o 
the lack of unanimity in agreement in a un i f i ed p r i c e increase 
in Caracas in Decerrtoer 1979, OPEC l i b e r a l i z e d i t s raentoers to 
f i x up t h e i r p r i c e s r e f l e c t e d by the condit ions of the world 
market. In accordance with t h i s axrangement, thrAe l e v e l s were 
se t i , e , ( i) high levels covering p r i c e s of $ 28,00 and above, 
included the countr ies-zran/ Libya, isiigeria and Algeria, ( i i ) Low 
leve l , covering the p r i c e s of $ 24 and { i l l ) intermediate l eve l , 
with the p r i c e s ranging between $ 24,90 t o $ 27.56 per ba r re l , 
which included the count r ies - I r aq , UAS, Qatar, Venezuela and 
Indonesia, Kuwait joined the t h i r d l e v e l by increasing i t s o i l 
p r i c e s by 19 pe r cent reached $ 25,50 pe r b a r r e l (including a 
g rav i ty d i f f e r en t i a l cu t of 50 cents pe r ba r re l out of $ 26,00), 
Thus, the Kuwaiti Official sa les Brices rose by 108,7 p e r cent 
22, i b i d . , p,38 
],) 
in l a t e 1979 OVBT the price i n l a t e 1978, OSM y^ar 1979 was rnuch 
f arourable to the Kuwaiti acopcspj that the Kawait o i l prices jumped 
from $ 12,83 per barrel to $ 25.50 per barrel within a year, ihe 
prices of the Kutwaiti erode kqpt accelerating unt i l t l^y reached 
23 
upto $ 35.50 per barrel on 1 January 1981. Prices increascni 
from $ 25,50 per barrel in Noventoer 1979 to $ 27,50 per barrel in 
January 1980, $ 29,50 per barrel in May 1980, and $ 31,50 in 
July 1980. price f luctuations remained continued even in 1980». 
After ha-vdUig reached their peak at $ 35,50 per barrel, the prices 
of KJowaiti o i l began to decline, Uiey f e l l to $ 33,50 per barrel 
In Koveniber 1981 and further shrinked to $ 32,30 per barrel in 
January 1982, and $ 28,30 per barrel in February 1983, Shrinking 
of prices continued unt i l they f e l l to $ 27,10 per barrel in OUly 
24 
1984. These prices with marginal f luctuations, remained 
unchanged at $ 27,10 per bsurrel JUly 1986, However, the OPEC crude 
o i l prices had started declining afterward which caused a severe 
beloM to the revenue side of the memver countries. 
There %#ere the reasons of variations in cjtude o i l prices 
which were reflected by the Arab-Israel conf l ic t in 1971, and then 
in 1973, increasing d«nand for o i l in European countries and Japan, 
increasing cost of production, production out which further 
23. central Bank of Kaviait t Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l Bxilletln, 
1986, vo l .13 , No,3, p ,28, 
24, ib id . , P.28. 
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Increased the demand foe oiX, increase in the ^ot-Market* p r i c e * 
which had r i sen tangib ly in 1974 and 1979 f e l l in 1983 by 14 per 
cent as OPEC cu t down these p r i c e s in March 1983 by $ 5,00 per 
b a r r e l . These p r i c e s , however, increased i n the f i r s t half of 
1983 because of the increase in the world dotiand for o i l and i t s 
produicts. 
Oil Revenues t 
s ince the establishment of organization of Arab Petroleum 
Eacporting Countries (OAPEC) and afterward the two Geneva Agreements 
in 1972 and 1973 respect ive ly , in which Organization of Petroleiira 
Exporting countr ies (OPEC) could e s t a b l i s h i t s pos i t ion , gave a 
boost to the o i l p r i c e s , which r e su l t an t ly , increased the revenues 
of the member coun t r i e s . Inuring sevent ies , the o i l sec tor of the 
Kuwaiti economy witnessed t h e s ign i f i can t development xmder such 
agreements and arrangements of OPEC, on the l e v e l s of o i l p r i ces , 
production and the r e l a t i o n s between OPEC meirbers and o i l compa-
n i e s . Revenues from the sa les of o i l and i t s products daring 
s i x t i e s did not increase s tJbstant ia l ly due to the s tagnat ion of 
o i l p r i c e s a t $ 1,59 per ba r re l u n t i l Noventoer 1970. Thenceforth, 
owing to the increase in o i l p r i c e s frcan $ 1,59 per ba r re l to 
$ 1 , 6 8 per b a r r e l , revenxies from o i l sector began to increase 
25, El-Mallakh, Ragaei and \ t t a , Jacob K,, 0 £ » ^ i t . # P,19. 
J ; 0 
26 
treraendoasly and strengthened the economy, m 1969, the 
o i l revenues were eatimated a t KD 527.0 mil l ion vhich increased 
by 9,11 pe r cent to KD 564,5 raillicai in 1970, But the revenues 
increased treraendously by 52,2 p e r cent in 1971 when they reached 
to KD, 859,4 mJLllion. OMs was axe to the increase in the p r i ce s 
of o i l from $ 1,59 per ba r re l t o $ 1.68 per b a r r e l . This indica tes 
t l » t mere 5,6 pe r cent incxrease in the p r i c e s ibf o i l per bar re l 
ccjuld be of iimnense help to the Kuwaiti economy as i t pushed 
up the revenues by more than 52 per cent in a year . However, 
the p r i c e s of o i l increased by 29,7 pe r cent i n JUne 1971 when 
they reached to $ 2,18 per ba r r e l but the revenues increased a t 
p ropor t iona te ly low r a t e due to the devaluation of U.S dol la r in 
27 Dec briber 1971. Again in February 1973, the devaluation of U.S. 
dollsir had a blow on the revenu side of the economy while they 
increased by merely 6,7 p e r cent over the previous year , Dn 1972, 
revenues increased from KD 931.7 mi.Llion t o KD 994,13 million 
i s 1973, This minor increase was cfeae to the tfluggishness in the 
r a t e of production of o i l as i t i s quoted t h a t •'During 1973 some 
western and Indus t r i a l iaed count r ies f e l l under t o t a l embargo; 
Kuwait, along with other Arab producers, reduced output during the 
enbargo per iod following Middle East msec i n October of tha t year, 
and t h i s accounts for sudden drop in 1973 e35>orts and br i sk 
26, i b i d . , p . 19 , 
27. i b i d . , p,15 
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KPWIITI OIL REVBHgES t 19fi9-3.985 
( ^ ^ l l o n fe^aiii 5i^af») 
1 1 / 
Yeatc Rerenusfi % change 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
527.0 
564,5 
859,4 
931,7 
994,13 
3020.05 
2456,56 
2519,67 
2477.32 
2527,31 
4417,91 
5059.23 
4117.76 
2805,56 
3089,28 
3425.66 
2983,16 
-
7 .11 
52.2 
8 , 4 
6 .7 
203.7 
- 1 8 . 6 
2 . 5 
- 1 , 6 
2 . 0 
74.S 
14.5 
- 1 8 . 6 
- 3 1 , 6 
10 ,1 
10.8 
- 1 2 . 9 
Scjurce I ( i ) caatrsd Bank o f KXiwait t Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l 
Bttllatln^ v o l , 4 , N o , l JanuaryCFSTCfin^T? 
( i i ) ceaatral Bank of Kuwait t Economic Report* 1986 
v o l , 13, N o , l , p , 4 3 . = * ^ - ' 
11 ^ 
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revl-val i n 1974 a f t e r o i l t r a d e reaimed normal p a t t e r n s " . 
Therefore , t he rervenuee inca:eased by a buitper f i g u r e of 2o3,7 p e r 
c e n t r each ing KD 3020,05 m i l l i o n in 1974, But t h e d e c e l e r a t i o n 
i n crude o i l p r o d u c t i o n i n Kuwait again i n 1975, 1977 and e a r l y 
29 1978 caused n e g a t i v e growth i n o i l r evenue* . Revenues shr inked 
t o KD 2456,56 m i l l i o n by 18,7 p e r c e n t i n 1975. Hoviever, t h e 
f i g u r e of revenues i n c r e a s e d from KD 2519,67 m i l l i o n i n 1976, an 
i n c r e a s e of mere 2 ,5 p e r c e n t ove r t h e p r e v i o u s yea r , again hoped 
by 1,6 p e r cen t t o KD 2477,32 m i l l i o n i n 1977. But again wi th the 
recovery of t h e r a t e of o i l p roduc t ion i n t h e l a t e r p a r t of 1978^ 
t h e r e was an i n c r e a s e i n revenues of 2 p e r con t by which the f igxire 
aga in went up t o KD 2527,31 m i l l i o n . The r evenues i n c r e a s e d 
tremendously dur ing 1974/75 due t o t h e quardup l ing pf p r i c e s which 
i n c r e a s e d t o $ 10,85 p e r b a r r e l on 1 January 1974 and $ 11,30 p e r 
30 b a r r e l on l October 1975, But aga in , t h e i n c r e a s e by 10 p e r cen t 
i n p r i c e s dur ing 1979 v a r y i n g between $ 14 p e r b a r r e l and $ 24 p e r 
b a r r e l pushed t h e economy f o r ahead . The r e v a l u e s aga in jumped 
high, reaching to KD 4417,91 m i l l i o n by a h igh i n c r e a s e of 74 per 
c e n t over the p r e v i o u s y e a r . I t ftirther i n c r e a s e d Hy 14,5 p e r cen t 
28 , El Mallakfa, Ragae i , Kxiwait t Trade and Investroent, 
westvittw, B o u i d ^ , 1979, P , 1 0 4 . 
29 , Cen t r a l Bank of Ktjwait i E c o n o m i c J i ^ o r t , 1969-79, p , 3 4 , 
2 0 . ?ji:^^x_i-.^^„W??E?-AZ^.\®' No, 1591, May 2 1 , 1980, I I I -K 7 . 
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reaching to KD 5059,23 mlllloci In 1980. The revenues kept 
acce le ra t ing d i r ing sevent ies but wi th minor f l uc t aa t i ons mean-
whi le . These fluc-baations never wiped away as the revenues dropped 
again in 1981 toy 18,6 pe r cent when they shrinlcBd to KJ>, 4117,76 
wil l ion and fur ther by 31,6 per cent i n the next year, while the 
revenues dropped again to KD 2805,56 mi l l ion . TSiis s i tua t ion was 
e:<perienced by the Kuwait economy on account c£ the proaic t ion 
i 
ce i l i ng iraposed by OPEC under which the t o t a l production had to i 
be kept l e s s than 18 nd l l i cn b a r r e l s per day and Kuwait was 
31 
a l l o t t e d the quota of 0.65 mil l ion b a r r e l s per day, l^e pos i t ion | 
improved again s l i g h t l y while the revenues increased by abcut 10,1 ' 
pe r cent in 1983 reaching KD 3089,28 mi l l ions and fur ther increased 
by 10,8 pe r cent in 1984 while the f igures increased to KD 3425,66 
mi l l i ons . However, the re was a marginal increase over the previous 
years during e a r l y 1980s but i t was a tangib le decl ine of about 
32 per cent in 1984 over the year 1980, mainly due to the djrop in 
32 
world demand for o i l and the r e s u l t a n t marketing d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
Deifpite an increase in o i l p r i c e s which reached t h e i r peak in 1980/81 
a t $ 35,50 per ba r r e l there remained f l uc tua t i ons i n the revenues. 
P r ices dropped even in 1985 by 12,9 p e r cent when the revenues 
were estimated a t KD 2983,16 mi l l ion , 
3 1 , Asopa, ^ e e l K,, p r in twe l l , Jaipur ( India) , 1986, p .38 , 
32, Central Bank of Kuwait t Economic Report 1980-84, Cp. c i t . , 
p,3 2, -^* 
121 
proaaction orend* t 
The production of oil in Kuwait remained accelerating 
contimoufily during s ix t ies and in 1972, i t roee to l t « peak at 
1201,6 million barrel*, a t the ra te of 3,28 milllcjn barrel per fay 
QPEC's production increased to i t s higheit level of 30,98 
sdll ion barre l in 1973 of which Kttwait hsld a ihare of 9.7 per cent. 
In the earae year, to ta l world oi l production was estimated at 
56,97 million barrel in which Kuwait shared 5,3 per cent, iSie 
table 4,3 reveals that the oi l production continued to increase 
on account of r i s ing world oi l demand. I t also appears that, in 
case of Kutwaitf to ta l oil production contizsuously declined frcmi 
1972 to 1984 baring the years 1978 and 1979, in which tota l pro-
duction Inproved s l ight ly . I t began to decline from 3,28 million 
barrel per day in 1972 to 3,02 million barrel per day in 1973 and 
further frcxn 2,54 million barrel per day in 1974 to 2,08 million 
barrel per day in 1975, This was a dras t ic decrease in o i l -
production that in a short i^an of three years from 1972 to 1975, 
the production declined by 36,6 per c« i t . Decleration during 
th£»e years can be at t r ibuted to the s t r i c t conservationist 
pol icies adopted by Kuwait since i t s oil production reached an a l l 
time high in March 1972. i t was for the f i r s t time that produo-
tion l imi t of 3 million barrel per day was imposed in 1972 and 
further i t was reduced to 2 million barrel per day in 1975,^^ This 
33, El Mallakh, Ragaei-and Atta, , Jacob K,, Op, d t . , p, l8 
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policy wa» adcjpted keeping i n mind several i inplications as i s 
evidaat from t h i s " F i r t t , the timing of the production r e s t r i c t i o n 
in 1972 might have contr ibuted s ign i f i can t ly t o the increased 
bargaining positLcm of OPEC s ince a t tha t time i^wait shared «}ith 
Saudi Acabia the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of caking up the difference between 
voxld demand and supply of exude, second^ given estimated reserves 
of 67 b i l l i o n b a r r e l s i n 1977, the count ry ' s o i l resources can 
l a s t about n inety years , the longest l i f e span of any prodkidng 
34 
coun t ry ' s crude o i l reserves*** 3fee conserva t icn is t pcOLicy, 
fuBther helped i n crea t ing denand fo r higher pjdLces in normal 
circuinstances. Thus, Kuwait played an i i tpor tant r o l e in the de ter -
mination of a?EC o i l p r i c e s . I f we take the f igures of predic t ion 
from the year 1975 onward, i t s l i g h t l y luproved i n 1976 whan the 
production rose to 785 t ^ l l i o n ba r r e l a t the r a t e of 2,14 millicai 
ba r re l per day t y an increatse of mere 2,8 pe r cent over the previous 
year . But again i t f e l l by 8,4 per cent reducing the f igures to 
718 mil l ion b a r r e l in 1977 when the production of o i l was a t the 
r a t e of 1,96 mil l ion b a r r e l per day. However, the world o i l annual | 
average production stKSWed genera l ly an upwaupd trend with 248 million j 
ba r r e l during 1971-80, owing to the 64 per cen t increatse in \ 
I 
Soc ia l i s t count r ies and 27 pe r cent increase in other p a r t s of the | 
1 
i 
world. 
34. i b i d , , p , l 9 . 
p/quu uoiionpoJcj 
At the end of 1979, world o i l production increased by 33 per 
35 
cent over i t s l eve l in the beginning of the year . production of 
o i l Kuwait marginally improved by 3,5 pe r c»nt and 4 pe r cent in 
1978 and 1979, when i t reached 776,9 mil l ion b a r r e l and 911 million 
ba r r e l r e f l e c t i v e l y . Increase i n the production of o i l during 
sevent ies was the resxilt of the recovery i n the i n a i s t r i a l i a e d 
na t ions and discontinued growth of o i l in United s t a t e s and Japan 
in 1978, During the per iod beginning frcsn 1980 onwards, produo-
t icn f igures in Kuwait slx)wed a downward tjrend, l^e r a t e of pro-
duction f e l l by 34 per cent i n a year from 2,50 mil l ion ba r r e l per 
day in 1979 to 1,65 mil l ion per day i n 1980, I t fiirther decreased 
by 32 per cent in 1981 amd 26,7 per cent in 1982 when the production 
f e l l to only 0,82 lai l l ion ba r r e l per day, "She year 1979, can be 
observed as the peak year i n which the world o i l production was 
ever highest a t 63,2 mi l l ion b a r r e l s of which Kuwait held a share 
of 3,9 per cent , Tl^ere has been an overa l l dec l ine in world o i l 
production since 1979 and, thas, Kuwait followed s u i t . This 
decelerat ion in production was mainly die to the over supply in the 
world o i l market. 
35, Central Bank of Kuwait i Econc»nic Report, 1969-79^ P.23. 
36. i b i d . , p ,34 . 
7 0 e 
( i i i ) Kavait and world Cdl Deyeloproent : 
By having a cursorry look of the table« i t can eas i ly be 
understood tha t the developnwits in the o i l inctistry in Kuwait 
took place simil taneously with the development in the world o i l 
market. The demand for o i l in the world remained continued in an 
\:^ward trend from 22.64 mil l ion b a r r e l s per day in 1969 to 34.13 
mil l ion b a r r e l pe r day in 1973 v i t h an average of 12.2 per cent 
in 1970, 7,3 per cent in 1971, 10.3 pe r cent in 1972 and 13.4 
pe r cent i n 1973, Saanne was the t rend of o i l esqport of the world. 
I t improved from 20,78 mil l ion ba r r e l per day in 1969 to 23,43 
mil l ion b a r r e l per day i n 1970 with an average inprovement of 
12,7 pe r cent to 25,54 mil l ion b a r r e l per day, an increase of 9 per 
cent in 1971 to 27,95 mil l ion b a r r e l per day by an increase of 
9,4 per cent in 1972, and 27,95 mil l ion ba r r e l per day by an 
increase of 12,9 per cent in 1973, More or l e s s , same was the 
case of Kuwait, Export of jaiwait o i l improved from 2,44 mill ion 
b a r r e l per day in 1969 to 2,92 mil l ion b a r r e l per day in 1972, 
Kuwait held a share of 13,4 per cent of the t o t a l export of OPEC 
of 18,08 mil l ion b a r r e l per day in 1969, The t o t a l production of 
the world remained acce le ra t ing u n t i l 1979 reaching from 43.7 
millicjn b a r r e l per day in 1969 to 63,2 mil l ion b a r r e l per day with 
an overa l l increase of 44,62 per cent over a per iod of 10 years , 
OPEC's share in the predic t ion also improved with the same pace 
but minor f luc tua t ions occurred meanwhile, i t increased from 
20,90 mill ion ba r r e l per day in 1949 to i t s peak 30.98 million 
ba r r e l per day in 1973, Thenceforth, i t began to decline 
TABLE 4 , 4 
SaCPCRT OF CRUDE OIL t 1970-1985 
( A l l i e n l&arrel«) 
2/ 
year Exports % change 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1 9 ^ 
1984 
1985 
941.7 
1013.0 
1070.6 
966.0 
804.8 
652.7 
655.5 
588.4 
642.8 
760.1 
477.0 
297.0 
134-6 
198.7 
240.8 
173.7 
7.57 
5.68 
- 9 . 7 7 
-16 .68 
-18 .89 
0.42 
-10.23 
9.24 
18,24 
-3 7.24 
-37 .73 
- 5 4 . 6 8 
47.62 
21.18 
-27 .86 
source t (i) centra l Bank of Kuwait t S t a t i s t i c a l B u l l e t i n , 
January-March, 1978, v o l . 5 , No,3, p , 6. 
( i i ) Central Bank of Kuwait t Eccnoraic Report, 1986, 
v o l , 13, K0.4, P .27 . 
2 s 
marginally. I t dropped to 15,93 mil l ion b a r r e l per day i n 1985. 
Kuwait 's share in world production reached i t s highest level a t 
6,4 per cent in 1971# and i n QPBC*s proaaction i t was estimated 
a t i t s peak 13,2 pe r cent i n 1969, However, Wawait's production 
was a t i t s top in 1972 a t 3,28 mil l ion b a r r e l per day. Though, 
the f igures of e3¥)ort of o i l were est imated a t t h e i r highest l eve l s 
of 33.83 mil l ion b a r r e l per day of the world in 1979, 27,64 
mil l ion b a r r e l per day of OPEC in 1977 and 2,92 mil l ion ba r re l per 
day of Kuwait in 1972, But the years 1977, 1973 and l97l are 
remarkable for the world. OPEC and Kuiwait respec t ive ly , 
Kuwait has been able to improve i t s revenues from KD 527 
mil l ion In 1969 to KD 5059.23 mil l ion i n 1980, a ne t increase of 
860 per cent over a per iod of 16 years while the quanti ty of i t s 
ea^ort declined from 2,44 mil l ion b a r r e l pe r day in 1969 to 1,63 
mil l ion b a r r e l per day in 1980, I t r e a l l y i nd i ca t e s a tremendous 
inprovement in o i l i n d i s t r y . The f ree world demand f^r o i l 
increased by 50,7 per cent between 1969 and 1973 but i t declined 
by 2.3 per cent in 1974 and 9 pe r cent in 1975, I t again inproved 
by 46,3 per cent and 8,1 pe r cent in 1976 and 1977 respec t ive ly . 
I t remained esca la t ing onwards baring the years 1978 and from i980 
to 1982. The t o t a l f r ee world demand for o i l reached 58.46 mill ion 
b a r r e l per day in 1985, The requirements for o i l in the free world 
declined during 1979 to 1982 due to the f a l l of consumption in the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d countr ies sach as western Europe, u , s ,A, and Japan. 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency t Annual Report, 1981, p , 17, 
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But the cage was reverse i n the developing s t a t e s wtere the 
38 
consumption of o i l iniproved marginal ly , Ttie demand for the o i l 
products f e l l as a r e s u l t of the dec l ine in consun?)tion. The f a l l 
In the p r i c e s was mainly d i e to the depressing demands for o i l . 
I t fiirther put the conaiming cotmtr ies i n a stage of conserving 
t h e i r o i l for future purposes and taking a s h i f t from the use of 
o i l to the other sor t of energy. Owing t o the continuoas pressure 
on o i l p r i c e s in the ear ly 1983, United Kingdom and Nan*ay had to 
40 
reduce t h e i r Officied Pr i ce s by $ 3,50 to 4,00 per barre l . "OPEC 
a l s o did the same by c u r t a i l i n g i t s o f f i c i a l p r i c e s for Arabian 
l i g h t by $ 5,00 per barrel to $ 29,00 per barrel and f i x e d a pro-
41 daction c e i l i n g a t 17,5 m i l l i o n barre l per day. "flie year 1985, 
observed a dec l ine in the world demand for o i l due t o the dec l ine 
in economic growth r a t e s i n the advanced countr ies and the ir 
42 
adoption of p o l i c i e s aiming at the conservation of energy. I t 
resu l ted i n a s h i f t from o i l to the other energy sources such as 
atOTiic and s o l a r e tce tr i i . m the same 3^ar, world market a l s o 
38, i b i d , , p , l 7 
40 , S«Bidi Arabian Monetary Agency i Annual Report, 1984, p ,3o , 
4 1 , i b i d . , p , 
42, Central Bank of Kuwadt t Economic Report, 1985, p,3 6. 
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13. 
ifltnessed the wideapread reduction in the t ransac t ions of o i l 
for goods and the increas ing iraportance of £{)Ot Oil Market froro 
vhere a long terra aupply can be had, lUhe Oil sec tor shows a 
tremendous growth r a t e in the Gross Dcaaiestic Product upto 1973, 
43 but i t s share declined to 52,1 pe r cent in the GDP in 1985. 
I t was the r e s u l t of the diversion of emphasis from o i l to non 
o i l sec to r . However, the c r e d i t of the development of noiv-oil 
sector goes to the o i l sector because the revenues earned from the 
sa les of o i l and i t s products are being used i n the development of 
non-oi l sec to r . 
In t h i s way, the o i l sec tor i s e n t i r e l y responsible for the 
overa l l defelopment of the economy* This has been the r e s u l t of 
the development of o i l indus t ry . I t has esqpandcd not only within 
the country taut i t Iwlds shares i n foreign pr<fcjx:ts a l so , 
<lv) In tac t of OPEC and 0\PEC : 
Unt i l the formation of Ocganigatlon of Petroleum Exporting 
count r i es (OPEC), the Kiiwaitl o i l indus t ry could not achieve tha t 
p lace of i t s developir«nt x -^hich i t p re sen t ly has, p r io r t o the 
advent of OPEC, d i f fe ren t pr ic ing techniques were adopted for crude 
o i l bu t they were a l l adopted the o i l Coi^anles without any consul-
t a t i on with the o i l prodaclng coun t r i e s ' government. Through t h i s 
43 . cen t ra l Bank of Kuwait i Quarterly s t a t i s t i c a l Bul le t in , 
198 6, Op, c i t . , p . 
1-7, 
wa^ of f ixing up the prices , the o i l producing countries had to 
loose a l o t in terms of o i l revenues. They were paid merely 
royalt ies for their o i l . Price c i t s in 1959 and 1960# which 
tota l led an average of 2? Cents per barrel, heavily rediced the 
revenues of the o i l prockcicing countiries, such steps taken by the 
o i l Coiapanies antagonised the producing countries which established 
C^ EC in septeinber i960. 
iSiough, the OPEC could not be of immense help to the pro-
ducing countries, but put a check on furtiier price cuts . Raising 
the revenues of o i l producing countries being OPEC's primary 
objective, i t nade a l l of i t s e f forts in this direction, AS 
revexues are determined by prices and production, the organization 
of Petroleum Eoqportlng countries e^anded i t s e f forts to control 
these two elements of o i l market, Inapite of making every thing 
in favour of o i l pro<iiXcing countries* the Organisation could be 
of l e s s e r help in 1960s, But in 1970s, i t has brought about ^ 
tremendous change in the o i l market with the help of i t s unanimous 
decision of using o i l as a 'weapon' daring 1973 Arab*Israel 
conf l ic t and the producing countries earned a l o t of revenues by 
keeping the price high. The quadrupling of prices was the result 
of OPEC's decision of determining the prices by i t s e l f . I t i s also 
substantiated by the fact that '•On the price front, as a result of 
the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, OPEC decreed that from then 
on i t s member countries world no longer negotiate over prices with 
the o i l companies but would f i x the prices themselves", 
44, F.M.A. I Arab world Filey 15o, 1508, 13 February 1980, 
General t 1820/1. 
u^, 
in connection wi th the productLon of o i l , OPEC adopted a pol icy 
45 
of govexnroent p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n o i l Ccxtipanies' a c t i v i t i e s . This 
l ed to the 100 pe r cent p a r t i c i p a t i o n or the takeover of the 
o i l companies i n most of the coun t r i e s . This« the GPEC could be 
proved of g rea te r help during 1970s since the control over pro-
duction and p r i c e s of o i l wewt in to the hands of producing s t a t e s . 
on the same l i n e , the Organisaticoi of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Coxxntries (OAPEC) was formed on 9 January, 1968, But 
the difference i s of membership which confined to the Arab s t a t e s 
producing o i l on commercial sca le as being i t t h e i r main source 
46 
of revenues. The main objec t ives of OAPEC were as follows, 
i , to e s t a b l i s h coqperation amcmg i t s meidaers in a l l 
aspects of economic a c t i v i t i e s in o i l indus t ry , 
i i « to taike s teps for reconci l ing the l ega l systems 
applied within the member count r ies , 
i i i . t o make e f f o r t s in exchanging informations and expert 
t i s e among members and c rea te t r a i n i n g and en|)loyment 
oppor tun i t i es 
i v , promote cooperation among mentoers to overcome any 
problem crea ted in o i l indus t ry 
45, i b i d , , p . 1820/1. 
46, i b i d . , p . 1820/1. 
I 3 o 
V, f oondlng Joint projects in raenber countries bjf 
benefitting frcxn their resources and capab i l i t i e s . 
Under the shadow of OPEC and OAPEC, Kuvaiti o i l industzy 
since l97o made the following develcpiaents, OSie price of o i l of 
o 47 
31 API were raised to $ 1,68 per barrel on i4 th Noveoiber l970. 
!Zhese prices inproved at a greater scale reaciiing their peak 
48 
at $ 35.50 per barrel in January 1981, Owing to such tremendous 
increase in o i l prices^ o i l revenues Jun¥>ed from KD 527 million 
in 1969 to KD 2.983,16 million in 1985, meanwhile reaching their 
49 peak at KD 5059,23 mill ion in 1980. prpduction also wont under 
the control of the producing country, Kuwait, through i t s conser-
vat ion i s t pol icy, which adqpted after reaching i t s production to 
1201,6 million barrel in 1972, controlled over the outflow of o i l , 
production was kept on reducing scale baring few years. I t 
dr<^ped to 718,1 million barrel in 1977 and further reduced to 
299,3 mill ion barrel in 1982, Kawait produced o i l at the rate 
of 0,90 n i l l i o n barrel per day i n 1984 and 1,01 mill ion barrel per 
day in 1985. 
In t h i s way, the main objectives of OPEC f u l f i l l e d by 
improving the revenues through the control over prodaction and 
47, El Mallakh Ragaei and Atta, Ja^ob K„ CE>. c i t , , p. 
48, central Bank of Hawait t aiaPterly s t a t i s t i c a l Bulletin, 198$ 
v o l , 13, No,2, p,28. 
49, Central Bank of Kuwait t Econcniic Report, 1986. 
1 Hi 
p r i c e s , Ir. order to pu t ^ s t ^ ahead towards the developraent of 
i t s o i l industry, Kuwait signed an agreement with the Compamy for 
i t s 60 per cant p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the Kuwait Oil Conpany' s on 
St January 29, 1974, * Kuwait concluded a s imi lar agreement with 
Arabian QLl Conpany (AOC), operating in t he Neutral Zone area and 
i t a lso acquired 85 per cent pa r t i c i pa t i on in Araerican Independent 
52 
Oil C0B5>any (Aminoil), In the same year . Through i t s p a r t i c i -
pat ion, Kuwait achieved lo per cont takeover of Kawait Oil Company 
in March 1975 and of Aiainoil in septentoer 1977, 
This, Riwait i o i l industry could achieve a l l t ha t which 
might not be had in the absence of these two OEganisationsi OPEC 
and OAl^c. Through the p o l i c i e s o£ these Organisations, FUwait 
made appreciable e f f o r t s in the l i n e of making cordia l r e l a t i ons 
with other members of these two. I t has devel<^ed a b e t t e r indus-
t r i a l atmosphere by e s t ab l i sh ing ncai-oll i n d u s t r i e s a l s o . Down-
stream s ic t iv i t i e s have a lso impzxived a l o t . Kuwait has beer inve»-
t ing much of i t s c a p i t a l i n foreign p r o j e c t s , CiSirough the osypEC 
pol icy of providing s k i l l and exper t i se t o the o i l i n d i s t r y o£ other 
mefflbers, nawait has been successfully absorbing the foreign 
labourers p a r t i c u l a r l y Arabs. Exchange of informations r e l a t ed 
with o i l mat te rs i s frequent witii other Arab o i l s t a t e s and the 
maxibers of OPEC and O^FEc. 
5 1 . g.M.Ai Arato world g i l e . . Ho,799, 9 November, 1977, 
General t 1841/1. 
52. ^ ^ t P . 1841/1 
53- i ^ i i * ' P . 1841/1 
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KKLvadt has been propped axocessful in achieving the stage 
of present develoianent through adoption of the p o l i c i e s of OPEC 
and OAPEC. Beneath the untorella of OPEC and OAPEC, iDawaiti Oil 
Industry i s running f r u i t f u l l y . These two organisat ions have 
provided a l i n e of progress to the Rawaiti Oil I n d i s t r y which has 
a f a n t a s t i c i n t a c t of OPEC and CftPEc, 
(v) Down s t rcan Oil Cfieratjqas t 
All those a c t i v i t i e s which are undertak«i a f t e r the 
explorat ion and exp lo i t a t ion of o i l , are ca l l ed downstream operas 
t i o n s . I t may a l so be subs tant ia ted by t h i s f a c t tha t "The u t i -
l i z a t i o n of these raw mater ia l s in the prodUcticjn of f i n a l products 
a n ^ o r i s ^ u t s i s what has been descJdLbed in the l i t e r a t u r e as down-
54 
strean opera t ions" . The r a t i o n a l e behind i t , i s to u t i l i s e 
indigenous raiw mater ia l such as o i l , to the optimum capacity of 
the industry i n order to d ive r t e n t i r e r e l i a n c e on crude o i l 
e s c o r t s to i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and eaqoort of ref ined o i l* l i qu i f i ed 
gas, petrochemicals and f e r t i l i z e r s e t c e t r a by maJcLng use of 
indigenous scurces of t ranspor ta t ion such as p ipe l i ne s and tanker 
f l e e t s , 
a3ie Kuwaiti o i l Policy a l so provides for extending in to 
serv ices concerned with sxdn. a c t i v i t i e s , Kiiwait has been maJcing 
e f f o r t s to e3qE>and downstream operat ions through the following 
54, El Mallah Ra$aei and Atta, Jackob K,, Qp. c i t , , p,24, 
ViS 
a c t i v i t i e s t 
i . Oil Refinery 
i i . Petrochemical industry, e s s e n t i a l l y F e r t i l i z e r s 
i i i . Oil and Gas Transportations through p i p e l i n e s 
and tanker f l e e t s . 
Oil Refinery : 
with the rapid s t r i d e s of the economy, indigeneous o i l 
oonsur^tion trementously increased . The planners, therefore, paid 
nuch a t t ent ion towards re f in ing aspect of the o i l industry. I t 
enabled the country to u t i l i a s the o i l resources a t home and to 
export the surplus of cnide alongwith re f ined products, l i q u i f i e d 
petroleum gas , petrochemicals and f e r t i l i z e r s e t c e t r a , Kuwait has 
been more success fu l i n process ing raw mater ia l s for export. 
Therefdure, on these l i n e s , there have been e s tab l i shed three o i l -
r e f i n e r i e s i n Kuwait; Mina al-Ahmadi, near northeast of Burgan, 
was es-t^blished in 1949, w i th a capac i ty of 25000 barre l s per day 
and was operated by Kawait Oil Company (KOC), second ref inery was 
i n s t a l l e d and operated by American Independent Oil company (Aminoil), 
in 1958, near Wafra, with a capacity of 30,000 b a r r e l s per day, and 
the th ird ref inery was i n s t a l l e d a t shuaiba, near the c i t y of 
Kuwait, In 1968, w i th a capac i ty of 200,000 barre l s per day, Mawait 
National petroleum Company (KKPC) was s e t up i n 1960, Since i t s 
55 , El sheikhr Riad, Kuwait t Economic Growth, Problems and 
P o l i c i e s , Kuwait, 1972-73, p , 5 1 . 
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establislment, mvc i s engaged In o i l refining and i t s distriJ^a-
tion in dcn^stic and world meurkets. These re f iner ies produce 
kerosene, gasoline, gas o i l , aviation fuel , d iese l , ne^tha and 
d i s t i l l a t e s etc^itra, IQi^ a^it has been more sucx:essful i n these l ine s . 
By having a cursory look of the table, i t i s clear that the produc-
tion of xrefined o i l has treiajusly increased from 147,5 million 
barrels in 1970 to 206.7 million barrels in 1985. I t shews an 
increase of 203,1 per cent over a span of 15 years. If we take 
the figures of e:q>ort of refined o i , we find that i t rose from 
141,8 mill ion barrels in 1970 to 170.6 mill ion barrels in 1985 
registering an increase of 20,3 per cent over a period of 15 years. 
However, the production of refined o i l increased substantially but 
the gradual f luctuations affected the trend. Hi 1971, production 
increased by 1,6 per cent, but, thereafter, i t declined by 10,4 per 
cent. I t again improved marginally by 1,2 per cent in 1973 but 
decreased by 3,8 per cent upto 1979 with a l i t t l e Improv^nents 
meanwhile, i t again began to decline by 18,2 per cent in 1980 
and further f e l l by 16,3 per cent in 1981. But since 1981 
onwards i t never declined, 
same has been the process of export which began to increase 
f ran 1970 with gradual variations meanwhll«, and increased f iarly 
wel l . The e3qport trend shows a dscline by 7 per cent in 1971, 
12 per cent in 1974, 19.18 per cent in 1975, 1,5 per cent in 1977, 
5.3 per cent in 1979, 17,1 per cent in 1980, and 16,2 per cent in 
1981 over their preceding years, within a period of mere 5 years 
J "t(i 
froB 1970 to 1975, ei^ort of refined o i l declined by 33,1 per cent. 
•The years 1975 and 1981 indicate the loweet figures of export as 
94,8 mill ion barrels and 93.2 mil l ion barrels rej^ectiveXy. The 
figure from 1981 onwards never shows declining. The total export 
of refined o i l out of the total production of crude increased from 
13,52 per cent in 1970 to 56,07 per cent in 1985, It shows that 
within a cpan of 15 years period, Kuwait has been able to improve 
i t s capacity of refining the crude. This also diows that the 
capacity of re f iner ies in^rcTved a l o t within t h i s period. 
The f a l l in the production and e^qport of refined o i l caused 
by veurious factors at different stages. In 1972, the production 
dropped on account of the adoption of o i l conservationist policy 
which reflultantly regulated the eaqport of crude and refined pro-
ducts. Arab-Israel conf l ic t caused a decline of 5,5 per cent in 
total crude o i l prodaction which naturally affected the refinery 
produiction and the future esiports, Kuwaiti re f iner ies faced dete-
rioration in their production i n 1980 and 1981 because of decele-
ration in their demands, ® vdth a recovery in demand for Kuwaiti 
refined products, the rate of producticxj of refuned o i l increased 
by 48,8 ^[mr cent in 1982, 12.7 per cent in 1983 and further 2,o 
per cent and 17,1 per cent in 1984 and 1985 respect ively . 
Other perameter of measuring the development of »xwalti 
ref iner ies i s their increased capacit ies by about 42 per cent 
56, central Bank of Kuwaitis Economic Report, 1980-84, p,33 
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Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source 
L 
B RCDOCTION 
TABLE - 4 . 6 
m^ EXPORT GF REF3KD O a 
( M i l l i o n BarrelflD 
Pro(Mctlon % change 
147 .5 
149 ,9 
134 ,2 
1 3 5 , 6 
1 2 1 . 2 
105 ,8 
132.0 
126 ,2 
130 .4 
1 5 0 . 6 
1 2 3 . 1 
103.0 
153 .3 
172.8 
176 .4 
2 0 6 . 7 
t a) 
( l i ) 
-
1 .6 
- 1 0 , 4 
1,04 
- 1 0 , 6 
- 1 2 , 7 
2 4 , 7 
- 4 . 3 
3 . 3 
1 5 , 4 
- 1 8 , 2 
- 1 6 , 3 
4 8 . 8 
1 2 . 7 
2 . 0 
1 7 . 1 
C e n t r a l Bank 
i n Ten Years* 
C e n t r a l 
TOl. 13 , 
Bank 
No,4 
Ssqport 
141 .8 
141 .8 
131 .8 
133 .4 
117 ,3 
9 4 . 8 
133 .2 
1 3 1 . 1 
142,0 
134 .4 
111 ,3 
9 3 , 2 
1 2 9 , 1 
140 ,7 
149 ,4 
1 7 0 . 6 
Of K i v a i t 
Of Kawait 
t# P . 2 3 . 
% change 
-
-
- 7 , 0 
1 .21 
- 1 2 . 0 
- 1 9 , 1 8 
4 0 . 5 
- 1,57 
8 , 3 1 
- 5 , 3 5 
- 1 7 , 1 8 
- 1 6 , 2 6 
3 8 , 5 1 
8 . 9 8 
6 .13 
14 .19 
^^ 
% o f e^^ort i n 
t o t a l crude o i l 
produc t ion 
13 .52 
12 ,85 
1^,16 
12 .29 
13 ,11 
13 .90 
1 6 . 8 1 
1 7 . 5 7 
16 .78 
16 .53 
2 0 . 2 6 
2 5 . 0 1 
5 1 . 2 1 
4 5 . 0 9 
5 3 . 6 9 
5 6 . 0 7 
• "The Kawalt i Economy 
;: I .cport , l 9 6 9 - i 9 7 9 . 
« Econ<anic Repor t , 1986 
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from 4,55,000 barrels per day in 1970 to 6,45,000 barrels per day 
in 1985. In t h i s way, Kuwait ha© achieved a better posit ion in 
world o i l product market. I t has further beai supported by the 
thzust of the fiv^-yeeir o i l plan of Ktiwait, beginning frora 1976 
and ended in 1980, which as i t s objectives, consisted of i the 
expansion, development and u t i l i za t ion of o i l resources along 
with raising the capaci t ies of exist ing ref ineries , additional 
57 exploration so fear ref ining, 
capacity of refining i s on*' of the raeaaires to scale 
the development of downstream operations. Refining capacity of 
iOiwait has achieved progress with the rapid s tr ides . I t was e s t i -
mated at 4,55,000 barrels of o i l per day in 1970. In 1985, the 
c^^acity was estimated at 0.6 millicm barrels per day of which 
CO 
0.08 to 0 ,1 rnilliaa barrels per day consumed locally."* TSnxs, 
the inprovanent in the capacity of refining Kqpport the development 
of overall o i l industry. 
Petrochemical Industry t 
The petrocheniicai industry in Kuwait i s focussed on the 
production of fert i l i s sers . Q^ble shows an increasing production 
trend which i s one of the outstanding features of the downstream 
operations. Amaog f e r t i l i z e r s , urea and Apmonia have registered 
I 
57. El-MallaJch, Ragaei and Atta, Jacob K,, Cp. c i t . , p.26. 
53, MERI REPORT t Iftawait, l985j croom »lro,London, p.74, 
1 4 ^ 
a remarkable growth i n their productions. The production of urea 
increaBSd by 309,1 per cent frora 162,3 thousand tons in 1970 to 
664 thousand tons in 1978. It remained in an upward trend tlr u ihout 
the period baring in 1974 and 1976» in which i t declined marginally, 
Ou-l{>ut of Apsnonia and urea declined from 5,23,000 tons and 6,64,000 
tons in 1978 to 3,57,000 tens and 5,49,000 tons daring 1983-84 
59 respectively. I t was a decrease in production of Amnonia and urea 
by 31,7 per cent and 17,3 per cent reepectively, over the year 1978. 
sa les of iUinicmia also declined to 58,000 tons in 1983-84, ccmpared 
to 96,000 tons In 1982-83. Owing to the sluggishness in the 
demand for sulphuric Acid, i t s sa les declined from 4,050 tons 
in 1982-83 to 3,650 tons in 1983-84,^-^ Production of Chlorine, 
Caustic soda anrl i^ l t , marginally improved from 34,000 tons in 
1982-83 to 38,000 tons in 1983-84.^^. The production of f e r t i l i z e r s 
declined in 1983-84 from their previous marHs due to the continued 
shortage of natural gas supply. 
59 MEES t 28t27, p. D-3. 
^« Ib id . , p . I>-3. 
^^ « i b i d . , p , I>.3, 
62. i b i d . , p. D-3 
1 ' •• 
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NatoraX Gas t 
produKstlon of natural gas in Kuwait i s c lose ly associated 
with the production of o i l . Variations in the rate of production 
of o i l affect the rate of production of natured gas. As i t s c lose 
association with the production of o i l , the production of natural 
gas also fluctuated during seventies, Siniultaneously« the produc-
tion of o i l and gas \mnt high in 1979 when the production of gas 
vas estimated at 647.8 b i l l i o n cubic f ee t where as the production 
of o i l peaked at l 2 o i , 6 mill ion barrels i n the sarae year, with 
the gradual decline of o i l production, the prodjction of natural 
gas alst) declined, Zt decreased front 647,8 b i l l i o n cubic fee t 
to in 1972 to 382,4 b i l l i o n cubic fee t in 1975, by about 41 per cent 
Thereafter the production improved by 3,45 pec cent in 1976, I t 
further improved from 395,« b i l l i o n cubic f ee t in 1976 to 960,4 
b i l l ion cubic f ee t in 1979 baring in 1977, when i t plunged to 
362,6 b i l l i o n cubic f e e t , 
m 1979, Kuwait's ratural gas reserves were estimated at 
33,800 b i l l i o n cubic f e e t . * With th is figure, Kuwait remained at 
fourth highest plaoe among the Arab countries in OPEC after Algeria, 
64 Saudi Arabia and Qatar. in th i s way, the annual natural gas 
production varied according to the changes in crude o i l production 
I t f e l l by 55.2 per cent from 460,4 b i l l i on cubic fee t in 1979 
63. F.M.Ai Arab world Fi le i NO. 1610i 1 OUne, 1980, p . l l -Klo . 
64, ib id . , p, l l -K10. 
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PRCPUCTION j^D g m i z y r i f f OF NAauRJtt. QK& 
Year production % change U t i l i s a t i o n % t o production 
1969 513.7 180,9 
1970 570.4 188,0 33 
1971 643.7 227.5 35,3 
1972 647.8 246.8 3 8 . 1 
1373 581 .1 265,1 4 5 , 6 
1974 466.9 251.4 53.8 
1975 382.4 226.0 59.5 
1976 395.6 243.8 61,6 
1977 362,6 245,3 67 .6 
1978 392,8 242.8 61,8 
1979 460.4 334,4 72.7 
1980 310.1 260.0 83 .8 
1981 223.8 196,4 87 ,7 
1982 162.7 145,9 89 .6 
1983 191,9 170,8 89 ,0 
1984 205,4 183,4 89 .2 
1985 205.9 178,9 86 .8 
so\u:ce t ( i ) centra l Bank of Kavait t Economic Report, 
1969-79, p . 153, 
( i l )Centra l Bank of Kuwait f Economic Report, 1986, 
•vol. 13, K c . l , p . 2 4 . 
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t o 205,9 b i l l i o n cubic f e e t in 1985, The s ign i f i can t fea ture 
of the na tu ra l gas jsector i s , the r a t e of i t s u t i l i z a t i o n in 
Kuwait, The u t i l i s a t i c m of na tu ra l gas in i t s t o t a l production 
was merely 33 per cent in 1970 which tremendously increased to 
89,6 per cent in 1982, the rea f t e r , i t dcscline t o 86.8 pe r cent 
i n 1985, By the u t i l i z a t i o n point of view, 1982 was observed as 
peak year , "Bhiere has been a continuous r i s e in the t rend of 
u t i l i z a t i o n throughout the period frcan 1970 t o 1985 baring a 
marginal dec l ines i n 1983 and 1985, The overa l l s i t ua t ion i n d i -
ca t e s the cc^acity of Kuwait t o absccb raxch of the quant i ty of 
na tura l gas, produced^ for the development of i t s o i l indust ry , 
Trana^ortaticai of Oil and Gas % 
By the object of t ranspor ta t ion of o i l , i t s products and 
l i g a i : i e d petroleum gas, Kuwait, founded "Kuwait Oil Tanker 
Corapany (KOTC), in 1957, with an i n i t i a l c ap i t a l of KD 13,288,095 
65 QED 13,2 mil l ion) by p r i v a t e Kuwaiti i n t e r e s t s . I t i s an oldest 
Arsib Maritime petroleum Transport Coicpany (AMPTC), The c a p i t a l 
were ra i sed by 95.18 per cent t o JfSs 25,936,605 (KD 25,9 mill ion) 
in 1976, of v?hich Kuwaiti government held a shares of 49 per cent 
Of about 3,45 mi l l ion , m 1974, Kuwait purchased a Methane 
Tanker froni French J.a C io t a t , The KCTC was na t iona l i sed in the 
^^« L-:^'.H„i^f^ world U l e i No, 1634, 9 July, 1980, P III-K13. 
66, i b i d . , p . l l l - K13 
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suraraer of 1979, r a i s i n g i t s c a p i t a l t o KD 200 m i l l i o n . Thus 
KOTC became 100 p e r c e n t government owned coinpany as had Kuwait 
Petroleum c o r p o r a t i o n <KPC), Jftetro-chanical i n d u s t r y cospany 
(PIC) and Kuwait N a t i o n a l Petroletiiii corapany (»IPC). The gwpreme 
6*7 
pe t ro leum counc i l assun©d t h e t h e r o l e of g e n e r a l assembly. 
KOTC coi tpr ised t o t a l 5 t a n k e r s In 1969,6 i n 1970#7 i n 1975,8 i n 
1976, 10 i n 1977 and 12 i n 1979 w i t h a t o t a l e s t i m a t e d e d a c i t y 
of 585 thousand m e t r i c t o n s in 1969 which i n c r e a s e d to 2310,000 
Kg 
rae t r ic t o n s i n 1979, The t o t a l number of v e s s e l s i n c r e a s e d to 
18 in 1980, a£ whdtch 14 v e s s e l s were crude o i l and 4 LPG 
69 
c a r r i e r s . 
L a t e r i n 1980, KOTC was merged w i t h Kawait Petroleum 
70 Corporat ion b u t r e t a i n e d a s an autonomous body. I t c o n s i s t e d i t s 
t anke r f l fee t s which a s on Janaary 1,1980 ccanposed of t h e v e s s e l s 
a s f o l l o w s . '^ 
67 , Meri Repor t i a i w a i t , 1985, croom Helm, Pennsylvania , 
(U.S .A. ) , P . 7 4 . 
68, C e n t r a l Bank of Kuwait i Ecoptaaic Repor t , l 9 6 9 - 7 9 , p , 4 l , 
^^» Meri Repor t t Kuwait; Op, c i t ^ , p , 7 4 . 
7 0 . F.M.A., NO, 1634 , , QP, d t . . I l l - K-13. 
7 1 . i b i d . , p . I l l - K13. 
I'h) 
o i l Tanker F l e e t s t 
CCttde Oil Tankers s 
Warbah - capacity 60,190 dead weight tannage (Noventoer, 1964) 
Al-sabblyah 
Al-jwrabiyah 
Al-Badiah 
Al-Andalus 
Al-Raudhatain 
Al-Riqqah 
Al-Faiha 
60# 188 dead weight tonnsige 
208, 907 dead weight tonnage 
208,777 dead weight tonnage 
357,230 dead weight tonnage 
316,379 dead weight tonnage 
395,000 dead weight tonnage 
261,000 dead weight tonnage 
(1965) 
(1969) 
(1970) 
(1975) 
(1976) 
(1977) 
(1977) 
Total capacity In e a r l y 1980 was 18,67,671 dead weight tonnage. 
In 1980, KOTC signed an agreeiaent with two Japanese 
Shipyards to construct four o i l teoakers of 80,000 dead weight 
tonnage c s^ac i ty each^ 
Oil Products F l e e t t 
I t conposed of 19 chartered vesaB3,s of the e d a c i t y of 
11,53,000 dead weight tonnage i n 1976, 
L iqui f i ed petroleum Gas F l e e t s 
KOTC cons i s t ed of the fo l lowing v e s s e l s in i t s LPG f l e e t s 
Gas al^IQiwait - capacity - 71650 (March 1978) 
Gas Burgan - capacity - 71650 (1979) 
Gas al^Ahmadi - capacity - 71650 (septerriber 1979) 
Gas al-Mlnaquish - e d a c i t y - 71650 (December 1979) 
7 I I 
Since the sales of o i l products izicreased in the vocid 
market^ l^wait raised i t s prodact tankers* capacity to 2.5 ndllion 
72 dead weight tonnage (dwt) in 1981. 
Hi 1985, KOnc cocprised a total of 23 tankers which 
transported 80 per cent of i t s L.P.G production, 37 per cent of 
73 i t s petroleum products and 18 per cent of i t s crude oi^. Oat 
of 23 tankers, there were 7 crude o i l carriers, 15 (MSPC) Medium 
s ize o i l product Carriers of 8,000 dead weight tcxinage to 28,000 
dead weight tcwmage capacity and a (VCPC) Vsacy l<a;cge product 
74 Carrier "al-Funtas* of 285,502 dead weight tonnage capacity. 
By establishing KOTC, Kuwait has made a tremendous effort 
to anchor a tanker f i l e t in the Oulf to transport i t s main source 
of revenue, KOTC has put Kuwait on top among Arab Petrol aum 
Escorting countries in their l ine of transport of o i l cUid i t s 
products through sea route. 
Hence, in the l ine of i t s downstream operations, Kuwait has 
made i t s posit ion strong enough as a inbstantial producer and 
esiporter of o i l products and LPG within a short ^an of time. Kuwait 
72* MERI REPORT I Kuwait,, 1985, Op. c i t . , p ,74. 
73, MBES I 28t27, 1985, p. D-3 
MEES I 28i 44; 1985, p. A»-5, 
increais«d i t s refined o i l production £rran 147,5 million barrel in 
1970 to to 206,7 b i l l i o n barrel in 1985, I t s e:^>ort of refined 
prodmcts juraped frcxn 14,8 mill ion barrels in 1970 to 170,6 million 
barrel in 1985, I t has also achieved success in the ut i l i zat ion 
of natMxal gas which iinproved from 33 per cent of i t s total produc-
tion of 570,4 b i l l i o n cubic f ee t in 1970 to 86,8 per cent of 
205,941 b i l U c n cubic f e e t in 1985. 
In the l i n e of production of i t s petro-chemicals and f e r t i -
li20rs« Kuwait has got a better concentration of consumers. So 
many new plants have been established and a number of foreign 
investmoDts have also been made through which the government of 
Kuwait earned a l o t and bettered i t s econony, 
KOTC i s caie of the most encouraging l i n e which gave a boost 
to the economy of Kuwait, ^ e nunteer of ve s se l s have increa»ed 
from 6 to 23 within 15 years period, 
Thus« with these concrete evidoices, i t seems easy to 
measure the development of Kuwait in the l ine of i t s downstream 
operations. 
(vi) Fut\u:e proipects t 
The future prospects of o i l industry in Kuwait can be 
well judged by having a cursory look at i t s past developments, 
Kyiwaiti o i l indkistry has attained the present stage of development 
n4 
by gone through two main »tages, 'She f i r s t stage re f l ec t s i t s 
gxovth since the establishnent further added v i th raany insta.-
Uatioxis such as of ref iner ies and terraLnals, and formation of 
OPEC and OAPEC. In the f i r s t stage, the production of o i l 
inprovefi treanendously from 5,9 million barrels in 1946 to i t s peak 
1201,6 mill ion barrels in 1972. Price daring t h i s entire period 
remained below $ 2 / barrel but were checked from declining below 
$ 1,59/barrel, The goveimraent always kept gaining on revenues, 
f i r s t due to the loosing grcjund by the operating o i l Companies 
after the formation of OPEC and seemely oving to the increasing 
proddctioB, lEhe capacity of ref ineries and tanker f l e e t s were 
inproved and, th i s , the e^qport of o i l too . But the big changes 
occurrc»d after 1972 wlien a strong conservationist po l icy was 
adopted and rhe production of o i l began to decl ine. 
Drastic change in o i l prices and revesmes re f l ec t s fantastic 
develojMnents achieved by Kuwait o i l industry, iStm share of o i l 
sector i n the G,D,P, increased from 60,3 per cent in 1970 to 
79,2 per cent in 1974, "She ncn o i l sectors v;ere also developed 
beccOise of the inf lux of o i l revenues. 
Therefore, Kuwait has experienced an Increase in the 
growth of her econcny. Despite a big amount of imports the 
baiaace of trade due to the greater exports remained favourable. 
On the bas i s of a l l the past experience&» present situation 
of o i l in the world market and the growing interest of super powers 
in th i s region and continuing Iran*Iraq and Arab-Israel weu: 
s i tuation r e f l e c t the blurred picture of o i l prospects. The 
suddon drop in the prices in 1986 and then again their recovery 
and present scale highlight the prediction of better future 
p r o t e c t s of o i l industries . 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
1 ^ ' i 
C O N C L U S I O K 
lAie aims of th i s chapter i s not only llrnlted to suinrnexlzt 
the @:itlre stud^ but also to highlight the sal ient features of 
the Oil indastry, i t s problems and prospects, and significance in 
tiie economy. It has been eiiphasised throughout the study tl:^t 
the econcnty of Kuiwait i s heavily d^endent vtpcm i t s o i l sector. 
OSie Kawaiti eooncxny has achieved a r^^id eccmcxnic growth since 
the disoovery of o i l and the o i l sector plays a doroinant role in 
augmenting the rooaaining sectors of the economy, 
The study c learly reveals that thB o i l concession agreement 
vas the outcome of a long-drawn negotiations between the sheikh 
of Kuwait and Bri t i sh and American Gil companies Jointly . British 
were the prime mover of t h i s picture who had i n i t i a t e d to incl ine 
towards KXmait by signing a treaty in 1899. Kuwait having 
geographically and s trateg ica l ly strong posit ion attracted not 
only Bri t i sh but other powers also. Diappeition of i t s vast 
o i l resources magnetised Maeaclcaxis a lso who, later , became equal 
and jo in t shareholder of Hawalt Oil Company with Brit ish as their 
counteipart, !Ihe f i r s t Kuwait Oil concession was signed in 1934 
between Kuwait on the one side and B r l t i i ^ and American Oil 
Ccanpanies jo int ly on the other, rAie eaoploration proved fruit ful 
in 1938 with the upstream of o i l in the Burgan area of Kuwait 
which eaatirely changed the fate of the state and desfelned i t with 
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vast o i l and gas xesources. 
The study highlights the major developments of o i l industry 
as by dividing the « i t i r e l i f e lepan into two parts . The f i r s t 
half covers the period frcm 1938 to the year 1969, in which Kuwait 
o i l indistry remained mostly under the stronghold of the operating 
oonpanies. Thotagh, o i l was f i r s t strucK in 1938 but due to the 
outbreak of world war XI, the e9q>ansion of o i l industry could be 
made possible only since 1946 with the delivery of f i r s t o i l 
shipment for exports, Bi the f i r s t half, prior to the formation 
of OPEC, the operating Majors were the sole determinants of level 
of producticai, i t s distribution and price . They Ic^t the price of 
o i l very low that they could s e l l i t to their parent countries 
without putting any burden upon them, d l was exploited in Kuwait 
and sent to the countries concerned with the coispanies. 'ffnXm 
situation stressed the host governments to remove the control of 
Majacs from their own resources and f i n a l l y the decision of for-
mation of OPEC was taken i n 1960, QPSC was the resu l t of over 
e}q>lQitatiaQ of prodadLng coimtries and i t ultimately relieved 
them from the web of M^OTB. Most of the areas were relinquished 
and control of Majors over t l» supply of cd.1 and i t s price redaced 
to minimum. Upto 1969, Kuwait o i l industry did not f lourish to j 
the extent to which i t esqpanded therea£ter. Because \^pto the \ 
formation of CPEC and QiU?EC, the control of production of o i l , | 
i 
its prices and distribution wa» entirely in the hands of operating I 
i 
company, Fawait did not even have its sovereignty over the area 
under concession until it was relinquished by the Company, 
|>rockiCtiaii of o i l wa», howeirer, kept accselerating by the company 
as i t remained in an upward trend right from the year 194 §. I t 
began to increase from 5.9 mill ion barrels in the same year and 
reached i t s peak at 1201,6 million barrels in 1972 baring s l ight 
fluctuations in the average daily pi»duction meanwhile. Revenues 
to the government which were estimated $ 4 6 5 , 2 mill ion in i960 
increased with slow pace as reached $ 895,1 mill ion in 1971. I t 
was die to the low o i l prices which remained below $ 1,59 pa: 
barrel t i l l 1970. Escort of o i l also increased from 608 million 
barrels in i960 to 990 million barrels in 1969, 
In the secind half which began from 1969 to 1985, o i l 
industry developed rapidly. The production of o i l peaked in 1972 
but -aiereaf ter i t declined owing to the adoption of conservationist 
policy by Kawait. Trice of o i l increased manifolds which in tuzn 
increased the revenues to the government. In the second phase, 
the production of o i l began 1K> decline as fiAurinked from i t s peak 
1201,6 million baan»ls in 1972 to i t s lowest figure 299,3 million 
barrels in 1982 thereafter i t again inproved to 3 68.6 million 
barrels in 1985. The exports of o i l and revenues also inproved 
at an accelerating sca le , QLl exports which brought about KD 527 
million to the country in 1969 iLaereaaed to i t s highest figure 
KD 4960,8 million in 1980 and k ^ t the trade balance in country's 
favour. But afterward ±t declined to KD 2847,7 ralllicn in 1985 
with low variations as a resulr of o i l glut, economic recession 
prevailing in the industrial countries and low world o i l d«nand. 
To sum up. Oil by far the b a s l e fac tor of production 
in modem Kuwaiti eeonoxny s t i l l domln^^tes the cent ra l f igure and 
t h i s aector con t r ihu tes more than 505^  of the G,D,P. and above 90 per 
cent of the t o t a l e3<ports eamings4 Oil being a ncn-rene^^able 
source, i t s production declining curve has not e:»^ressed an 
increas ing marginal cos t bu t i n a steady f a l l in the r a t e of annual 
production ind ica t ing a r a the r conserva t ion is t po l i cy . Oil 
xfavenues which dominates the pub l ic account have general ly kept 
pace with the grvwth of o i l e apo r t s . The r a t e of increase does 
no t depend e n t i r e l y oo o i l production bu t i s influenced by the 
p rev i l i ng world o i l p r i c e s , Brice of Kuwaiti o i l i s not deter -
mined only by the government i t s e l f but i t i s the r e s u l t of the 
decision taken by OPEC and the supply and demand s i tua t ion in 
the world o i l market, The e d a c i t y of Kuwaiti economy to absorb 
rouch of i t s o i l revenues i s l imited mainly dAe to the asnall sisse 
of the country, i t s population and market. Snail sisse of pop\>-
latioci does not alone determine the market s i z e , lliough, the 
o i l indus t ry has a l so a l imi ted capacity to absorb the manpower 
t u t i t c rea tes enployiaent in the other sec to r s of the economy. 
However, the non-oi l sec tor i s progressing shoulder to shoulder 
with o i l sector but u l t ima te ly has to depend on i t , within t h i s 
short ispan of time however, the IQuwaiti economy has transformed 
i t s e l f from the old modes to the modem ones, bu t the process 
towards d ive r s i f i ca t ion i s slow, Agriculture i s s t i l l lagging 
sector and c!ontribut»s an i n s i g n i f i c a n t share in the G,D,P. The 
government of the other non-oil s ec to r s depend upon the progress 
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of o i l sector. Therefore, the o i l seetor h»s a pdsl t lve Influence 
on the eeonomy. I t has increased aggregate demand of the country 
for eaqports. 
Tftie cdl industry vhich had suddenly met the situation facing 
declining world o i l pr ices and continued economic slowdotm soon 
recovered the satisfactory stage, Mbrld o i l demand decreased 
tremendously v i t h a result of prevailing necessary trend in most 
of the industrial countries had decelerated the o i l denand. other 
factors due to vrhich o i l indastxy had to face a decreasing o i l 
supply vere the discovery o£ o i l in the North-sea and ALaika and 
mbst i tat ion of other sources of energy, i « e , , neuclear and solar 
e t c . But xiltimately the hard days gone away and the odUL indistry 
cmce again got a chance of progress and expansicm. 
Although Other sources of energy bafve been indaeed in 
utilissatLon thoxxgh the future, of o i l , due to i t s low cost of 
production and vast reserves^ i s not so Meak, 
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